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Abstract: (170 words) 
The aim of this research is to expand the framework of contemporary conflict 
resolution by constructing a complementary relationship between Western 
epistemologies and a Buddhist epistemology. Despite its evolution and development 
through self-reflexivity and self-critique, contemporary conflict resolution established 
upon Western epistemologies has confined the understanding of human mind to 
social/cultural orientations and left a comprehensive and qualitative analysis of the 
potential of individual human mind underdeveloped. Buddhist epistemology, the 
central theme of which is to address human suffering that is mainly psychological and 
subjective, makes a critical analysis of human subjectivity in terms of how it can be 
become a root cause of suffering including conflict and how it can be addressed by 
gaining an insight into the social/cultural construction of human subjectivity. The 
argument of the thesis is that when a socially/culturally-oriented view of human mind 
and a deeper and more profound view of human mind are combined together, we can 
engage in a qualitatively richer and deeper analysis of the psychological and 
subjective dynamics of conflict resolution.  
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Introduction  
Personal motive for research 
As the title of this dissertation shows, my research is a critical and creative analysis to 
explore how Buddhist philosophy can contribute to contemporary conflict resolution, 
which is established upon Western philosophies. The motive that has made me choose 
this topic originates in my experience in the postgraduate course in conflict resolution 
at the Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford from September 
2000 to September 2001. The study in Bradford enlightened me by broadening my 
views on conflict, violence and peace. By taking lectures and working on essays and 
my dissertation, I came to be aware of the diversity and profundity of the meanings of 
conflict, violence and peace: I was conscientized to know that we can build multiple 
meanings and understandings of conflict, violence and peace and consequently studied 
various approaches for that purpose. 
 
However, while I enjoyed the study and learned a lot, I came to realize one thing that 
could be seen commonly throughout lectures and studies in peace studies. That is, 
contemporary peace studies including conflict resolution has been established upon 
predominantly Western philosophies and values. The proliferation of academic 
programs of peace studies at postgraduate and undergraduate level and the diffusion of 
ideas of conflict resolution beyond Western society and academia can be 
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acknowledged as a clear testament that peace studies and peace research have gained 
currency as a global discourse. Further, the scourges of war, conflict and violence of 
many kinds have blighted people’s lives around the globe. So, studying violence, 
conflict and peace is not a matter exclusively for Western society. Rather, it is a 
universal human theme, in which various actors with different and diverse cultural, 
racial and religious backgrounds at least have the potential to communicate, appreciate 
and cooperate with each other to examine and transform the world filled with violence 
and conflict into a peaceful and harmonious one. Moreover, as it is a universal human 
agenda, it is assumed that not only Western philosophies or wisdom but also 
non-Western philosophies or insight can make an invaluable contribution to studies of 
conflict and peace.  
 
Nevertheless, contemporary conflict resolution has been framed by mainly Western 
philosophies and values: while the conflict resolution enterprise has come to be 
accepted as a global subject, its academic, intellectual and practical approaches are 
still within a purview of Western views. We are consciously or unconsciously 
examining peace and conflict within a Western philosophical framework and this 
disproportionate status quo of conflict resolution made me decide to explore the 
potential of a Buddhist philosophy in contemporary conflict resolution.  
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The reason I have selected Buddhism as my research topic is that, above all, I am a 
Buddhist. Although I am neither a Buddhist monk nor a Buddhist scholar, through the 
study of Buddhism under the guidance of personal Buddhist master, I came to have 
confidence in the potential of a Buddhist contribution to conflict resolution. As will be 
elaborated in detail in the later chapters, the aim of Buddhist philosophy is not to  
indulge in metaphysical speculations about universe, such as whether there is a 
beginning and end of the world, whether there is an afterlife or whether there is a 
reincarnation, although it does not necessarily deny those metaphysical arguments 
themselves. Rather, its central theme has always remained the same since the Buddha, 
Gautama, the founder of Buddhism: to address problems and troubles facing human 
beings, which inevitably include violence and conflict, on a deep and profound level, 
by gaining an insight into a root cause of them. This essential character of a Buddhist 
philosophy, I believe, can assume a valuable role in enriching contemporary conflict 
resolution conventionally based upon Western philosophies. 
 
The aim of this dissertation 
The aim of this dissertation is to make an epistemological critique of contemporary 
conflict resolution and explore how a Buddhist epistemology can complement 
limitations revealed through the critique. As can be broadly acknowledged, 
contemporary conflict resolution has been established and rested upon Western 
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epistemologies, which is inevitable given that peace research as an academic 
discipline and field of praxis was created and has been developed in the USA and 
Western Europe.1  
 
Why should a Buddhist epistemology be introduced into contemporary conflict 
resolution despite its evolution and development through self-critique and 
self-reflexivity? The principal reason is Western conflict resolution’s understanding on 
human mind. Despite its evolution and expansion, contemporary conflict resolution 
founded upon Western epistemologies has confined human mind to social or cultural 
orientation and subsequently underdeveloped qualitative analysis on the potential of 
human mind, which can be complemented by a Buddhist epistemology. Buddhist 
epistemology, the central theme of which is to address human suffering that is mainly 
psychological and subjective,2 makes a critical analysis of human subjectivity in 
terms of how it causes trouble including conflict and how it can be addressed. Put 
differently, Buddhist epistemology has a deep and comprehensive understanding of 
the human mind, which differs from Western epistemological approaches, particularly 
as its principal focus is on the causes of human delusion and suffering.  
 
                                                  
1 Chapter one provides an analysis of essential characters of peace research and how 
was established as an academic discipline.  
2 Chapters four and five provide a detailed analysis on human suffering from a 
Buddhist perspective.  
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However, what must be remarked here is that although its central subject is a deep and 
holistic study of human mind, Buddhist epistemology does not deny socially and 
culturally oriented mind itself. What it claims is that although socially and culturally 
oriented mind is essential for us, it is not a full picture of human mind. Rather, there is 
a deeper and broader dimension of mind, which enables us to engage in qualitative 
critique of social and cultural dimension of mind. In short, when both social and 
cultural dimension and non-social and cultural dimension of mind are acknowledged, 
we can have a qualitatively richer and deeper view on human mind, which could make 
a valuable contribution to the conflict resolution enterprise.  
 
Therefore, this dissertation does not purport to negate contemporary conflict 
resolution based upon Western epistemologies and replace it with one founded upon a 
Buddhist epistemology. Rather, by exploring a complementary relationship between 
them, this dissertation seeks to enrich qualitatively Western conflict resolution itself 
and expand its framework. Their complementary relationship will enrich our 
understanding of dynamics of human mind in conflict and conflict resolution.  
 
Rationale for the research 
As we can see from the above outline, two themes constitute the research: an 
epistemological analysis of contemporary conflict resolution; and the construction of a 
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complementary relationship between Western epistemologies and a Buddhist 
epistemology within Western conflict resolution. Why should these two themes be 
examined? How can we establish a rationale for the research? 
 
Why should an epistemological analysis of contemporary conflict resolution be 
made? 
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that investigates the nature of knowledge, 
that is, what can be counted as valid knowledge and how it can be obtained (Rogers, 
2003). We do not normally think and act inconsistently or haphazardly: rather, we 
understand and approach the phenomenal world according to a certain theoretical 
perspective. Steans and Pettiford define theoretical perspective as “an attempt to 
construct a coherent explanation for a certain phenomenon, which in turn rests upon a 
wider belief system, or upon certain basic assumptions, about the nature of the world” 
(2001: 7). Further, the theoretical perspectives that shape the way we understand and 
act in our phenomenal world are founded upon our epistemological assumptions.3 Put 
another way, epistemology is a foundation that makes any theoretical viewpoint 
coherent and logical as it underpins the validity of methods and criteria to produce 
reliable and verifiable knowledge (Chia, 2002). Without epistemological framework it 
                                                  
3 Regarding the details on the relationship between theory and epistemology, Gray’s 
Doing Research in the Real World (2004) would be very useful and helpful.  
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is almost impossible to build theory and engage in praxis.  
 
Contemporary conflict resolution is not an exception. As we can see, there are 
varieties of theoretical perspectives or views of conflict resolution and applied 
approaches. However, there is one subject that seems to have been underdeveloped in 
the conflict resolution enterprise, that is, a systematic epistemological analysis of 
contemporary conflict resolution. While many actors have contributed to 
contemporary conflict resolution in terms of the development of theories and 
approaches to praxis, a deeper analysis of what kinds of epistemologies have 
constituted contemporary conflict resolution, what limitations or problems those 
epistemologies have faced and how they can be overcome seems to have been 
underdeveloped. Truly, there are some literatures that make an epistemological 
examination of contemporary conflict resolution. Fisher (1990), Rothman (1992) and 
Vayrynen (2001) are good examples. However, as they are focusing on a particular 
epistemological assumption for their analysis, they do not provide us with a 
systematic understanding of the epistemological contribution to contemporary conflict 
resolution. Based upon this present circumstance, this dissertation adds a 
supplementary analysis to contemporary conflict resolution by engaging in a 
systematic epistemological analysis. However, this research does not negate or 
downplay the above works: rather, by incorporating them into a broader and more 
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organized epistemological analysis, we will be able to gain a comprehensive and 
thorough understanding of the relationship between epistemology and conflict 
resolution.  
 
What should be remarked is that an epistemological examination is not irrelevant to 
peace research including conflict resolution that is essentially a praxis-oriented 
academic discipline. Rather, since epistemology bears mightily on the way we 
construct theoretical standpoints and put them into practice, an epistemological 
investigation of conflict resolution implies a deeper and fundamental analysis of 
theory and praxis of conflict resolution and accordingly can make a profound 
contribution to conflict resolution discourse. It might be highly difficult to be 
conscious of our epistemological assumptions as they tend to be tacit. However, when 
we are more highly and explicitly cognizant of our epistemological framework 
underneath our theoretical perspectives and practices (and the alternative 
epistemological frameworks and the theoretical and praxis implications of those 
alternatives), we could gain a broader range and creativity in critiquing existing 
approaches to conflict resolution and exploring new ones.  
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Why should Western conflict resolution and a Buddhist epistemology construct a 
complementary relationship? 
In contemporary conflict resolution, an inquiry into the potential of a complementary 
relationship between Western epistemologies and non-Western epistemologies 
including a Buddhist epistemology seems to have been left out as part of the main 
subjects. Truly, there was a sympathizer for Buddhism in Western peace research 
circle. Adam Curle, who was the founder of the Department of Peace Studies of the 
University of Bradford, is the best figure. As broadly accepted, he made a huge 
contribution to conflict resolution and worked on deep psychology and spirituality and 
peace in his later works.4 He also issued an article on Buddhism and peace in 1998. 
However, while the article elaborated well on the relationship between violence and 
peace and Buddhist teachings, a comparative analysis with Western views and 
exploration of the combined approach was underdeveloped.  
 
There are even Buddhist contributions to the study of violence, conflict and peace. 
Rothberg (1992), McConnell (1995) and Der-lan (2006) are clear examples. They 
provide us with detailed examinations on how Buddhism understands violence, peace 
or approaches to conflict resolution. However, as they have analyzed them only within 
a purview of Buddhist doctrines, no combined approach with Western epistemologies 
                                                  
4 To Tame the Hydra: Undermining the culture of violence (1999) would be a good 
instance.   
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has been explored: while both Western peace research circles and Buddhist circles 
have developed studies of violence, conflict and peace, they have done so in mutual 
isolation. This dissertation addresses this isolated circumstance and seeks to explore 
how contemporary conflict resolution can be reconceived and reframed when a 
Buddhist epistemology is introduced into the Western epistemologies that have shaped 
it. Both Buddhist doctrines and understandings of violence, conflict and peace and 
Western conflict resolution are founded upon distinctive epistemological foundations 
and when their epistemological assumptions are compared and their complementary 
relationship is established, we will be able to add fresh views to contemporary conflict 
resolution and expand the framework.  
 
There is one thing that should be mentioned before embarking on an exploration of a 
complementary relationship between Western epistemologies and a Buddhist 
epistemology to broaden the framework of Western conflict resolution. This 
dissertation employs ‘Buddhist epistemology’ as a generic term. As is well known, 
there are various branches and schools of Buddhism and each has built and developed 
its own distinct tradition and tenets. However, there is a certain commonality across 
all groups. That is the Four Noble Truths doctrine. As will be expounded later, the 
central theme of Buddhism since the Buddha, Gautama – the founder of Buddhism – 
is to attain liberation from suffering and the Four Noble Truths doctrine is the 
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foundation for the achievement. It is supposed that through the doctrine individuals 
can be empowered to understand the cause and nature of suffering, to know that the 
suffering can be overcome by their own efforts, and to acquire approaches to address 
suffering.  
 
This dissertation recognizes but does not focus on the diversity and distinctive 
character of each Buddhist branch and school. Instead, it claims that while each 
Buddhist group has advanced its own particular faith and principle, each is built and 
relies upon a common epistemological foundation, that is, a critical analysis of human 
mind in terms of how it creates suffering and how it can be overcome, the ultimate 
aim of which is to achieve serenity of mind. Therefore, the character of Buddhist 
epistemology discussed in this dissertation will be acknowledged as that which 
represents and runs through all Buddhist groups.  
 
Ramsbotham et al in their book Contemporary Conflict Resolution, which is 
incontrovertibly acknowledged as one of the prominent textbooks in the field of peace 
and conflict studies, makes a brief analysis of the new generation of conflict resolution. 
According to them, conflict resolution now falls into five generations5 and we are 
now in the fifth generation (2005). They foresee that this new generation “will come 
                                                  
5 Regarding each generation, see Ramsbotham et al (2005: 327).  
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from all parts of the world, and will draw from their own cultures in pushing shared 
human understanding of the costs of failure to manage conflict non-violently and of 
the benefits to be gained by strengthening non-violent conflict resolution capacity 
within and between societies” (2005: 329). While their hope for the new generation of 
conflict resolution should be respected, what must be explored is how we can give 
practical expression to what they suggest. Clearly, there are various approaches to that 
and the theme of this dissertation could be included as one of them.  
 
What Ramsbotham et al propose regarding the new generation can be interpreted as an 
assertion that different values or wisdom from around the globe should be appreciated 
and, if necessary, a complementary relationship between them should be explored. As 
it is almost impossible to establish a single conflict resolution approach, what we must 
do is to be open to views different from our own and be creative to keep producing 
dialectically built understandings of conflict and conflict resolution while appreciating 
existing ones and exploring a complementary relationship between different 
epistemologies. 
 
Structure of dissertation 
This dissertation consists of six chapters besides this introduction and the research 
implications. Further, those six chapters are divided into three sections – chapters one, 
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two and three as the first section, chapter four and five as the second section and 
chapter six as the third section – to advance the argument and achieve the main goal of 
the dissertation, that is, establishment of a complementary relationship between 
Western epistemologies and a Buddhist epistemology in contemporary conflict 
resolution and expansion of its framework.  
 
The aim of chapter one is to examine how contemporary conflict resolution has been 
developed as an intellectual discipline and field of praxis. This chapter consists of 
three parts. In the first part, a fundamental nature of peace research will be 
characterized. In the second part, contributions of two figures – Kenneth Boulding and 
Johan Galtung – to the foundation of peace research will be assessed. Following these 
examinations, in the third part, historical analysis of the development of contemporary 
conflict resolution will be made. The examination will be carried out according to the 
three phases of development. In the first phase, the work of John Burton will be 
investigated. Here, how his introduction of basic human needs theory into conflict 
resolution contributed to the development will be evaluated. In the second phase, the 
contribution of Edward Azar and social psychology will be examined. This stage looks 
into how Azar’s concept of protracted social conflict influenced conflict resolution and 
how social psychology developed psychological and subjective dynamics of conflict 
and conflict resolution. The third phase deals with the development of conflict 
 14
resolution in the post-Cold War era. In this phase, four subjects – culture and conflict 
resolution, peace building from below, emergence of the concept of conflict 
transformation and reconciliation and justice – will be analyzed.  
 
Following the historical analysis of conflict resolution, the purpose of chapter two is 
to map out a framework of contemporary conflict resolution. What must be remarked 
when we study conflict resolution is that development of conflict resolution as an 
intellectual discipline and field of practice never concludes: it keeps evolving and 
expanding its sphere. For instance, basic human needs theory, Azar’s protracted social 
conflict, and social psychological analysis of intergroup dynamics, all of which were 
introduced into conflict resolution decades ago, through dialectical and critical review, 
have been modified and reframed to be applied to the contemporary era. In short, what 
is presented and examined in chapter one is in constant evolution to meet the demands 
of changing circumstances that surround the conflict resolution enterprise.  
 
The framework of contemporary conflict resolution is examined from five angles: the 
generally accepted constitutive elements of conflict resolution; the main actors in 
conflict and conflict resolution; dynamism of conflict; types of conflicts that have 
been prioritized for resolution; and dimensions of conflict. This comprehensive picture 
of contemporary conflict resolution will reveal two prominent features: the 
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proliferation of concepts, approaches, key terms, pivotal actors, and arenas of conflict 
resolution; and the diversity of approaches to conflict resolution, that is, that there is 
no single, universal or comprehensive way of conceiving and constructively 
addressing violent conflict or of making conflict resolution a matter of simple and 
objective analysis and the application of agreed procedures. This revelation produces 
further questions such as “What makes conflict resolution enterprise diverse?” and 
“Why are there various approaches to conflict resolution?” and these questions will 
eventually lead us to a more profound and fundamental consideration of conflict 
resolution, that is, its epistemological foundations. 
 
Having unearthed the importance of epistemological considerations of conflict 
resolution, chapter three engages in a critical analysis of the epistemological 
foundations of contemporary conflict resolution: a critical examination of Western 
epistemologies that have shaped it. The main theme of this chapter is, by critically 
analyzing contributions of Western epistemologies to the development of 
contemporary conflict resolution and limitations that they have encountered, to 
explore what kinds of epistemologies can overcome the limitations, which eventually 
suggests Buddhist epistemology as a prominent candidate.  
 
Since the Ancient Greek era, Western philosophy has evolved and expanded its 
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intellectual sphere, which gave rise to a variety of epistemologies. As it is impossible 
and beyond the scope of this dissertation to make a detailed analysis of each 
epistemological assumption, this chapter categorizes Western epistemologies into 
three types: objective epistemology; subjective epistemology; and critical 
epistemology. However, what must be taken note of here is that this classification has 
been done not to impair the significance and contribution of each Western 
epistemological viewpoint that has its own distinctive character. Rather, it has been 
done in order to enable us to engage in a systematic critique of Western 
epistemological foundations of contemporary conflict resolution more effectively and 
efficiently.  
 
This chapter falls into three parts. The first part investigates the characters of objective, 
subjective and critical epistemologies and how they have contributed to contemporary 
conflict resolution. The second part critiques them and uncovers limitations they face 
in resolving conflict. Here, the pinnacle of critique is the discovery that Western 
epistemologies underpinning contemporary conflict resolution have confined human 
mind exclusively to social and cultural orientation and subsequently underdeveloped a 
qualitative analysis of mind. Consequently, a qualitative exploration of the potential of 
individual mind has been underdeveloped in Western conflict resolution. Following 
this revelation, in the third part, what kinds of epistemologies can be added to 
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contemporary conflict resolution based upon Western epistemologies is explored and a 
Buddhist epistemology is proposed. It is posited that since the main theme of a 
Buddhist epistemology is a deeper and more holistic analysis of human mind, it can 
complement Western conflict resolution that centers on social and cultural orientation 
of human mind in approaching psychological and subjective dynamics in conflict and 
conflict resolution. What must be emphasized in suggesting a Buddhist epistemology 
is that the aim is not to deny or replace Western epistemologies and contemporary 
conflict resolution established upon them with Buddhist conflict resolution. Rather, by 
building a complementary relationship between Western epistemologies and a 
Buddhist epistemology, it is to enrich qualitatively contemporary conflict resolution 
per se and to open up the potential to expand its framework.  
 
Following the critical analysis of contemporary conflict resolution and Western 
epistemologies, the main theme of section two, that is, chapter four and five, is to 
make an in-depth analysis of a Buddhist epistemology. Chapter four presents an 
introduction to Buddhism. As readers of this dissertation are not necessarily Buddhists 
or those who are familiar with Buddhism, explaining basic features of Buddhism, 
especially the fundamental goal and foundational doctrine to achieve that goal is 
intended to be useful and helpful. Therefore, Four Noble Truths doctrine, which is 
shared commonly by all Buddhist schools and sects, will be expounded. Through the 
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Four Noble Truths doctrine, how Buddhism understands our phenomenal world, why 
human beings experience suffering in the phenomenal world and how we can tackle 
the suffering will be examined. After elucidation of the Four Noble Truths doctrine, an 
implication of the doctrine for Buddhist epistemology will be analyzed. It is exhibited 
that the implication is that human mind is the source of knowledge to realize liberation 
from suffering. From a Buddhist epistemological perspective, human mind can be 
both a cause of suffering or trouble including conflict and a key to overcoming 
suffering. Put differently, a Buddhist epistemology can be characterized as a critical 
analysis of human subjectivity that examines how human mind causes suffering and 
how it can be addressed.  
 
Following the introduction to Buddhism, chapter five provides an in-depth analysis of 
Buddhist epistemology. Firstly, a root cause of human suffering will be investigated. 
Especially, how “ignorance” or “avidya” in Sanskrit, which is recognized as the 
root-cause of suffering, gives rise to it and affects human mind will be examined. 
Then how ignorance can be addressed will be inquired into, which makes a study of 
three key elements or doctrines, that is, “dependent-arising” or “pratityasamutpada” in 
Sanskrit, “emptiness” or “sunyata” in Sanskrit and the Two Truths doctrine. The study 
will reveal that the key to overcoming human suffering caused by ignorance is to gain 
an insight into the nature of reality, more specifically, an insight into the nature of our 
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conceptual thought-constructions that shape our reality. This revelation will lead us to 
know that Buddhist epistemology can be characterized as an epistemology of 
epistemologies or a knowledge of knowledge of any sort. This means that, rather than 
advancing and holding certain distinctive knowledge, Buddhist epistemology takes a 
critical attitude toward all sources of knowledge. However, Buddhist epistemology 
characterized as a knowledge of knowledge of any kind does not negate knowledge or 
conceptual thought itself: rather, it claims that how knowledge or conceptual thought 
we hold to make sense of phenomenal world including ourselves is dealt with must be 
critically examined as it can cause suffering or trouble. Following the characterization 
of Buddhist epistemology as an epistemology of epistemologies, the ultimate state of 
mind in a Buddhist epistemology will be explored. Here, it will be explained that an 
ultimate aim of Buddhist epistemology is to attain a detached mind that has overcome 
an absolutization and extreme attachment to particular conceptual thoughts or views.  
 
Based upon the arguments in the first five chapters, chapter six, which is the 
intellectual crux of this dissertation, explores a complementary relationship between 
Western epistemologies and a Buddhist epistemology in contemporary conflict 
resolution. The main theme of this chapter is how a Buddhist epistemology that makes 
a deeper and more profoundly qualitative analysis of human mind can complement 
Western epistemologies that focus mainly on social and cultural orientation of human 
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mind in approaching conflict resolution.  
 
Firstly, a Buddhist epistemological contribution to the theoretical and conceptual 
development of contemporary conflict resolution will be examined. It will be argued 
that Buddhist epistemology has contributed to incorporating individual deep 
psychology into the core elements of conflict resolution. Of course, social psychology 
has made an invaluable contribution to the development of psychological and 
subjective dynamics of conflict and conflict resolution. However, what should be 
emphasized here is that the introduction of individual deep psychology into the centre 
stage of conflict resolution allows us to make a deeper and more fundamental analysis 
of psychological and subjective dynamics of conflict resolution, which enables us to 
critically examine how socially/culturally-oriented mind itself can become a root 
cause of conflict. Further, it will be also claimed that the introduction of individual 
deep psychology allows us to explore qualitative enhancement of the potential of 
individual agency in conflict resolution.  
 
Following the analysis of theoretical and conceptual development, how a 
complementary relationship between Western epistemologies and Buddhist 
epistemology can contribute to developing practical implications for contemporary 
conflict resolution will be explored. Firstly, more elaboration on socially and 
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culturally-oriented mind will be made. Here, as a generic term of socially and 
culturally-oriented mind, “conditioned mind” will be proposed, which can be defined 
as the mind that is oriented and trained by socially or culturally constructed views or 
conceptual thoughts to make sense of reality. It will be claimed that contemporary 
conflict resolution established upon Western epistemologies has centered on 
conditioned mind. In the second part, a critical analysis of the conditioned mind from 
a Buddhist epistemological perspective will be made. The critique of Western conflict 
resolution from a Buddhist epistemological viewpoint is that as it focuses on the 
conditionedness of mind, a deep and profound examination of a potential danger of 
the conditioned mind itself has been underdeveloped. As a result of the critique, the 
conception of “unconditioned mind,” which can be characterized as mind that has 
overcome an extreme attachment to a particular view or conceptual thought by gaining 
an insight into the nature of conceptual thought construction, will be proposed as an 
antidote to tackle a potential danger of the conditioned mind. However, what must be 
underlined is that the objective of proposing the unconditioned mind is not to negate 
the conditioned mind: it is to show that human mind has both a conditioned and an 
unconditioned nature; and when those two dimensions of mind are known, 
contemporary conflict resolution comes to be analyzed from the conditioned mind and 
the unconditioned mind viewpoints, which will enable us to approach contemporary 
conflict resolution with a fresh view and open up the possibility to expand its 
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framework.  
 
After critical examination of the conditioned mind and the unconditioned mind, key 
elements in psychological and subjective dynamics of contemporary conflict 
resolution – culture, social identity and critical attitude toward socially or culturally 
constructed human subjectivity – will be re-examined from both the conditioned mind 
and the unconditioned mind perspectives.  
 
Methodology 
This research is a library and text-based study, the methodology of which comprises 
critical reading, comparative analysis (within and between literatures) and 
philosophical analysis, especially with respect to epistemology. The approach is a 
philosophical critique of existing literatures. The main concern of philosophical 
analysis is to understand and question common ideas that we use in our lives without 
usually thinking about them (Nagel, 1987). Engagement in reflection on conceptual 
thoughts and beliefs that we normally employ in an unreflective use can offer us an 
opportunity to examine how thinkers in different periods and with distinct 
backgrounds construct views and beliefs. This frees us from being limited by the 
unquestioned assumptions of those around us (Thompson, 2000). By making 
ourselves aware of and questioning thoughts or views we generally take for granted, 
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philosophical analysis suggests new ways of looking at questions and new ways of 
expressing ideas (Thompson, 2000).  
 
Although several Buddhist texts are consulted and referenced in this dissertation, as 
the author of is not familiar with Chinese, Sanskrit or Tibetan, in which original texts 
were written, all of them are in English translations as referenced. There is one more 
thing that should be mentioned here regarding the analysis of Buddhism in the context 
of this dissertation. Although this research explores the potential of Buddhism to 
expand the framework of conflict resolution, its intellectual orientation is 
non-doctrinal. Although in  chapter 4, the doctrine of Four Noble Truths is analyzed, 
the main theme of this analysis is neither to show its superiority over other religious 
doctrines nor to impose it upon non-Buddhists. Rather, the central aim is to make a 
critical analysis of its epistemological standpoint and to explore how it can contribute 
to expanding the framework of contemporary conflict resolution, which can be 
appreciated by and applied to even those who are not acquainted with Buddhism.  
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Chapter One: History and evolution of Contemporary Conflict 
Resolution 
1-1 Genesis of Conflict Resolution 
1-1-1 Peace Research: What is Peace Research? How are peace research and  
conflict resolution related? 
According to Rogers and Ramsbotham (1999), it was in the years after World War 
Two that peace research, as a formal enterprise with its own institutions and 
professional journals, was constituted. One of the essential characteristics of peace 
research is the critical attitude towards traditional International Relations. Peace 
research came to the subject of trying to make the world better place with a set of 
methods and assumptions different from those of the traditional academic practitioners 
of International Relations (Roberts, 1991). Mack (1985) notes that in the first decade 
and a half after World War Two, Realism had been the dominant theory in the study of 
international relations,6as a result of which, peace research took the critical stance on 
Realism. Wallensteen argues that one of the roots of peace research is a constant battle 
with Machiavelli and his legacy in the study of war and peace (1988).7  
                                                  
6 Roberts defines realism as a view of the world that places emphasis on the 
importance of power politics, which stresses the inevitably competing elements in the 
interests of states. (1991).  
7 According to Wallensteen (1988), there are six basic ideas of Machiavelli: Violence is 
omnipresent and inevitable; Violence is instrumental for a successful reign of power, 
but it should be used with judgment; In politics, violence is the ultimate source of 
power: even if there are laws and popular support, control of military power will be 
the ultimate determinant; Conflicts are resolved through power and violence; The 
state and the government are the primary actors of importance; and The state is 
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Galtung held that peace research should be “directed towards the understanding of 
conditions that may prevent international and intergroup violence and conditions for 
furthering harmonious and creative relations between nations and other groups of 
people” (1975: 167), which shows that in peace research the state is not the only 
significant actor: rather, in peace research, non-state actors should be also included. 
Wallensteen maintains that peace researchers seek to survey the conditions that would 
make the attainment of peace possible (1988). Peace research is not simply interested 
in empirically understanding the existence of violence but also aspires to contribute to 
the improvement of the human condition (Wallensteen, 1988).8  
 
Jeong insists peace research should make an effort to transform a world filled with 
violence of any kind (1999). At the same time, he maintains that there are diverse 
views on how to do research on peace and war. How we define peace research leads to 
different implications for the nature, content and scope of theory as well as the 
methods of analysis (Jeong, 1999). So there is no one single meaning of peace: the 
plurality of the meanings of peace creates multiple perspectives on the research 
                                                                                                                                               
independent vis-à-vis other states. From these assumptions, it can be seen that the 
inevitability of violence and power and the centrality of the state are the key elements 
in Machiavellian world.  
8 According to Galtung (1975), one of the mistakes of scientific peace research was to 
put too much emphasis on empiricist methods. Jeong (1999) also claims that scientific 
approaches in peace research can ignore substantive problems that are not amenable 
to quantitative analysis.  
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agenda. 9  The diversity of approaches to peace implies that the adoption of 
interdisciplinary research is an important feature of peace research.10 However, 
Rogers and Ramsbotham also claim that while peace research has drawn from existing 
fields of study such as jurisprudence, philosophy, anthropology, politics and 
international relations, it has been distinct from them in its primary concern with 
issues of peace and conflict, its multi-disciplinarity, its holistic approach with 
quantitative and empirical methodologies and its normative commitment to inquiry 
into the conditions for non-violent social and political change (1999).  
 
As Mack notes, it may be almost impossible to define peace research in a way which 
can command wide consensus (1985); and, as Rogers and Ramsbotham hold, it is 
unrealistic to hope for a single peace research methodology or grand theory (1999). 
Nonetheless, a conspicuous feature of peace research, broadly defined, remains “a 
methodologically pluralistic community with emancipatory interest in transformative 
                                                  
9 Jeong (1999) for example, notes specific policy issues such as disarmament, 
peacekeeping, conflict resolution, preventative diplomacy, non-violent social change, 
development and environmental security are linked to peace research. Besides that, 
he says those issues are interconnected with globalization, identity formation, 
requirements for the satisfaction of basic human needs, regional developmentalism 
and civil society. The New Agenda for Peace Research edited by Jeong illustrates well 
that various people discuss peace issues from different angles.  
10 For instance, Mack (1985) notes that political science, sociology, social psychology, 
economics and rational choice theory took precedence in peace research over 
diplomatic history, international law and classical strategy.  
Roberts (1991) also states the methods and assumptions in peace research were from 
social anthropology, sociology, economics and psychology. Further, he suggests that 
there were high hopes that those various approaches could play an important role in 
solving major world problems.  
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possibilities for the improvement of human well-being as well as the prevention of 
violence” (Jeong, 1999: 6).  
 
While the criticism that peace research has no established and generally recognized 
methodology in research, nor guidelines or priorities in research is understandable, it 
can be also counter-argued that this is its very strength since its plurality in research 
methodology enables an expansion of the meaning of peace. As Tromp insists, reality 
keeps changing incessantly and the meaning of words describing reality in everyday 
life is also changing ceaselessly (Tromp, 1991), which is certainly true with the 
concept of peace. Restricting peace as the absence of inter-state war does not make 
sense (Tromp, 1991). This does not mean that the absence of inter-state war is not 
significant, but it is just one dimension of the meanings of peace that have been 
generated over decades.   
 
The essential objective of peace research is to make a contribution to achieving a more 
just and peaceful world (Rogers and Ramsbotham, 1999) by making an effort to 
critically examine the status quo of the contemporary world and to enlarge the range 
of the meaning of peace. In other words, as Rogers and Ramsbotham propose, while 
peace research does not show specific solutions or end goals for society, its 
intellectual effort to explore non-violent processes of political change can have 
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profound implications for the transformation in existing asymmetric power structures 
(1999).  
 
As discussed, the prominent attribute of peace research is its multi-disciplinary 
approach to transforming an unjust and violent world into a just and more peaceful 
one in a non-violent way, as well as its effort to broaden the meaning of peace. 
Accordingly, it comes to be recognized that conflict resolution is one of the essential 
components of peace research.  
 
According to Roberts, peace research does not deny the phenomenon of conflict itself 
in human affairs (1999).11 The crucial point is the research into making the conditions 
that enhance constructive ways of managing conflict and preventing destructive 
conflict (Reychler, 1991). Here, conflict resolution comes into being.  
 
Rogers and Ramsbotham argue that the purpose of conflict resolution is not to prevent 
conflict but to transform actual or potentially violent conflict into peaceful and 
non-violent processes of political and social change (1999). 12  Furthermore, 
                                                  
11 Rogers and Ramsbotham (1999) argue that while most peace researchers see 
violence in its various guises as the antithesis of peace, they agree that it does not 
apply to the concept of conflict. In general, it can be seen that conflict is recognized as 
the essential component of human beings.  
12 Roberts (1991) says the important point is how we can adopt peaceful means to 
resolve conflict and attain lasting peace situations in which conflict can be resolved or 
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Ramsbotham et al assert that conflict resolution is a comprehensive term that is 
concerned with addressing and transforming the deep-rooted sources of conflict 
(2005).13 They hold that when behavior is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer 
hostile and antagonistic, and the structure of the conflict has been transformed (2005). 
Thus a resolution entails “the transformation of the situation and relationship at a deep 
level in such a way as to remove the underlying reasons for the conflict” (Beckett, 
1997: 68).  
 
1-1-2 Johan Galtung’s work 
As argued, the raison d’être of peace research is to broaden our understanding of 
peace, which owes much to Johan Galtung.14 Among his output since the early 1960s, 
studies in the meanings of violence and peace are seminal.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
transformed into peaceful change. Kelman (1991a), while recognizing that to some 
extent conflict is necessary and desirable in a social system, argues that it is critical to 
develop the mechanisms to carry out conflict by non-violent means, as well as means 
for managing and resolving conflicts.  
13 It should be noted that the there is no single definition of conflict resolution. As 
Ramsbotham et al mention (2005), some are critical of conflict resolution, suggesting 
the term of ‘conflict transformation’ since conflict resolution is not looking into 
transforming the structure that has created and prolonged conflict. However, it should 
also be remarked that there is no single clear relationship between conflict resolution 
and conflict transformation. This will be discussed more in later part of this chapter.  
14 Johan Galtung was born on 24 October 1930. He is one of the founding fathers of 
peace research in Europe. He studied philosophy, sociology and mathematics. 
Gandhian philosophy is said to have had a huge influence on Galtung’s work in peace 
research. He also seems to have been influenced by Buddhism, which is demonstrated 
clearly in his Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and 
Civilization, which was published in 1996. He made a huge contribution to the 
foundation of the Journal of Peace Research in 1964, which was edited by him for the 
first ten years.  
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In one key article (1969), Galtung focused on six dimensions of violence: the 
distinction between physical and psychological violence; their negative and positive 
influences; the existence or non-existence of an object that is hurt; the existence or 
non-existence of a subject who acts; the distinction between intended and unintended 
violence; and the distinction between manifested and latent violence. According to 
Lawler, among those dimensions, the fourth is the most important since it is there that 
the distinction between personal (direct) and structural violence is introduced (1995). 
In both cases, individuals can be killed or hurt and subject to intimidation, but while 
direct violence can be caused by specific individual actors, in the latter case there may 
be no clear perpetrator, that is, the violence is built into social structures and shows as 
unequal power, resulting in uneven life opportunities (Lawler, 1995).  
 
Structural violence can be defined as “the cause of the difference between the 
potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is” (Galtung, 1969: 
168). The potential level of realization is what is possible with a given level of insight 
and resources (Galtung, 1969). Accordingly, if insight and resources are dominated by 
a group or class or used for other objectives, there emerges an incompatibility between 
the potential and the actual and violence is present in the system (Galtung, 1969).15 
                                                  
15 Mack (1985) states the suffering generated by structural violence does not result 
from any absolute lack of resources but rather from an inequitable distribution of 
resources, which is socially and politically determined.  
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Concretely, unjust accesses to resources, to political power or decision-making, to 
education, to health care, legal standing and so on are good examples. Put another way, 
the condition of structural violence can be referred to as social injustice.  
 
The distinction between direct violence and structural violence accompanied the 
creation of two concepts of peace: negative peace and positive peace. Galtung insists 
that if peace means absence of violence, then action should be taken against structural 
as well as personal violence (1969). The absence of direct violence does not bring 
about a positively defined condition, which is negative peace, whereas the absence of 
structural violence is social justice, which is a positively defined condition, that is, 
egalitarian distribution of power and resources – positive peace (Galtung, 1969).16 
For Galtung, peace is not only an issue of control and reduction of apparent violence 
but also one of tackling the latent structures that cause social injustices.  
 
Galtung notes that structural violence comes from the social structure itself – between 
human beings, between sets of human beings, between sets of societies in the world 
(1996). Put another way, structural violence is seen in every kind of human 
relationship. For this reason, as Ramsbotham et al (2005) observe, Galtung thought 
                                                  
16 Mack (1985) notes that positive peace is a synonym for a particular conception of 
‘the good society’ which is fair-minded and egalitarian and in which human beings can 
achieve their own true potential.  
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that peace research should not be confined to the study of preventing war. Rather, 
peace research should be expanded to research into the conditions for peaceful and 
just relationships between the dominant and the exploited, rulers and ruled, men and 
women, western and non-western cultures, humankind and nature (Ramsbotham et al, 
2005). The central theme here is exploration for realizing positive peace in the form of 
human empathy, solidarity and community, the goal being the eradication of structural 
violence by revealing and transforming structures of imperialism and oppression 
(Ramsbotham et al, 2005).  
 
1-1-3 Kenneth Boulding’s work 
While Johan Galtung is the main actor in founding peace research in Europe, Kenneth 
Boulding is the central harbinger of peace research in North America.17 One of the 
most important contributions to peace research made by Boulding, in particular, the 
conflict resolution field, is the publication of Journal of Conflict Resolution. In 1957, 
with a small group of academics, which included Anatol Rapoport 
(mathematician-biologist), Hebert Kelman (social-psychologist) and Robert Rapoport 
                                                  
17 Kenneth Boulding was born in Liverpool in England in 1910 and graduated from 
Oxford University. He was a member of the Society of Friends (Quakers). In 1937, he 
moved to America and was granted United States citizenship in 1948. In 1941, he 
married Elise Bjorn-Hansen. According to Kerman (1974), one of Boulding’s most 
faithful convictions was that war is one of the most urgent problems humankind must 
solve and the most awful aberration of the human spirit, which affected his work 
throughout his life.  
 33
(sociologist), he issued the Journal of Conflict Resolution.18  
 
According to Boulding, there were two conditions that promoted the publication of the 
journal. Firstly, there was the pressing problem facing humankind – the prevention of 
war on a global scale (1957). Secondly, if the study of international relations was to 
evolve intellectually, it had to be an interdisciplinary enterprise that would draw its 
discourse from all the social sciences and even further (1957). Conflict was a 
phenomenon that had been examined in various fields: by sociologists, by 
psychologists, by psychiatrists, by economists and by political scientists. It was 
imperative to integrate those mutually isolated studies that could create a general 
theory of conflict, which was based on the conviction that the behavior and 
interactions of nations were not an isolated and self-contained area of empirical 
material but part of a wider field of behavior and interaction (1957).  
 
One of the Boulding’s most salient personal works for peace was his critical attitude 
toward the nation state system and international relations. He thought that the change 
in the technology of international war to a great extent eroded the legitimacy or the 
primacy of the nation state (1978). In other words, the prevention of war is not only a 
matter of individual nation states, but the fundamental issue for human beings. The 
                                                  
18 This is the first time the term conflict resolution was used.  
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key to his hope was the proposition that “war as a specific human institution is the 
result not of conflicts, nor of human weakness, but of the political organization of the 
world into a number of separate, sovereign and irresponsible countries” (Kerman, 
1974: 79) For Boulding, the prevention of war was based on two contentions: the 
notion that the nation state is obsolete; and the reliance on research, statistics and 
information as a way out of conventional dependence on military force (Kerman, 
1974). If war was the result of the intrinsic nature of the sovereign state system, the 
reform of international organization and the development of a research and 
information capability would be the key to preventing war (Ramsbotham et al, 2005).  
 
Through discussions with Quincy Wright, Boulding came up with the idea of “social 
data stations.” These would play a role like a global weather network, which collects 
and processes data on population, rates of economic growth, surpluses and shortages, 
attitudes, tension levels, shifts in power relationships of classes or groups within a 
country, voting trends, images nations have mutually – all kinds of social indicators 
that could be put together to detect social temperature and pressure (Kerman, 1974). 
Thus, for Boulding, as Ramsbotham et al note, conflict resolution meant the 
development of a worldwide knowledge base (2005).  
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1-1-4 The emergence of basic human needs and its application to conflict 
resolution 
Basic Human Needs Theory 
Besides Kenneth Boulding and Johan Galtung, John Burton19 should be recognized as 
one of the most significant figures in conflict resolution because without his work, the 
development of the field of conflict resolution would have been impossible. 20 
Although John Burton did fundamental work on basic human needs theory and its 
application to understanding of protracted conflict, he did not create the theory. Rather, 
it was developed by the works of the American psychologist Abraham Maslow and the 
sociologist Paul Sites.  
 
Maslow developed a hierarchy of needs: “physiological needs”; “safety needs”; 
                                                  
19 Burton was born in Australia in 1915. He got a Masters degree at the London 
School of Economics in 1938 and his Ph.D in 1942. Then he joined the Australian civil 
service, participated in the foundation conference of the United Nations in San 
Francisco and served in the Australian Department of External Affairs and as High 
Commissioner in Ceylon (Ramsbotham et al, 2005). He was designated a post at 
University College London in 1963, which coincided with the formation of the Conflict 
Research Society in London (Ramsbotham et al, 2005).  
20 This does not mean that Kenneth Boulding and Johan Galtung are not important 
figures in the field of conflict resolution. As argued, Boulding’s idea of the social data 
station was one type of conflict resolution. However, as will be discussed later, Burton 
proposed a more concrete approach to resolve conflict, which is represented by the 
adoption of basic human needs theory and controlled communication or 
problem-solving. This stance can be supported by Vayrynen’s contention (1998). She 
says Burton’s idea of the relationship between basic human needs and the 
development of protracted conflict has brought in a set of new agendas and touched off 
a lively theoretical argument among conflict analysis and peace research. Further, she 
states even for those who do disagree on Burton’s idea of universal applicability of 
basic human needs, his theories have provided a beneficial starting-point for the 
advancement of new approaches to conflict. Hence, this thesis will take the following 
stance: while Boulding and Galtung are founding figures of peace research in general, 
Burton is the pioneering person in conflict resolution which is one of the specific fields 
in peace research.  
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“belongingness and love needs”; “esteem needs”; and “need for self-actualization” 
(1970: 36-46).21 Further, according to Sites, there are eight essential needs: “a need 
for response; a need for security; a need for recognition; a need for stimulation; a need 
for distributive justice; a need for meaning; a need to be seen as rational; and a need to 
control” (1973: 43).22 Maslow claimed that a conflict or frustration is not always 
pathogenic. Rather, it becomes so only when it threatens or prevents the gratification 
of basic needs. (1970). Sites also insists individuals are often willing to behave outside 
socially accepted rules in order to seek the satisfaction of basic needs (1973). The 
deviation of individual’s behavior based on individual basic human needs being 
frustrated by society provided Burton with a method of conflict analysis and 
resolution.  
 
Basic needs and critique of traditional approach to conflict 
In Burton’s view, the needs which are most essential to understand destructive conflict 
are those for identity, recognition, security and development (1986). Burton insists 
these basic needs are universal motivations and they will be pursued by all means 
available because from an ontological point of view, individuals or groups of 
individuals are conditioned by biology or by an intrinsic drive to pursue those needs 
                                                  
21 Maslow maintained once lower needs (physiological needs as a starting point) are 
satisfied, new and higher needs emerge, which would be repeated. Hence, he says, the 
basic human needs can be organized into a hierarchy of relative prepotency.  
22 Regarding the detailed contents of each need, see Sites (1973: 37-43).  
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(1990). If these needs are frustrated, they will behave outside the norms of society 
(1990). Further, Burton made a distinction between needs that are non-negotiable 
since they are primordial drives for survival and developments; and interests that are 
negotiable (1990). 23  This distinction entailed his critical attitude towards the 
traditional approach to conflict.  
 
The adoption of human needs theory revealed that protracted conflict was mainly over 
non-negotiable needs (Burton, 1986). This revelation led to the need to make a 
distinction between resolution which deals with the problems that are the sources of 
conflict; and the suppression or settlement of conflict by coercive means or bargaining 
and negotiation in which relative power decides the outcome (Burton, 1990). Burton 
insisted that in the traditional settlement approach, conflict can be prolonged 
unnecessarily when inalienable values – basic needs – are translated into interests 
merely to fit into the traditional processes of bargaining and negotiations (1986). The 
traditional approach focused on surface interests which are visible, and ignored basic 
needs that are the root causes of conflict. For Burton, the source of protracted conflict 
                                                  
23 Burton also mentions values. According to Burton (1990), values are ideas, habits, 
customs and beliefs which are a peculiar to particular social communities. Therefore, 
they are acquired and differ from needs since they are universal, inherent and genetic. 
However, at the same time, he states that in conditions of oppression, discriminations, 
unprivileged and isolation, the defense of values becomes critical to the needs of 
personal security and identity. Hence, in this sense, Burton says that values impinge 
on needs and can be confused.  
Regarding interests, Burton (1990) states that they are the occupational, social, 
political and economic aspiration of the individual and of identity groups of 
individuals within a social system, are competitive and have a win-lose component.  
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lies in the expression of basic human needs. In other words, in order to resolve 
conflicts, how the basic needs of the parties to conflict can be satisfied should be 
analyzed. 
 
Controlled communication (Problem-solving) as conflict resolution 
According to Burton, conflict resolution means “terminating conflict by methods that 
are analytical and that get to the root of the problem” (1991: 72). Problem-solving 
conflict resolution signifies a concern with the causes that create conflict: unless 
fundamental causes of conflict are tackled, there cannot be resolution of a conflict, let 
alone prevention of conflict in the future (Burton, 1990). Conflict resolution by 
problem-solving implies that in order to uncover the nature of conflict and the sources 
of conflict, the approach has to be analytical (Burton, 1990). The practice of 
problem-solving conflict resolution is established upon the theory of conflict as a 
universal response to frustrated human needs (Burton, 1991).  
 
The practice of problem-solving provides the following opportunities for the parties: 
“to analyze relationships to generate an accurate definition of the problem in terms of 
motivations and human needs; to cost their goals and policies once they are fully 
informed of all aspects of the conflict, including the motivations and values of the 
adversary; and to discover the possible options that may be available once there has 
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been a full analysis of the conflict in its elements” (Burton, 1991: 86).  
 
Since parties in a conflict are unlikely to have adequate knowledge of the sources of 
their conflict relationships and of the options available to resolve them, a 
problem-solving approach to conflict resolution requires a most knowledgeable and 
skilled party (Burton, 1990). However, in Burton’s problem-solving conflict resolution, 
the role of the third parties is different from that of traditional arbitrators, mediators or 
negotiators who have the power to determine the results. According to Burton, conflict 
resolution pursued through problem-solving should be the examination by 
protagonists of the patterns of their own overt behaviors in an intimate and analytical 
interaction in which there can be detailed checking (1990). Therefore, the role of the 
third parties is supposed to be less active: it is not to persuade, not to verify or to judge 
the accuracy of statements made by the parties in conflict, or judge the reasonableness 
of argument (Burton, 1969).  
 
Nonetheless, at the same time, the third parties play an active and influential role in 
the sense that they explain conflict, its origins, and its escalation by referring to other 
conflicts but within the context of a continuing discussion between the protagonists 
(Burton, 1969). The task of the third parties is to apply general theories about conflict 
and human behavior to the particular situation under consideration in order to help the 
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parties in conflict to analyze it (Burton, 1990). By obtaining new knowledge about 
conflict in general, the parties will be supported by academic tools of analysis to 
critically analyze their conflict and to understand its origin and its manifestation 
(Burton, 1969), that is, realizing the existence of basic human needs on both sides, 
which would make more creative resolution of conflict feasible.  
 
1-2 Construction of Conflict Resolution 
Following the era of the 1950s and 1960s, during which the foundation of peace 
research and conflict resolution had been established, the 1970s and 1980s saw the 
further elaboration of conflict resolution. In particular, Edward Azar’s work, 
represented by the concept of ‘protracted social conflict’ and the contribution of social 
psychology to conflict resolution are significant.  
 
1-2-1 Protracted Social Conflict and Conflict Resolution 
The background of the creation of the concept of protracted social conflict 
Edward Azar24 held there are two competing images of politics. One is ‘real politics’ 
that engages in conflict over scarce goods and values (1990). Another is the view that 
                                                  
24 Azar was born in Lebanon in 1938 and moved to the United States where he 
studied international relations. He worked with John Burton in the 1980s and set up 
the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University 
of Maryland. He was the director of the Center. It has been said his work was 
influenced by his concern with his native Lebanon.  
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politics is about collective security, community building and prosperity, with the goal 
of politics being the promotion of cooperation, development of conflict management, 
the pursuit of socio-economic development and the facilitation of peaceful interactions 
at all levels (1990).  
 
Although Azar argued that since World War Two, most of the conflicts in the Third 
World had been ethnic or identity-related conflicts (1986)25, as Ramsbotham (2005) 
states, during the Cold War era, international relations and strategic studies had been 
mainly preoccupied with Clausewitzean war.26 In other words, the main concern 
during that era was with the former dimension. However, for Azar, the latter 
perspective of politics was much more important, which resulted in his creation of the 
idea of ‘Protracted Social Conflict.’27 
 
Protracted Social Conflict 
According to Azar, protracted social conflict is “the prolonged and often violent 
                                                  
25 Azar insisted that as of 1986, around 60 cases of conflict in the Third World had 
been counted as ethnic conflicts.  
26 Ronald Fisher (1997) also states that Azar’s analyses of international conflict 
demonstrated that since World War Two, almost all of conflicts had occurred in the 
Third World and many of them were ethnic conflicts. Fisher also argues that during 
the Cold War era, interventions by the superpower and their allies made the 
situations of those conflicts worse.  
27 Fisher (1997) argues that for Azar the shift in international relations was 
imperative – from a superpower discourse that had put a huge emphasis on strategic 
interaction, deterrence, crisis management and coercive containment to an 
acknowledgment that two-thirds of states in the world are small, poorly defined, in 
poverty and vulnerable to both ethnic fissures and negative international influences.  
 42
struggle by communal groups for such needs as security, recognition and acceptance, 
fair access to political institutions, and economic participation” (1991: 93). For Azar, 
as Ramsbotham argues, the traditional preoccupation with relations between states had 
obscured a precise understanding of these dynamics (2005).28 
 
The hypothesis of protracted social conflict is that there is the denial of the elements 
essential for the development of all people and societies and that the pursuit of them is 
an imperative need for peoples (Azar, 1986).29 Thus, it can be clearly seen that Azar’s 
protracted social conflict owes much to Burton’s work, that is, adoption of the concept 
of basic human needs to conflict resolution. However, the distinct contribution of Azar 
was his analysis of the structural roots of the denial of basic human needs, which 
cause and prolong social conflict.  
 
Azar’s protracted social conflict theory takes four variables as its preconditions: 
communal content; human needs; governance and the role of the state; and 
international linkages.  
                                                  
28 Azar (1990) proposed three characteristics of many conflicts that occurred in 
developing countries. They are: a blurred demarcation between internal and external 
sources and actors; multiple causal elements and dynamics that are reflected in 
changing goals, actors and targets; and no clear starting and terminating points of 
conflict.  
29 According to Azar 1986), those needs are security, identity, social recognition of 
identity and effective participation in the process that decide the conditions of security 
and identity and other such development requirements.  
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First, the critical factor concerning a protracted social conflict is the communal 
content of a society. In protracted social conflict, a key actor is the communal group 
such as religious, racial, cultural and so on (Azar, 1991).30 Since the communal group 
tends to be more responsive to the basic needs of its members than does the national 
government in underdeveloped countries, societies will often be divided along 
communal lines (Azar, 1991).  
 
Second, as argued, the deprivation of basic human needs is considered as the root 
cause of protracted social conflict. However, it is also of great importance to 
understand how basic human needs are sought: in protracted social conflict, the basic 
unit is the communal group (identity group or immediate identity group). Accordingly, 
people will seek their basic needs in terms of communal perspective: individuals take 
any effort available to achieve their developmental needs through the formation of 
identity groups (Azar, 1990). Deprivation of physical needs and denial of access are 
rooted in the refusal to recognize the communal identity of another group (Azar, 
1990).  
 
                                                  
30 Azar and Moon (1986) insist protracted social conflict differs from the conventional 
idea of inter-state or social conflict since it takes as its principal elements each 
individual member of society, as well as groups internal and external to the country to 
which each individual belongs. Further, they maintain that both individuals and 
groups are interconnected in terms of racial, ethnic and religious identities.  
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Third, since the state is provided with authority to govern and to use force when 
necessary to regulate society, to protect citizens and provide collective goods, the 
extent of satisfaction or deprivation of basic needs is affected by the intervening or 
mediating role of states (Azar, 1990). Political authority in a country with protracted 
social conflict, Azar notes, tends to be controlled by one group or a coalition of a few 
groups and they use the state as a tool to maximize their interest without gratifying the 
needs of others (Azar, 1990).  
 
Fourth, formation of domestic social and political institutions and their effect on the 
role of the state is heavily influenced by the patterns of linkage with the international 
system, in particular, political and economic dependency. Economic dependency 
within the international economic system not only limits the autonomy of the state, but 
also distorts the pattern of economic development, which hampers the gratification of 
security needs (Azar, 1990). In political and military client relationships with strong 
states, the patron state provides protection for the client state in return for loyalty, 
which sacrifices autonomy and independence of the recipient state (Azar, 1990). This 
causes the client state to seek domestic and foreign policies that do not reflect the 
needs of its own public (Azar, 1990).  
 
In addition to the four preconditions, Azar proposed process dynamics on which the 
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four preconditions above will or will not activate overt conflict. They are: communal 
actions and strategies; state actions and strategies; and built-in mechanisms of conflict.  
 
First, a trivial event may touch off protracted social conflict, it becomes a turning 
point at which individual victimization is collectively registered (Azar, 1990). 
Collective recognition of individual grievances can lead to collective protest, which is 
in many cases met by repression or suppression (Azar, 1990). Second, if the state 
understands communal grievances and takes steps to ameliorate the gratification of 
communal needs at the early stage, a protracted social conflict can be prevented or 
kept latent. Nonetheless, it is not the case in many instances mainly because the norm 
of winner-take-all still prevails in multi-communal societies (Azar, 1990). Therefore, 
coercive repression is often employed. Third, conflicts that are concerned with 
communal identity and fear of marginalization or loss of communal integrity are 
inclined to involve a lasting hostile set of perceptions and interactions between and 
among communal groups and the state (Azar, 1990). In this situation, the interaction 
will be limited or proscribed, which perpetuates and even worsens communal hatred 
and solidifies protracted social conflict. Further, the mutual distrust and antagonism 
gain velocity with the deepening of the deprivation of basic needs (Azar, 1990).  
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Conflict resolution from Azar’s viewpoint 
The structural roots of the antagonistic interactions that characterize protracted social 
conflict can be understood only after examining the interdependent nexus of 
underdevelopment, structural deprivation and communal or identity cleavages (Azar 
and Moon, 1986), which made Azar stress the facilitation of problem-solving 
approaches and the promotion of balanced socio-economic and political development 
as keys to conflict resolution (1990).  
 
As explained, since the source of protracted social conflict lies in the struggle over 
human needs for security, identity and social justice, problem-solving can be proposed 
as an initial step.31 Azar claimed what is needed is a framework in which the parties 
can analyze and explore their perception of the origin and nature of protracted social 
conflict and realize that they are seeking similar needs such as recognition and 
security through adversarial tactics (1991). The process, according to Azar, involves 
bringing together representatives of the parties in conflict to engage in honest, 
face-to-face, analytical discussions about their grievances, interests, perceptions of 
problems and possible solutions (1990).32 
                                                  
31 Azar (1990) called problem-solving “Track Two Diplomacy” that aims to search for 
and promote the peaceful relation between warring parties without relying on official 
efforts.  
32 Azar and Moon (1986) insist that once the basic needs of the various communities 
can be discovered and once each group recognizes the validity of the fears of the others, 
a constructive process of accommodation can begin and the groundwork for future 
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However, for Azar, problem-solving is not the only approach to conflict resolution. 
Rather, it should be regarded as one important tool among several to resolve conflict. 
As Azar himself asserts, effective resolution of protracted social conflict must go 
beyond the face-to-face forum stage and pursue structural development (1991).33 
Successful management of conflict needs political and economic development that can 
promise to rectify communal grievances and gratify communal identity needs (Azar 
and Moon, 1986). Nevertheless, Azar insisted that the traditional concept of 
development does not match the concept of development in dealing with protracted 
social conflict (1991).34 For Azar, “the goals and objectives of national economic 
development need to be redefined from the perspective of the basic needs of 
contending communal groups, especially those which have been previously 
marginalized” (1991: 102). Further, Azar argues that the state should not be taken as 
the sole actor that determines the nature and direction of development. Rather, he 
claimed that inputs from the grass-roots level involving various communal actors 
should be included into an overall decision-making process, which entails the 
decentralization of political power and decision-making process (1991).  
 
                                                                                                                                               
negotiation might be founded.  
33 Ramsbotham (2005) in his examination of Azar’s work maintains that for Azar, 
principled negotiation, facilitative mediation or problem-solving approaches are not 
the only ways to resolving conflict.  
34 Azar (1991) identifies traditional development with economic growth measured in 
such terms of gross national product, industrialization and exports of manufactured 
goods.  
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Azar’s work and contemporary conflict resolution 
Since structural inequality that causes the uneven gratification of basic needs among 
different communal groups is the most pressing issue in protracted social conflict, 
structural reform through sound development is essential, the aim of which is to 
breakthrough marginalization and discrimination (Azar and Moon, 1986). In short, it 
is essential to promote reform in sociopolitical structures and a redistribution of power. 
In structural transformation, the decentralization of political systems is the 
prerequisite. Since the central government that does not reflect the communal plurality 
in its policy is the main problem in protracted social conflict, it is crucial to promote 
decentralized political structures that empower the local authorities to run their 
educational system and address social concerns endemic to their areas (Azar, 1986). 
Further, Azar insists that the international community should make sure each 
individual and community is empowered to resolve protracted social conflict.35 For 
Azar, conflict resolution needs to understand the importance of open, participatory and 
decentralized political structures as opposed to centralized, dominant and exclusive 
structures (1986).  
 
Thus, conflict resolution from the viewpoint of protracted social conflict has revealed 
                                                  
35 Azar and Moon (1986) claimed that the aim of development diplomacy must be 
inducing economic participation in the same way political reform emphasizes political 
participation. Besides that, they insisted that individuals and communities need to 
believe that their participation is assured and makes a difference.  
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that Azar’s approach is comprehensive and has much bearing on new conflict 
resolution approaches that have gained currency since the end of the Cold War. 
Communal pluralism, structural transformation, and empowerment of local structures 
have been important agendas for conflict resolution since the end of the Cold War. But, 
there is a clear line of development rather than discontinuity between conflict 
resolution in the Cold War era and that in the post Cold War era.  
 
1-2-2 Social Psychology and Conflict Resolution 
What is social psychology? Why is social psychology needed in conflict 
resolution? 
It is very difficult to offer an exact definition of social psychology (Kremer et al, 
2003).36 However, it can be described as the scientific study of social behavior and 
thought (Pennington, 1986).37 According to Hogg and Vaughan, social psychology as 
a discipline of general psychology is concerned with analyzing human behavior in 
terms of processes that occur in the human mind and concerned with face-to-face 
interaction between or among members of groups, while general psychology focuses 
on people’s reactions to stimuli that are not necessarily social (1995).38 Thus, social 
                                                  
36 Pennington (1986) notes it is arrogant to define precisely social psychology since it 
could impose restrictions on what ought and ought not to be appropriate areas of 
inquiry.  
37 Hogg and Vaughan (1995) note social psychologists are interested in not only 
behavior, but also in feeling, thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, intensions and goals.  
38 Further, Hogg and Vaughan (1995) note that in dealing with groups, social and 
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psychology examines how different individual or groups influence each other in terms 
of their changes of thought, feelings and behavior.   
 
Social psychology focuses on the study of intergroup relations in terms of how people 
in different groups are affected by other people who are physically present or who are 
imagined to be present. Social conflict presupposes the presence of at least two 
different groups of people: social interaction is the prerequisite. The characteristic of 
social interaction is that the participants take into account not only mutual behavior, 
but also each other’s purposes, perceptions and intentions and the structural 
constraints within which they are constructed (Kelman and Cohen, 1979). This general 
feature of social interaction demonstrates that the basic assumptions of social 
psychology can be applied to understanding conflict and its resolution.  
 
Problem-solving as a step toward resolving inter-group conflict 
Since interaction process is pivotal for social psychology, face-to-face, interactive 
methods of de-escalating and resolving inter-group conflict become important (Fisher, 
1990a). An approach to conflict resolution from social psychological perspectives 
                                                                                                                                               
cultural norms and intergroup behavior, social psychology has much bearing on 
sociology that analyzes how groups, organizations, social categories and societies are 
organized, how they function and how they change, and social anthropology that does 
the same with sociology but puts more focus on non – industrial, tribal societies that 
exist or have existed mainly in developing countries.  
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focuses on interaction and on an analytic view of conflicts, encouraging parties in 
conflict to pay attention to the other, to try to grasp other’s perspective and to examine 
subjects’ own impact on the other – to analyze how both parties perceive themselves 
as well as their antagonists (Kelman and Cohen, 1979). A basic assumption of 
interactive approaches is that creative possibilities for conflict resolution can emerge 
when the parties treat their conflict as a shared dilemma that requires some common 
effort for its resolution (Kelman and Cohen, 1979), and this is the area in which the 
problem-solving approach is focused.  
 
According to Kelman, interactive problem-solving is “an unofficial, academically 
based, third-party approach to the analysis and resolution of international and ethnic 
conflicts, anchored in social-psychological principles” (1996: 501). Interactive 
problem-solving approach is a small-group discussion between/among unofficial 
representatives of an identity group in destructive conflict, which is principally 
supported and facilitated by an impartial academically based third party (Kelman, 
1996). The main objective of a problem-solving workshop39 is to produce changes in 
the participants themselves: changes in the form of more differentiated images of the 
                                                  
39 According to Kelman and Cohen (1979), the basic idea of workshop is to bring 
together representatives of conflicting parties in a relatively isolated situation – 
preferably an academic context – in which they can engage in face-to-face 
communication in the presence and under the guidance of social scientists knowledge 
about group process and conflict theory.   
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other side, greater insight into the dynamics of the conflict and new ideas for resolving 
the conflict and for overcoming the barriers to a negotiated solution (Kelman, 1996). 
The changes at the level of individual participants are not ends in themselves, but 
driving forces for promoting changes at the policy level (Kelman, 1996).40 Another 
goal of workshops is to maximize the possibility that the new information, insights 
and proposals elaborated in the workshops are fed back into the political debate and 
the decision-making process within each community (Kelman, 1996).41 
 
In order to achieve those two purposes, the selection of potentially influential 
participants from the parties in conflict is an important matter. According to Kelman 
and Cohen, participants should be “individuals who are generally influential within 
their respective societies, who speak for some significant segment of opinion, and who 
have potential access to political leaders” (1976: 84). Since those are the persons who 
                                                  
40 Tajfel and Turners (1979) note that the intergroup interaction consists of 
interactions between two or more individuals that are determined by their respective 
memberships in various social groups or categories and not at all affected by the 
inter-individual personal relationships between the people involved. Further, they 
hold that the more intense is an intergroup conflict, the more likely it is that the 
individuals who are members of the opposing groups will behave mutually as a 
function of their respective group memberships, rather than as individuals with their 
own specific characteristics. In short, individuals will act not as individuals, based on 
their own individual characteristics or interpersonal relationships, but as the 
members of their groups standing in defined relationships to members of other groups. 
And it can be seen that this is the basic assumption for the problem-solving workshop 
approach form social psychological perspective. The individual representatives in 
workshop are not independent individuals from their own parties, but are individuals 
who are representing their respective parties’ idea, feeling, thoughts. In other words, 
it is assumed that change at the individual level can reflect the change at the group 
level. The micro-level change can lead to the macro-level change, that is, group in 
general. That is why the individual change is expected to have influence on the change 
at the policy level.  
41 This idea also seems to derive from the above basic assumption.  
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can make a difference in the policy process, they are the ideal candidates for an 
approach that is directed at changing individual perceptions, attitudes and 
formulations of problems and solutions (Kelman and Cohen, 1976).  
 
The role of the third party is essential to the success of problem-solving 
workshops42and it has to be strictly facilitative (Kelman, 1996). Although the third 
party can promote the learning process, it should not give or impose an answer. One of 
the fundamental principles of the approach of problem-solving is that the most 
constructive ideas for conflict resolution are those that have emerged from the 
interaction between the parties in conflict themselves (Kelman, 1991b). The main task 
of creating novel ideas and infusing them into the political process in each party 
should be carried out by the participants themselves. Thus, the role of the third party 
in problem-solving workshops is similar to Burton’s approach in that it is clearly 
different from traditional mediation and arbitration.  
 
However, Kelman and Cohen caution that conflicts are not simply the products of 
                                                  
42 Cairns and Hewstone (2001) maintain while in conflict situation, conflicting groups 
are unlikely to have contact, unless attempts are made to bring about contact, the 
situation will be exacerbated. They hold the absence of contact is likely to reduce the 
likelihood of future contact, strengthen the assumption that the conflicting groups 
have different or irreconcilable beliefs, keep intergroup anxiety and reinforce the 
boundary between or among them. In that situation, without intervention of third 
party there is almost no chance for contact, which can be the rationale for third party 
to get involved in problem-solving workshop.  
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misunderstanding and misperception that can be overcome in face-to-face 
communication: rather, they maintain, most conflicts involve actual clashes of 
interests, ideologies centering on incompatible goals and structural commitments to 
the perpetuation of the conflict (1976). Consequently, the problem-solving approach 
should not be seen as a substitute for official diplomatic or political negotiations; 
rather the problem-solving method should be regarded as a supplement to or 
preparation for negotiations (Kelman and Cohen, 1979).  
 
A contingency and complementarity model of third party intervention 
The introduction of a social psychological approach into conflict resolution revealed 
the phenomenological aspect of conflict, which is expressed in the perceptions, 
emotions, interactions and social structures of the parties in conflict (Fisher, 1997). A 
social psychological point of view puts an emphasis on the subjective side of 
escalation, de-escalation and resolution of conflict. However, at the same time, social 
psychologists engaged in conflict resolution acknowledge that conflict should be 
understood as a dynamic process of the mixture of objective and subjective elements. 
As a corollary of this understanding, it is claimed that both objective and subjective 
dimensions should be addressed to resolve conflict.  
 
Fisher and Keashly proposed that conceptualizing conflict as a mixture of objective 
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and subjective factors that change over time could lead to the assumption that different 
types of third party interventions might be most suitable and effective at different 
stages of a conflict (1991). Different interventions at different phases can be chosen: 
while consultation and conciliation will take a subjective approach in some cases, 
mediation and arbitration will be employed for objective elements (Fisher, 1997).43 
 
The acceptance of the objective-subjective mixture in conflict can be complemented 
by the corollary that subjective elements increase and take on added importance as a 
conflict escalates (Fisher and Keashly, 1991). Since third party interventions vary in 
the emphasis given to objective or subjective dimensions, the potential of matching 
the intervention to the level of escalation must be focused and effective (Fisher and 
Keashly, 1991). The potential of a contingency approach is based on a conviction that 
all approaches have their limitations and in order to overcome or complement those 
shortcomings, we need to establish a cooperative and interdependent relationship 
between/among them.  
 
The main significance of psychological elements is that they play a critical role in 
                                                  
43 For example, Fisher and Keashly (1991) proposed that when objective elements 
such as resource scarcity or the structure of the situation are predominant in conflict, 
third party intervention that promotes compromise would be relevant. On the other 
hand, if subjective factors such as misperception, miscommunication and the different 
valuing of real interests are predominant, third party should take steps that promote 
collaborative outcome between the parties in conflict would be suitable.  
 56
escalation and perpetuation of conflict by creating barriers to both the occurrence and 
the perception of change that are necessary to promote mutual dialogue 
between/among conflictual groups (Kelman, 1990b). Kelman notes that while 
overcoming psychological barriers does not in itself resolve conflict, if such barriers 
can be overcome, new possibilities may be created for negotiations on the basis of 
objective conditions and current interests (1990b).  
 
1-3 Further Development of Conflict Resolution 
The distinctive feature of conflict resolution in the 1990s onwards has been the 
self-reflective critique of conflict resolution approaches in previous eras. By this 
period, conflict resolution had achieved sufficient standing and substance to become 
self-critical, in general terms as well as between the various perspectives that 
comprise it. Critiques of conflict resolution from a cultural perspective, the 
exploration of peace-building at the grass-roots level, the argument over conflict 
transformation, and the exploration of the restoration of broken human relationships 
have been the important aspects of conflict resolution in the contemporary era.  
 
1-3-1 Culture and Conflict Resolution 
From the start of the post-Cold War era, the culture question has been one of the 
imperative agendas in the conflict resolution field. More concretely, there has emerged 
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the question of whether conflict resolution is a globally applicable enterprise as its 
founders assumed, or whether is it based upon some hidden cultural values that are not 
universally shared (Miall et al, 1999). 
 
Paul Salem’s critical examination of conflict resolution from non-Western 
perspectives 
One of the most prominent critiques of conflict resolution from non-western 
viewpoints is the work of Paul Salem. In his work, Salem tried to present a 
comprehensive critique of some hidden assumptions in the Western approach to 
conflict resolution.  
 
Salem claims that the Western community of theorists and practitioners of conflict 
resolution operate “within a macro-political context that they may overlook” (1993: 
361). He asserts that the context overlooked by them colors their attitudes and values, 
which has much bearing on the West’s dominant status in the world (1993). Further, 
he argues that the ideology of peace “reinforces a status quo that is favorable to the 
dominant power” (1993: 362). In other words, it could be inferred that conflict 
resolution, which has been based on western values, while making effort to resolve 
conflict, tries to forestall challenges to the existing framework in which the world 
system – in an economic and political sense – is controlled by the West. 
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The centrality of the idea that peace is good and war is bad is, to some extent, peculiar 
to the Christian worldview, which, Salem insists, might not be necessarily suitable to 
other cultural contexts in which war in itself is not necessarily shameful (1993)44 
Salem also pays attention to the philosophy of utilitarianism as the foundational 
assumption of conflict resolution. He also notes that Western conflict resolution is 
established upon the idea that pain is bad and pleasure or comfort is good. It is clearly 
admitted that the suffering, physical or otherwise, associated with conflict is one of the 
main outcomes that conflict resolution practitioners try to eradicate, which derives 
from the task of the 19th century utilitarian philosophers like Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill (1993). However, according to Salem, how suffering is defined or 
how it is dealt with differs from culture to culture (1993). 
 
This is a brief summary of the critique of conflict resolution by Paul Salem, but the 
significance of his work is that he tried to show that serious diversity exists at the 
deepest level of different cultural and social formations (1993). What should be 
appreciated is that “value judgments only make sense from within one cultural 
framework or another” (Salem, 1993: 368). His critique gives us a warning that 
conflict resolution has been based on some hidden western values and often this is not 
explicitly acknowledged, which allows Western conflict resolution theories and 
                                                  
44 For example, Salem (1993) notes the Prophet himself and all the Rightly Guided 
Caliphs were proud warriors.  
 59
techniques to be applied to the non-Western world without cultural consideration. His 
critique tells us that we should take cultural adaptation into serious account. 
 
Critique of John Burton’s basic human needs and its application to conflict 
resolution 
It can be seen that the critical work of Paul Salem is looking into the overall 
framework of conflict resolution, the aim of which, by critically examining the 
fundamental assumption of conflict resolution, is to show that conflict resolution has 
been mainly based on Western culture or values and applied to the non-Western world. 
Therefore, his critique is not so much the proposal of concrete theories or techniques 
for conflict resolution from cultural perspectives – especially from his own 
background of the Arab world – as a warning that conflict resolution overall 
dominated by the Western cultural values has been carried out as if it were universally 
applicable. From these points of view, he can be considered as the key person who has 
played an essential role in opening the door for discussions of the importance of 
cultural perspectives in conflict resolution.  
 
While Salem’s work is the critical examination of conflict resolution from 
non-Western perspectives, there has been cultural examination of conflict resolution 
between Western conflict resolution theorists and practitioners. In particular, critical 
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analysis of John Burton’s basic human needs theory, which Burton believed, is 
universally applicable, is distinctive.  
 
Burton’s theory of conflict is based on a set of basic human needs that are held to be 
universal (1990), and accordingly it is believed that conflict emerges from the 
frustration of those basic needs. Burton assumes that those who participate in conflict 
are struggling in their institutional circumstances at all social dimensions to fulfill 
primordial and universal needs (1991). Further, he insists since basic human needs are 
universally applicable to each individual, no society can be harmonious or survive 
unless it gratifies basic human needs (1979).45 In short, from Burton’s perspective, 
people of all races possess some common values and similar objectives: achieving 
basic human needs, the frustration of which causes conflict.  
 
From that point of view, it has been claimed that the theory of conflict resolution 
should be treated as a generic (or genetic) that constitutes or influences theories in 
every behavioral discipline and therefore should be taught and practiced as it is 
assumed that it is applicable to all social system levels (Burton and Sandole, 1986). 
                                                  
45 Burton notes (1979) that individuals will use the norms common within society and 
push against them to ensure that they work in gratifying human needs, but if the 
norms inhibit and frustrate the achievement of basic needs, he/she will employ 
methods outside the norms or codes that are expected to be observed by all. In doing 
that, he/she will be regarded as deviant, but the deviance from societal norms, Burton 
insists, is the reflection of the frustration of needs satisfaction, which should be 
resolved. 
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Consequently, Burtonian problem-solving at the social level – be it the small group, 
the nation-state or the interactions between states – is possible only when the basic 
human needs of the individual are taken as the basis for analysis of the problem 
(Burton, 1979). For Burton, to make the parties in conflict aware of basic human 
needs common to all human beings as the root cause of conflict is fundamental. 
Burtonian problem-solving conflict resolution is not uniquely part of any regional 
cultures (Burton, 1990). In fact, culture is not an important element in the Burtonian 
analytical problem-solving conflict resolution process, the aim of which is to get to the 
realization of universal basic human needs.  
 
The concern with the role of culture in conflict arises from “a conception of social life 
in which culture is seen to be a fundamental feature of human consciousness, the sine 
qua non of being human” (Avruch and Black, 1993: 132). Culture is the assumption 
and presupposition that individuals and groups hold about the world: shared common 
sense that is usually local (Avruch and Black, 1991). In short, “culture as 
consciousness is organized around the understanding that human beings use locally 
received or constructed common sense to perceive, interpret, evaluate and act on and 
in both external and internal reality” (Avruch and Black, 1991: 31).  
 
Cultural patterns shape how a person understands the world. Put another way, 
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typifications are intersubjective – they are created by cultural patterns that prevail in 
social groups (Vayrynen, 1998). Accordingly, questions such as “What is conflict?”, 
“What is the cause of conflict?”, “How are basic human needs defined or understood?” 
and so on will be answered in different ways according to each culture. If shared 
typifications break down, a common reality, the underlying framework of shared 
reality collapses (Vayrynen, 1998). The implication of this is that “conflicts are 
characterized by a breakdown of shared reality” (Vayrynen, 2001: 117). What is at 
stake is not the denial of basic human needs common to all. Rather, at the center is a 
breakdown of shared interpretation of a reality or an underlying clash of typifications 
(Vayrynen, 1998). 
 
From cultural perspectives, the basic idea of conflict resolution will be that relevance 
system and typifications need to be altered, and a new definition of a reality found, 
which makes cooperation between/among the parties in conflict possible (Vayrynen, 
2001). Therefore, the role of conflict resolution problem-solving workshops, from the 
cultural perspective, should be to create a framework for mutual cultural adaptation. 
Such problem-solving workshops deal fundamentally with the interpretative schemes 
of the participants by giving them a chance to negotiate a shared reality (Vayrynen, 
2001). Consequently, if problem-solving workshops succeed, it is not because the 
workshops achieve the realization of universal basic human needs, but because they 
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enable the parties in conflict to appreciate each other’s standpoint, gaining insight into 
each other’s concerns, priorities and constraints (Avruch, 1998), which could open the 
door for exploring a shared understanding of conflict.  
 
1-3-2 Peace-building from below 
What is peace-building from below? Critique of traditional conflict resolution 
approach 
According to Ramsbotham et al, much of the growth of the idea of peace-building 
from below came during the course of experience gained in supporting local groups 
trying to preserve or nurture cultures of peace in areas of armed conflict in the 1990s 
(2005). Lederach notes one of the characteristics that can be commonly seen in the 
majority of the armed conflicts since 1990s has been that people seek their own sense 
of security in smaller or narrower identity groups such as ethnic, racial, religious, 
cultural and so on (1997). Further, Lederach argues while the identity of people in 
those armed conflicts is not exclusively tied to citizenship in the state, the paradigm 
that informs the approaches for comprehending and dealing with those conflicts has 
remained that of international or interstate diplomacy (1997).  
 
Against this background, it has come to be recognized that simple one-dimensional 
intervention, whether by traditional mediation for formal peace agreements or 
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peacekeeping operations placed to observe ceasefires or monitor elections cannot 
secure a comprehensive and long-term resolution (Woodhouse, 1999a). In the 
traditional approach to conflict resolution that mainly relied on small group 
problem-solving workshops, it has been uncommon for the consequences of a 
workshop to be transferred in any meaningful way to the conflict (Rupesinghe, 
1995).46 In other words, even though the main victims of conflict are ordinary people 
or citizens, they are often marginalized in conflict resolution.47 A new means to depict 
the complex dynamics and processes of conflict resolution has been developed, which 
includes the idea that effective and sustainable peacemaking processes should be 
based not merely on engineering peace agreements made by elites, but more 
importantly on the empowerment of communities devastated by war or conflict to 
build peace from the bottom (Woodhouse, 1999a). As the significance of post-conflict 
peacebuilding has been recognized as a critical part of conflict resolution, there has 
arisen the idea that formal agreements at the top leaders’ level need to be 
complemented by understandings, structures, and long-term development frameworks 
that eliminate cultures of violence and sustain peace processes on the ground 
(Woodhouse, 1999a).  
                                                  
46 It should be also noted that the limitations of problem-solving had been recognized 
before the end of the Cold War. Kelman and Cohen (1976), for example, cautioned that 
problem-solving should not be viewed as panacea.  
47 Ryan argues that most of the literature in the conflict resolution field has been 
concerned with inventing approaches to help the parties in conflict resolve their 
conflicts through face-to-face talks and the problem of that is ordinary people have 
been marginalized in conflict resolution theory (1995).  
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Comprehensive conflict resolution approach: expanding the range of participants 
Ryan (1995) argued that peace-making 48  initiatives can address the fears and 
perceptions of people at the decision-making level.49 While they are the main victims, 
ordinary people at the grass-roots level have been provided with few opportunities in 
the process of resolving their own conflicts. Traditional approaches to resolving 
conflict were focused on the Track One approach represented by negotiation or 
mediation that involves elites or decision-makers and Track Two approach represented 
by problem-solving workshops in which unofficial but politically influential persons 
were main actors. Under these circumstances, a shift in our thinking has been required, 
which sees that the setting and the people in a conflict situation are not problems and 
that outsiders are not the only agents necessary to resolve conflict. Rather, people 
from the setting and their taken-for-granted knowledge about the setting, including the 
conflictual situation are key resources (Lederach, 1995b).  
 
John Paul Lederach argues that an infrastructure should be established that legitimizes 
and integrates multiple levels of the population affected by violent conflict so that 
everyone can be empowered to participate in rebuilding a war-torn society (1995b). 
                                                  
48 Ryan notes peace-making is concerned with third-party intervention in the 
negotiation process between decision-makers. It is concerned with interventions at the 
elite, decision-makers level. Ramsbotham et al (2005) note peacemaking means 
moving towards settlement of armed conflict. They also say in peacemaking parties 
are induced to reach agreement voluntarily.  
49 Nordstrom (1995) argues that elite agencies lose the insights available at the 
grass-roots level and tend to develop policy that does not gratify the ground reality. 
 66
Therefore, he categorizes the population into three levels. The first level is top-level 
leadership, which comprises the key political and military leaders in the conflict, who 
represent a few key actors within the broader conflict setting (1997). The second level 
is the middle-range leadership that is composed of persons who function in leadership 
positions within a setting of conflict, but whose position is defined, but not necessarily 
controlled by the authority or structures of the formal government or major opposition 
movements (1997). According to Lederach, the important figures in sectors such as 
health, education, business and so on are included in this category. The third level is 
the grassroots level, which represents the vast majority of the affected population: the 
common people, displaced and refugee, local leaders, elders, church groups and 
locally based NGOs (Woodhouse, 1999a). What should be highlighted regarding these 
categorizations is that each group engages in respectively different business or plays a 
particular role in the peacebuilding process.50 
 
From this model, Lederach proposes that in order to resolve contemporary conflict, 
there should be mechanisms for integrating and coordinating high-, middle-, and 
grassroots level strategies, in which all of those who have been affected by conflict are 
                                                  
50 For example, Lederach (1997) explains the top level peacebuilding approach is 
focused on achieving a negotiated settlement, that is, ceasefire or a cessation of 
hostilities. The typical peacebuilding at the second level is the problem-solving 
workshop. And at the third level, the peacebuilding is not a matter of political 
accommodation done at the top-level, but focus is on how to deal with interdependent 
relationships in the everyday lives of significant numbers of people. See more detail 
Lederach.  
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given space and legitimized (1995b). The Lederach model is neither a final answer nor 
panacea. However, as Miall (2004) acknowledges, the significance of Lederach’s 
model is that it broadens our view of conflict and the conflict parties and draws 
peacebuilding resources from the wider society. Structuring a peace process in deeply 
divided societies needs a framework that takes into account the legitimacy, uniqueness, 
and interdependency of the needs and resources of the grassroots, middle-range and 
top-level groups (Lederach, 1997). Thus, the approach of peacebuilding from below 
shows that no one must be marginalized from conflict resolution process. Rather, as 
Ramsbotham et al argue, in the peacebuilding from below approach, keys to achieving 
lasting peace are derived from and built from local resources (2005). Put another way, 
people in a conflictual situation should be made aware that they are not merely the 
recipient of external help but that they can be the essential actors who decide the 
direction of conflict resolution.  
 
However, as Woodhouse cautions, the approach of peacebuilding from below does not 
mean that a role for external third parties is denied, but it proposes that their roles 
should be reoriented (1999a). External third parties are not the only answers to resolve 
conflict; rather, their roles should be empowering the people in a conflict setting to 
transform the situation into peaceful one. However, this does not impair the 
importance of outside intervenors who wish to help resolve conflict. As Ramsbotham 
 68
et al insist, peacebuilding from below is not the panacea (2005).51 
 
1-3-3 The emergence of Conflict Transformation 
What is conflict transformation? 
Although it is generally accepted that conflict is an all but inevitable part of human 
life, as Lederach notes, conflict can affect and change things both in destructive and 
constructive directions (1995b). In other words, how we understand conflict and how 
we approach conflict are crucial.  
 
Transformation gets involved with wide-ranging social structures, moving toward a 
social space open for cooperation, for more sound relationships and far more 
nonviolent mechanisms to deal with conflict (Lederach, 1995b). Although it is almost 
impossible to have single definition of conflict transformation, Mitchell argues that 
there is one key thing about which most would agree: the conflict transformation 
approach copes with destructive conflicts beyond the cessation of violence, the 
attainment of compromised settlement or even the joint creation of an acceptable 
solution to the issues in conflict between/among the adversaries, in other words, 
“beyond resolution” (2005: 2).  
 
                                                  
51 Regarding the possible problems of peacebuilding from below approach and the 
reorientation of outsiders’ role, See Ramsbotham et al (2005: 222-229).  
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Critical view of conflict resolution 
Since the 1990s, there has been critical review of conflict resolution, which prompted 
the emergence of the concept of conflict transformation as part of contemporary 
conflict resolution discourse. 
 
Nordstrom argues that the tendency to take a Western epistemology of time as a linear 
process and the resolution of conflict as a finite point on that line perpetuates both the 
cycle of conflict resurgence and a blindness to its nature (1995).52 Based on this linear 
concept, Lederach holds, the language of resolution implies finding a solution to a 
problem, which results in regarding some set of events or matters that are experienced 
as painful to an end (2003). Accordingly, for conflict resolution, the presentation of 
problems is the main focus. From a conflict transformation angle, conflict resolution is 
inclined to concentrate on the substance and content of the problem, which indicates 
that conflict resolution can be understood as content-oriented undertaking (Lederach, 
2003).  
 
Conflict resolution in many cases has been understood to be focused on mediated 
dialogue that seeks to address the fundamental needs of both or all parties to a conflict 
                                                  
52 Galtung (1995) also argues that the underlying assumption of the resolution 
perspective is that conflict as a formation has a finite life, which is followed by an 
eternal afterlife either as resolved or as intractable. And he claims this attitude is 
clearly Occidental.  
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(Francis, 2002). For this reason, the problem-solving workshop has been taken as the 
central approach to resolving conflict.53 One of the critiques of conflict resolution 
based on problem-solving is that the main focus has been on the role of the third 
parties – in particular, outsiders – as intermediaries and the relatively little attention 
has been paid to the role of inside actors (Francis, 2002). Besides that, 
problem-solving conflict resolution has tended to deal with conflicts by operating 
close to official efforts and deal with decision-making elites or at least with opinion 
leaders and influentials (Mitchell, 2005). Further, Reiman (2004) insists that a 
problem-solving approach cannot critically examine the underlying frameworks it 
assumes such as a status quo, social order, or to question its assumption about 
universality and objectivity. Conflict resolution approaches based on problem-solving 
that do not get to the structural analysis of conflict can have an overall result of 
maintaining an existing unequal social system and the conflict it creates (Rubenstein, 
1999). Consequently, the approach to transforming the structures that create and 
sustain conflict is required.  
 
                                                  
53 Fetherston (2000) notes in analytical problem-solving workshop a rational 
distancing is needed, which the participants come to see their conflict as frustration of 
basic human needs and learn how to deal with conflicts of interests.  
Besides that, Rupesinghe (1995) maintains that large number of literature on conflict 
and conflict resolution has been in the form of theoretical reflection that originates in 
the USA and Europe and this presupposes a domain of rationality in which all the 
parties share certain central values based on rational argument. Based on this 
assumption, he insists that the focus in conflict resolution is to get the parties in 
conflict to the table and through negotiations it will be possible to find a positive-sum 
solution acceptable to them.  
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Approaches to conflict from conflict transformation 
While conflict resolution is conceived to be content-oriented, emphasizing tackling 
the manifested problems in conflict, conflict transformation can be understood to be 
process-oriented. Lederach insists that a peace-process is not just the short-term 
business of getting people to the negotiating table, nor of accomplishing a cease-fire, 
but includes tasks such as broader transformation, reconciliation, social reconstruction 
and so on (1995). In other words, conflict transformation, as Miall notes, is “a process 
of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses, and if 
necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent 
conflict” (2004: 4), the ultimate aim of which is to achieve the non-violent struggle for 
social change and justice.  
 
The critical first step in the transformation approach is the belief that there is nothing 
sacrosanct about a status quo since it is the source of the conflict, so that the process 
of transformation begins with an inquiry into and critique of the existing system and 
an assumption that it is fundamental to create new systems, structures and 
relationships (Mitchell, 2005). 
 
Rupesinghe holds that transformation can bear fruit if it is not merely a transfer of 
power; but only if sustainable structural and attitudinal changes are also achieved 
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within the society and new institutions emerge to tackle outstanding issues, the 
achievement of which requires the empowerment of local people (1995). This shows 
that conflict transformation and the approach of peace-building from below are 
interconnected, which has much bearing on founding constructive conflict handling 
mechanisms within the setting. Constructive conflict handling requires the society’s 
confidence in its civic institutions, culture and capacity to manage conflict peacefully 
and productively, which lies in the hands of people in its society. Therefore, as Francis 
argues, the development of good governance and political participation, including 
pluralism and the public expression of various points of view on public policy, can be 
recognized as essential for the foundation of stable and prosperous societies in which 
conflict will be dealt with in non-violent and constructive way (2002). Empowerment, 
participation and the idea of fair-minded relationships can be acknowledged as 
cardinal elements in conflict transformation.   
 
Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation: What is the relationship 
between them? 
While there has been an increasing critique of conflict resolution from the conflict 
transformation perspective, it also should be noted that there is some critical 
engagement of conflict transformation from a conflict resolution perspective.  
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Ramsbotham et al argue that conflict resolution is a more far-reaching term that 
implies the deep-rooted sources of conflict are tackled and transformed (2005). 
Further, they maintain that conflict resolution indicates that behavior is no longer 
violent, attitudes are no longer hostile, and the structure of the conflict has been 
changed (2005). From these points of view, conflict transformation is the deepest level 
of the conflict resolution tradition rather than a separate venture (2005). If their 
definition of conflict resolution is employed, conflict resolution can be understood as 
an imperative part of work for development, social justice, and social transformation. 
Their idea of conflict resolution does not put exclusive emphasis on addressing the 
visible manifestation of conflict, rather it also takes efforts to transform the underlying 
structure that has created conflict and make hostile relationships between former 
antagonists just and sound to prevent the resurgence of conflict.  
 
Kanisin also claims that conflict resolution is a process-oriented enterprise whose aim 
is “to address the underlying cases of direct, cultural and structural violence” (2003: 
2).54 He also argues that tackling the causes of cultural violence entails a change in 
the belief/value system and if addressing cultural violence is part of conflict resolution, 
that indicates strategies for engaging at the level of mass people, not just among the 
                                                  
54 According to Galtung (1996), the function of cultural violence, which is expressed in 
any kinds of symbol such as religion, ideology, language, art, science, law, media, 
education and so on, is to legitimize direct and structural violence.  
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few participants in problem-solving workshops (2003). Thus, Kanisin’s idea of 
conflict resolution is also a comprehensive approach to conflict that goes beyond the 
critical idea of conflict resolution from conflict transformation perspective. Further, as 
explained in the preceding sections, it should be remembered that those who had 
contributed to conflict resolution before the end of the Cold War acknowledged that 
the problem-solving workshop is not a panacea.  
 
Thus it can be seen that there are various ways to define the term ‘conflict resolution,’ 
which means that while some are focusing on tackling its manifestations, in other 
cases, as represented by Ramsbotham et al and Kanisin, conflict resolution also goes 
beyond addressing visible issues, deeper into tackling invisible structural sources of 
conflict. Put another way, conflict resolution and conflict transformation are not 
necessarily antithetical, but as Kanisin notes, if there is a difference between conflict 
resolution and conflict transformation, “it lies only in our perspective” (2003: 14).  
 
1-3-4 Spiritual dimension in conflict resolution: restoring human relationships 
The argument over human nature 
One of the prominent characteristics of contemporary conflict resolution is its 
religious engagement. As broadly argued, religion has two faces: religion as a 
legitimization for violence and war; and religion as deep source for mutual 
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understanding, promoting non-violent conflict resolution and peace. 55  As 
Ramsbotham et al note, religion can be used to reinforce exclusive identities – the 
sharp demarcation between “us” and “them” – and to justify destructive political 
programmes (2005). However, at the same time, religion can give us a deep insight 
into human nature that transcends secular divisions, which could enable us to achieve 
unity as human beings.   
 
The most essential human nature from a spiritual perspective can be seen as the 
divinity of every human being. For example, Adam Curle insists spiritually irrefutable 
knowledge of the existence of God within each individual, which must form the 
foundation of our attitude towards ourselves and towards others to whom we are 
joined, being all children of God (1981). Montville also maintains that the three 
Abrahamic faiths focus on the dignity and rights of the individual as central to all 
religions (2002). Further, he insists that “the moral compulsion to inclusion of all 
God’s children is clear and inescapable” (2002: 107).56 
                                                  
55 For example, Montville (2002) holds that religion reinforces the human 
psychological construct, where human beings can be capable of love and creativity but 
also hatred and destructiveness.  
See also Appleby, R. (2000) The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and 
Reconciliation Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, Md. This book examines the two 
faces of religion in detail.  
56 According to Montville (2002), one of the core values of Christianity is the 
recognition that human beings are created in the image of God, which leads that all 
human beings have been given sacred quality as birthright and deserving of dignity 
and respect in all relationships. Regarding Judaism, he holds God’s compassion is 
universal, not just for Jews since all human beings are children of the same Father 
and are created in the image of God. Further, he argues the unique characteristic of 
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Curle argues that non-Abrahamic religions have the same essence as Abrahamic ones. 
He insists that in Hinduism, the concept of Atman represents both the sources of all 
being, Brahman, the Absolute and its individualized expression (1981). Besides that, 
he explains, the Buddhists recognize in all the existence of the Buddha nature (1981). 
In short, all religions have the same fundamental teaching, that is, the inherent divine 
nature of all human beings and the achievement of unity with others is the aim of the 
religious life or the purpose of all human existence (Curle, 1981). All the wisdom 
traditions that have emerged through human history reflect a desire to heal broken 
relationships among human beings and to find ways of acceptance that enable them to 
live together in peace (Petersen, 2002).  
 
Why is restoring human relationships needed in conflict resolution? 
Contemporary conflict can be broadly characterized by deep-seated, severe enmity, 
fear and serious stereotyping. Although we see tremendous pain and deep-rooted 
antagonism in any war, as Lederach argues, the nature of armed conflict, where 
neighbor fears neighbor and in some cases family member fears family member and 
each sheds blood, makes the emotive, perceptual, social-psychological and spiritual 
perspectives core matters (1997). Further, Lederach insists that the immediacy of 
                                                                                                                                               
Islam is the conviction that belief in the oneness of God unites the Muslim with all 
humanity since God is the creator of all human beings, irrespective of their religious 
backgrounds.  
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hatred and prejudice and of racism as important elements and motivations of conflict 
demonstrates that its transformation should be rooted in social-psychological and 
spiritual dimensions, which has been left out of international diplomacy (1997). In 
addressing contemporary conflict, not only dealing with the causes of conflict, but 
also making an effort to accomplish peaceful relationship or restoring human 
relationship between/among the former antagonists should be included as the essential 
component of conflict resolution.   
 
Reconciliation as a way of restoring human relationships 
Ramsbotham et al (2005) argue that reconciliation, that is, restoring broken 
relationships and learning to live non-violently with radical differences, can be 
regarded as the ultimate objective of conflict resolution. Besides that, they also insist 
that it is the long-term process of reconciliation that constitutes the essence of the 
lasting transformation which conflict resolution seeks – the hallmark of the integrative 
power that binds disparate groups together into genuine societies (2005).  
 
According to Lederach (2001), reconciliation can be characterized as dynamic and 
variable processes that purport to reconstruct and restore the broken framework of 
interpersonal relationships and community lives.57  Reconciliation is establishing 
                                                  
57 Volf (2002) maintains reconciliation is mainly a process whose objective is not so 
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relationships and relationships are about real people in real situations who have to find 
a way forward, which means that the relationship that made possible the 
interdependent co-existence of former adversaries should be built in reconciliation 
processes (Lederach, 2001).58 
 
In order to prevent a resurgence of the cycle of hostility, how the history of conflict 
relationships can be overcome becomes the cardinal matter. Establishing trust 
between/among former antagonists should follow overcoming past wounds of 
victimization by such means as acknowledgement of past crimes and expression of 
remorse (Jeong, 1999). Lederach (1997) insists that reconciliation should find ways to 
deal with the past without being entrapped in a vicious cycle of mutual exclusiveness. 
People need opportunity and space to express mutually the trauma of loss and their 
grief at that loss and the anger that accompanies the pain and the memory of injustices 
(Lederach, 1997). In this process, acknowledgement is the decisive element. Lederach 
(1997) holds that acknowledgement through one another’s stories can validate 
experience and feelings and become the first step to restoration of the person and the 
relationship. 
                                                                                                                                               
much the integration of citizens into a political unity as the creation of a community in 
which each recognizes and is recognized and in which all mutually give themselves to 
each other in love.  
58 Fisher (1999) argues in a situation in which violence has become a social norm, 
promoting a mutually conciliatory accommodation between/among the antagonists 
and establishing a peaceful relationship is of great importance.  
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In relation to reconciliation, the issue of forgiveness should be also considered. Staub 
and Pearlman (2002) claim healing, reconciliation and forgiveness are deeply 
interconnected. They maintain that while forgiving is very difficult, it can open the 
door for reconciliation and further healing (2002). They also hold that offering 
forgiveness can improve the psychological well-being of victims – forgiveness can lift 
the burden of anger and the desire for revenge (2002). However, Volf insists that 
forgiveness should not be confused with acceptance of the other (2002). To offer 
forgiveness means at the same time to condemn the misdeed and accuse the doer, and 
to receive forgiveness means to admit the deed and accept the blame (2002). Hicks 
cautions that although it might be true that forgiveness not only helps free the 
victimizer of and shame and the burden of wrongdoing, but also frees the victim, the 
problem is that forgiveness must not be forced (2002). Rather, he insists, it is unethical 
to push forgiveness onto those who are not ready to forgive (2002).  
 
Justice and reconciliation 
Reconciliation has been assumed by some to be an essential element in achieving a 
peaceful society after devastating conflict, but there are some issues that should be 
considered in relation to reconciliation.  
 
Pankhurst (1999) argues although the process of public truth-telling can make a 
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contribution to reconciliation and long-term positive peace, in which former enemies 
live peacefully, in truth commissions or the similar processes of revelation and 
recording of the past tragedies, there emerge the issues of amnesty versus prosecution, 
which raises an importance to discuss the issue of justice. 
 
While justice is essential to reconciliation, it is also important to know that there are 
several forms of justice. The first type of justice can be called retributive justice. 
Lederach explains retributive justice assumes that the violent offense that has taken 
place against a person or a group is best coped with as if it were a crime or violence 
against the laws of states or against humanity (2001). This can be also termed criminal 
justice, which involves the inquiry, prosecution and punishment of the leading figures 
and executors of gross human rights violation (Chapman, 2002). 
 
While individual responsibility is important, this type of justice can be problematic. 
For instance, Volf claims that although the enforcement of punitive justice might 
rectify past wrongdoings, it cannot create communion between victims and 
perpetrators since the matter of positive relationships that need to be constructed 
between the former antagonists is left out (2002). The main problem of retributive 
justice is that it cannot heal broken relationships.  
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The second type of justice can be called restorative justice. According to Staub and 
Pearlman, restorative justice tries to show through actions that the perpetrators are 
sorry, understand the pain they have inflicted and want to make amends (2002). The 
aim is for the community to acquire a sense that justice has been done, that the 
offenders and their offenses have been denounced and held accountable, that a sense 
of peace and community healing have been restored and that a process of establishing 
safety and trust has begun (Staub and Pearlman, 2002). Thus restorative justice seeks 
to repair an injustice, to compensate for it and affect corrective changes in 
relationships and in future behavior (Chapman, 2002). It can be seen that while it does 
not deny the punitive actions, restorative justice gives priority to the restoration of 
human dignity to both the victims and those who have done damage to them so that 
broken human relationship could be healed.  
 
Further, there is a third type of justice, which can be called distributive justice. A main 
theme of distributive justice is to address the underlying causes of conflict that in 
many cases lie in real or perceived socio-economic, political or cultural injustices 
(Mani, 2002).59 The central concern of distributive justice is how post-conflict 
societies overcome grievances such as unjust distribution of and access to political and 
                                                  
59 Mani maintains that while issues of distributive justice are not necessarily the 
fundamental cause of all contemporary conflicts, they emerge as prominent 
facilitating factors in the terrain of internal political conflicts (2002).  
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economic resources that underlie conflict (Mani, 2002). The rationale for addressing 
distributive justice as Mani argues, can be of help to prevent a relapse into conflict and 
future conflicts, which can consolidate peace (2002).60 
 
Thus justice does not have only one dimension; rather there are several possible 
approaches to justice in conflict. It would be missing the point to question which 
justice is best to deal with conflict. The most important thing to be kept in mind is that 
justice is multi-faced, which can be shown by the various approaches such as truth 
commissions, tribunals or reparation, rehabilitation steps and the long-term effort to 
build sound governance that enables the fair distribution of or access to political and 
economic participation, which would promote and achieve reconciliation. It should be 
remembered that what kind of justice will be employed relies heavily on the situation 
in the country in question.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the history and evolution of conflict resolution. Since its 
genesis as an important component of peace research, conflict resolution has seen the 
all but inevitable interplay between theoretical development and practice. Secondly, a 
rich body of literature continues to develop from within its own tradition, both in an 
                                                  
60 Regarding the more detail of distributive justice, see Mani (2002: 126-157).  
 83
ordinary developmental sense and in a reflexive, self-critical way. Thirdly, conflict 
resolution continues to draw on the insights of many academic disciplines and 
traditions. It can be seen that the concept of conflict resolution has been expanded in 
terms of the causes of conflict, who the main actors are in both conflict and conflict 
resolution, the meaning of peace and so on. Having looked back at the historical 
evolution of conflict resolution, the next chapter will map the framework of 
contemporary conflict resolution.  
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Chapter Two: The Scope of Contemporary Conflict Resolution 
 
The previous chapter has examined the history and evolution of conflict resolution, 
which concluded that the concept of conflict resolution has been broadened in terms 
of causes of conflict, the important actors in conflict resolution, the concept of peace 
and ideas on the appropriate and effective methodologies and levels of action. 
However, what must be remarked is that, as a field of praxis and as an academic 
discipline, the development of conflict resolution never ceases. Rather, it keeps 
progressing and broadening its sphere. For example, basic human needs theory, the 
concept of protracted social conflict, and social psychological analysis of intergroup 
dynamics, which were introduced into conflict resolution decades ago, have been 
subject to critique and reframed according to the demands of changing circumstances.  
 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to map out the framework of contemporary 
conflict resolution as it now stands by extending the history and evolution of conflict 
resolution outlined in chapter one, and by incorporating the most recent theoretical 
debates and applications. This requires re-visiting a number of the subjects examined 
in chapter one; and since some of the foundational work of the early pioneers of 
conflict resolution continues to be debated, reappraised and practiced, there is 
inevitably some repetition. It does not serve the purpose of this dissertation to take an 
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argumentative position on any of these issues. Rather, the presentation of these 
established and critiqued theories and practice is in terms of their broad acceptance (or 
otherwise), not as original judgments of this dissertation.  
 
2-1 The generally agreed constitutive elements of conflict resolution 
2-1-1 Basic Human Needs 
As explained in the previous chapter, basic human needs theory was introduced by 
John Burton into the conflict resolution field and that has made a huge contribution to 
conflict resolution in its theory and praxis. Although several decades have passed 
since basic human needs theory was introduced, it can be maintained that basic human 
needs theory is still one of the most important elements in conflict resolution.61 
According to Jeong, the gratification of basic needs is required for human 
development as well as the survival of human beings in both physical and social terms, 
and, therefore, the struggle for the satisfaction of basic needs is a crucial motivational 
factor behind human behavior and social interaction (2000).  
 
Further, Jeong claims that in basic human needs there are primary emotional 
                                                  
61 For instance, Jeong (2000), in his book which is characterized as an introductory 
guide to peace and conflict research, discusses the importance of basic needs as the 
root-cause of conflict. Also, in 2001 The International Journal of Peace Studies 
presented a special theme issue on John Burton and basic human needs and in that 
volume, several authors, including Burton himself, explored critically and 
constructively basic human needs and conflict resolution for the future.  
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perspectives, represented by fear, anger, depression, happiness and so on as well as 
physiological dimensions (2000).62 Sites argues that animals including human beings 
possess the need for conditions that will reduce the negative emotional states of fear, 
anger and depression and enable them to achieve the positive emotional state of 
satisfaction (1990b). Emotions and corresponding needs are present in humans though 
they are intertwined and very complicated as they are related to the survival of the self 
as well as survival of the physical organism (Sites, 1990b). Therefore, it can be 
assumed that emotions and corresponding needs are present in humans in all societies, 
and consequently, the satisfaction of basic needs becomes essential for human beings 
since fulfilling basic needs plays the critical role for them to grow in society. 
 
Basic needs and conflict transformation 
If basic human needs are widely, if not universally, recognized as a root cause of 
conflict, it can be presumed that aggressions and conflicts are the direct result of some 
institutions and social norms being incompatible with inherent human needs (Burton, 
1998). As Burton insists, “conflict resolution and prevention would be possible by 
removing the sources of conflict: institutions and social norms would be adjusted to 
the needs of persons” (1998: 1).  
                                                  
62 Sites (1990b), by using Kemper’s theory, holds that expressions of the same 
primary emotions appear in every human infant at early stage and these emotions are 
often identified in cross-cultural research.  
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Burton assumes that throughout history, philosophers, social scientists and policy 
makers seem to have prioritized the need for order and stability and the preservation 
of the institutions of society over the lives and the needs of the individual person 
(2001a). However, from conflict resolution perspectives based on basic human needs 
theory, societies should be modified to meet the needs of people. In other words, when 
societies or the institutions in society fail to respond to the basic needs of people, 
which causes violent conflict, they should be transformed into ones that can gratify 
those needs of members of society.  
 
Thus, it can be seen that Burtonian conflict resolution ultimately aims at changing a 
political-social system in order to satisfy the basic needs of everyone in the society. 
Preserving the existing social systems that validate the inequality among members is 
the critical element that causes and prolongs violent conflict without solution. For the  
Burtonian approach, the key to resolving violent conflict is to transform societies as a 
whole so as to become less wasteful of resources, more long-term oriented and more 
cooperative in decision-making (Burton, 2001b). This demonstrates that structural 
transformation becomes the focal point so that inequality among people in terms of 
political and economic opportunities is to be overcome and more harmonious 
relationship among them will be achieved. Subsequently, basic human needs theory 
and its application to conflict resolution, in particular, the Burtonian one, has much 
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bearing on conflict transformation that is one of the main themes in contemporary 
conflict resolution. 
 
2-1-2 Social Identity 
As explained in the preceding chapter, social psychology has contributed to theoretical 
and practical elaboration and development of conflict resolution. An essence of social 
psychology is not to examine individual difference: rather, the main focus of research 
is “on the collective aspects of conduct, the socially shared, derived and systematic, on 
how social forces shape the many, not the individual exception” (Turner, 1996: 20). 
Rather than individual behavior, analysis of intergroup relations is a central concern 
for social psychology (Turner, 1996).  
 
At the heart of intergroup dynamics lies identity. Deschamps and Devos assert that 
identity is an essential element in social psychology since it is one of its central 
concerns (1998). Furthermore, Jussim et al claim that various disciplines of 
contemporary social science research and theory have indicated that self and identity 
play the central role in understanding human thought, feeling and action as they are 
crucial in establishing correlation between individual human beings and larger 
socio-cultural groups and systems (1998). For this reason, the examination of identity 
should be taken into serious consideration in approaching phenomena in the human 
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world. Since human beings are bound to be social beings, analysis of social identity is 
of particular importance to grasp dynamics of the human world; and the phenomenon 
of conflict is not an exception.  
 
Black insists that it has come to be broadly recognized that many contemporary, 
deep-rooted, protracted and intractable conflicts are those between/among identity 
groups (2003). One of the outstanding characteristics of contemporary conflict is that 
identity groups in conflictual situations “live as neighbors and yet are locked into long 
standing cycles of negatively defined interaction” (Caritas International, 1999: 3), 
which incrementally aggrandizes mutual fear, anger and antagonism and falls into 
vicious cycles of violence. Therefore, it can be reasonably seen, as Rothman dwells on, 
that “although the analysis of identity groups, or collectivities based on ethnicity or 
nationality, religion or ascriptive traits, has not replaced the nation-state as the 
dominant conceptual and organizing vehicle for international relations, it is clear that 
identity as an analytic tool and focus of global peacemaking continues to grow” 
(2001: 284).  
 
According to Northrup, identity can be defined as “an abiding sense of self and of the 
relationship of the self to the world” (1989: 55). It can be also delineated as “a system 
of beliefs or a way of constituting the world that makes life predictable rather than 
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random” (Northrup, 1989: 55). However, what must be remembered in understanding 
the construction of identity is that as we are essentially social beings, groups are 
indispensable components of self-identity. Put another way, as Brown states, “we join 
groups to help define ourselves” (2006: 319) and social identity comes to the fore.  
 
Black explains that social identity signifies public aspects of the individual self that 
are important for group membership, the construction of social bonds and the 
formation of collective action (2003). In other words, social identity can be 
understood as the social dimensions of an individual’s self-image that derives from 
belonging to a certain social group and the emotional and evaluative significance that 
results from such group membership (Fisher, 1990b). It is through this belonging to a 
certain social group that enables individuals to define their specific positions in 
society (Deschamps and Devos, 1998), which gives them an answer to the existential 
question of “Who they are.” Consequently, it can be seen that social identity makes an 
important contribution to the establishment of an individual’s self-esteem or positive 
self-concept, that is, “a quality that it is assumed people are generally motivated to 
increase or maintain” (Fisher, 1990b: 95). In this line of thinking, social identity 
inheres in our identity as its central component.  
 
However, there is one more thing that must be mentioned regarding construction of 
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social identity: in the process of identification with a certain group, there emerges the 
division between “in-group” or “us” and “out-group” or “them.” Although, as Black 
states, the distinction between “us” and “them” is a universally seen phenomenon 
(2003), this division has a huge impact upon the dynamics of conflict. Therefore, 
in-depth analysis of social identity in terms of how it affects subjective and 
psychological dimensions of contemporary conflict characterized as a social/collective 
identity-based phenomenon needs to be examined, which will be delineated later in 
this chapter.  
 
2-1-3 Culture 
As examined in the preceding chapter, culture has been one of the critical elements in 
contemporary conflict resolution.  
 
Human beings cannot live alone: rather, we are essentially social beings and tend to 
belong to some groups. LeBaron argues that human beings are intrinsically creatures 
who assign meaning, seeking to explain, to understand and to make sense of their 
worlds and themselves in the worlds (2001), which makes culture an indispensable 
element for human beings.  
 
According to Kyrou et al, culture is the customary way in which groups form and 
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understand their behavior in relation to others and to their environment (1999).63 
Francis defines culture as “the patterning of assumptions about life, its realities and 
requirements and intrinsic or accompanying values and norms” (2004: 2). In short, as 
Vayrynen notes, cultures provide a grammar for acting and interpreting the world, and 
they refer to shared practices and to commonly held premises and presuppositions 
members of groups hold about the world that involves the social structuring of both 
the world outside the self and the internal world. (2001).  
 
Through socialization within their culture, individuals receive an understanding of 
what the world is like, adopt a particular set of values and gain an understanding of 
the cultural meaning of events and actions (Fry and Fry, 1997). Culture can be referred 
to as the systems of knowledge shared by large numbers of people (Gudykunst, 2004). 
Further, as Avruch argues, culture is conceived as an evolved element of human 
cognition and social action (2003). From these depictions, conflict can be understood 
as a cultural phenomenon since the ways in which conflict is perceived and dealt with 
reflect a culturally shared set of attitudes and beliefs (Fry and Fry, 1997). 
 
From a cultural perspective, it can be assumed that the different understandings of 
reality play the important role in conflict. As Vayrynen hypothesizes, when one group 
                                                  
63 Gudykunst states that belonging to group is an important motive for behavior since 
it removes ambiguity about ourselves and others (2004).   
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tries to impose its idea (of reality) on the other, that could give rise to a counterattack 
from the other, as a result of which violent conflict could arise (2001). The crucial 
point is whose definition of reality will be taken seriously and acted upon (Vayrynen, 
2001). Accordingly, as Avruch states, “although culture is rarely by itself the cause of 
conflict, it is always the lens through which differences are refracted and conflict 
pursued” (2003: 143).64  
 
Why are the different views of reality a focal point? Why does the struggle for the 
imposition of one’s definition of reality upon the other become a crucial theme? These 
questions are closely related to the identity problem. According to LeBaron, from 
infancy on, we receive cultural messages. They have a huge impact on who we are, 
who we believe it is acceptable and unacceptable to be, and how we perceive others 
and ourselves (2001). They also form our views on conflict, our efforts to establish 
and sustain relationships and communities and shape our common sense (LeBaron, 
2001). Therefore, deep-rooted or intractable conflict entails more than visible material 
resources and communication; rather it is closely connected with the symbolic level of 
identity and meaning-making and identity and meaning are so fundamental to our 
sense of self and position in the world (LeBaron, 2001). Therefore, the breakdown of 
                                                  
64 LeBaron also claims that conflict ensues when our need for security infringes upon 
another’s territory or the meanings we assign to behavior or events are different from 
others’. (2003).  
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shared reality or the struggle for the validity of one definition or view of reality could 
be crucial in understanding violent conflict.  
 
According to Avruch, from a cultural viewpoint, the analysis of psycho-cultural 
interpretations will be of importance (2003). The examination of the pertinent 
cognitive representations, such as the images, encodements, schemas, metaphors in 
each cultural group would be important (Avruch, 2003).65 In particular, the essence of 
conflict resolution from a cultural viewpoint is how a shared reality can be created – 
changing the psycho-cultural interpretations of one another: transforming metaphors 
and schemas. Therefore, as LeBaron insists, the effort to try to look through others’ 
lenses to see what they magnify and what they minimize is essential (2001). Besides 
that, it is important to adjust one’s own lenses to address conflict (LeBaron, 2001). 
When the effort is taken to try to understand another’s viewpoints and to modify one’s 
own assumptions, it might be possible to create a third culture. Broome notes that the 
third culture is characterized by unique values and norms that may not have existed 
prior to the dyadic relationship (1993). Further, he claims that third culture can only 
develop through interaction in which parties in conflict are willing to open themselves 
to new meanings, to commit themselves to honest dialogue and to respond to the new 
                                                  
65 LeBaron explains metaphors are windows into the terrain of a culture: they 
uncover how we see our relationships to each other and ideas (2003). Metaphors show 
us starting points and reveal something about the images we hold of ourselves and 
others (2003).  
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demands that emanate from the situation (1993).  
 
2-1-4 Power 
As Haugaard states, there is no single agreed definition of power (1999). Rather, 
Lukes argues that different theories offer different definitions of the concept of power 
and ordinary language allows for a wide variety of distinguishing, overlapping and 
inconsistent usages of the term (1977).66 However, Bell insists that whilst we have 
little agreement on a single, right definition of power, most of the available discourses 
on the topic are similar in that most authors take power as if it were a thing to possess 
for the purpose of achieving one’s will over others (1999).67 Karlberg also argues that 
power tends to be associated with competition at best, coercion or domination at worst 
(2005). Thus, it seems that power, which has been defined as a form of domination, is 
generally examined in the context of its impact on others (Bell, 1999). 
 
Truly, the concept of power as domination or so-called “power-over” is useful to 
understand conflict given that the structural dimension, which will be analyzed in 
                                                  
66 See Lukes (ed) (1986) Power Oxford: Basil Blackwell. This book clearly 
demonstrates how diversely the concept of power is understood by various authors 
like Bertrand Russell, Max Weber, Robert Dahl, Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, to 
name a few.    
67 Haugaard also mentions that in general, most social and political theorists conceive 
of the study of power as both the analysis of the capacity of individuals to make others 
do things that they would not otherwise do and as the study of the social relationships 
that sustain that capacity (1999).  
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detail later, has been recognized as one of the fundamental components of 
contemporary conflict resolution. As Francis explains, there are various vehicles for 
the exercise of power over others: “wealth; control of resources and terms of trading; 
language; education; fashion; political structures and practices; laws; imprisonment 
and physical violence or the threat of it, on whatever scale, including military systems 
or wars” (2004: 3). Violence – the harmful and destructive use of power over others – 
is both the means and results of domination (Francis, 2004). Put another way, “a 
culture of domination is a culture of violence” (Francis, 2004: 3).  
 
Haugaard states that social structure and the truth that is generally recognized in it 
play the pivotal role in maintaining the relations of domination.68 Perceptions of truth 
are what reinforce some worldviews, which shape the ordering of the world 
(Haugaard, 1999). Power constructs social organization and hierarchy by creating 
discourses and truths, by enforcing disciplines and order, and by shaping human 
desires and subjectivities (Karlberg, 2005). Furthermore, the rules of ordering the 
world sustain and promote certain relations of domination over others and create 
                                                  
68 Michel Foucault argues that there can be no possible exercise of power without 
some economy of discourses of truth. We are subjected to the production of truth 
through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth 
(1986). He also claims that we are forced to produce the truth of power that our society 
demands in order to function: we must speak the truth; we are constrained or deemed 
to confess or to discover the truth. (1986). Power does not cease its interrogation, its 
inquisition, its registrations of truth – its institutionalization, professionalization and 
rewards of its pursuit are inevitable (1986).   
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conditions of empowerment and disempowerment among different groups of 
individuals (Haugaard, 1999). Thus, it can be seen that power as domination or 
“power over” that accompanies the creation of certain truth discourses in society is 
intimately connected to structural inequality between/among different groups.  
 
However, the central aim of conflict resolution is addressing the root causes of 
conflict, transforming the structures that promote or exacerbate conflict and changing 
the antagonistic relationships between/among the conflictual groups into constructive 
and cooperative ones, so that conflict can be resolved in non-violent ways. So, what 
we should seek is not merely the cessation of domination by one party over another, 
but the transformation of dominatory and destructive relationships and structures and 
the manifestation of violence (Francis, 2004). Therefore, sticking to the concept of 
power as domination or “power over” will be missing the point: rather, power should 
be also understood in a positive way.   
 
For instance, Miller insists that the concept of power should be broadened to include 
the capacity to produce change, which embraces activities such as nourishing and 
empowering others (1982).69 This effort to expand the concept of power is based on 
                                                  
69 Bell also argues the alternative theory of the traditional theories of power 
distinguish “power over” seen as domination from “power to” that enlarge the concept 
to include various kinds of individual and communal empowerment and “power to” 
can be characterized as ability, capacity, competence, potentiality and so forth (1999).  
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the idea that the dynamics of power relations should include not only those who have 
power over others but also those who are seen as powerless and excluded from the 
study of power (Bell, 1999).  
 
As Bell claims, power entails a relationship between individuals and groups in an 
interactive social context (1999). Power is relational and cannot be exerted by one in 
isolation from others. Alternative theories of power are based on the wish to produce 
views that include the experiences of all people involved in power relations, and the 
aim of constructing them is to argue that the frequently dismissed weak are 
acknowledged and become important players in power interaction (Bell, 1999). 
Therefore, while the power with domination involves the maintenance of existing 
social structures, challenges from below or from grass-roots levels can be expressed 
by transforming those structures and by creating novel patterns of interaction that 
could enable the powerless to resist the requirements and norms of those who try to 
control them (Bell, 1999).70 
 
Finally, Kenneth Boulding categorizes power into three facets – threat power, 
                                                  
70 Haugaard holds the reliance on structural power carries with it its opposite, that is, 
a new type of resistance. And since the reproduction of social systems presupposes the 
participation of those over whom power is exerted, the system is not reproduced if the 
supposedly powerless refuses to take part in the reproduction (1999). This leads to the 
loss of legitimacy of the existing social structure and could open the for the 
transformation of it.   
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economic power and integrative power – and each idea correlates respectively, with 
the power to destroy, the power to produce and exchange and the power to integrate - 
that is, the power to create such relationships as love, respect, friendship, legitimacy 
and so on (1989). Among these three, integrative power plays the cardinal role in 
conflict resolution and transformation. Boulding holds that a main source of the 
integrative power of a community or organization is the extent to which the personal 
identity of the members involved is bound up with their perception of the identity of 
the community or organization as a whole (1989). He maintains that peace is 
fundamentally dependent on the growth of a larger sense of community, an integrative 
power that transcends the existing boundaries and begins to spread (1989). As 
mentioned earlier, transforming hostile relationships into peaceful or harmonious ones 
is recognized as one of the keys in contemporary conflict resolution or transformation, 
and therefore Boulding’s integrative power is very important. Thus, power, in the 
context of conflict resolution and transformation, should be taken as a complex and 
multi-dimensional phenomenon.  
 
2-2 Significant actors in conflict and conflict resolution 
2-2-1 Shift from state to human being 
According to Dunn, Burton’s thought, especially the adoption of basic human needs 
theory, has revealed “a progressive move away from the conventional wisdom of 
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international relations as a discipline” (1995: 199). Traditionally, in international 
relations, the central actor has been state. For example, Dunn claims that although 
Realists and Idealists approach the implications differently, 71  they share the 
fundamental paradigm of state-centricity (2001). Further, according to Broadhead, the 
traditional argument of International Relations maintains that states are central entities, 
the world is as it is, and should be sustained. (1997). In other words, there is little 
possibility envisaged for transformation of the existing order based on state 
sovereignty as its centre. (Broadhead, 1997). On such a view, human beings both as 
individuals and as groups, are subordinate to state.  
 
However, from basic human needs theory, the above assumption should be 
problematized. Rosati et al insist that since individuals strive to satisfy basic needs, 
social systems must respond to individual needs if they are to keep their legitimacy 
and survive in the long term (1990). They also claim that human social relations, 
including international relations, at the heart of which the state exists as its cardinal 
entity, will remain incomplete unless human needs are recognized as an essential 
source of political and social interaction in world society (1990). Their view, as Dunn 
(2001) mentions, demonstrates that the adoption of basic human needs in conflict 
                                                  
71 Dunn explains while Realists stress the perennial nature of political power and 
means to it, Idealists believe that the system can be reformed, improved and managed 
better (2001).  
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resolution, which has been mainly promoted by Burton, reflects the recognition of the 
shift to human rather than institutional priorities.  
 
This does not mean that states are no longer needed. Rather, as Wedge argues (1990), 
from a basic human needs perspective, the manner of operation of the national and 
international levels of human organization including states ultimately hinges on the 
participation or consent of the individual persons whose aggregated behavior 
constitutes organized actions including conflict and war. 
 
Rosati et al insist that there is a dialectic interplay between individual human needs 
and larger social values and interests that society promotes (1990). Further, they 
emphasize that there are strong links between the pursuit of human needs and the 
conventional concepts of power, values and interests (1990). While the human needs 
viewpoint acknowledges the importance of power and the related concerns of 
traditional political Realism, it analyzes the concepts within a larger framework that 
directs attention to the underlying sources of human motivations (Rosati et al, 1990). 
Accordingly, the focus should be not on the features, capabilities and interests of 
states, but on human beings themselves because they act as agents of or in the name of 
states (Dunn, 2001). Thus, the primary level of analysis, or the starting-point for 
examining conflict is the human being.  
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2-2-2 Groups 
Human beings have mainly two faces to their existence: individuality and collectivity: 
we are social beings as well as individual beings.  
 
As Austin and Worchel state, we live most of our lives “in and around groups of one 
kind or another” (1979: 1). Human beings, through their history, have survived by 
bonding together in groups (Brown, 2006). Brown maintains that, in the beginning, 
human beings formed groups for hunting and gathering food and for fending off 
predators and enemies, and then, with the advent of farming and herding, human 
beings needed to create more complex group structures for the division of labor 
(2006). Finally, groups have expanded and evolved from clans and tribes to forge 
states and nations (Brown, 2006). Thus, it can be seen that “there is no humanity 
outside the framework of society” (Sites, 1990a: 136) or human life revolves around 
making groups. According to Aronson et al, a group “consists of two or more people 
who interact and are interdependent in the sense that their needs and goals cause them 
to influence each other” (2005: 284). In other words, a group can be defined as “an 
interdependent collection of individuals who interact and possess a shared identity” 
(Brown, 2006: 317).   
 
Since human beings are social creatures, many needs as they relate to self can be 
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satisfied only in interaction with others (Sites, 1990a). For instance, as Aronson et al 
argue, groups become a critical part of our identity, which helps us to define who we 
are (2005). Brown holds that the connection with others satisfies a need for belonging 
and social inclusion (2006). Besides that, by manifesting dissimilarity from others, a 
need for uniqueness will be gratified (Brown, 2006). Further, Sites insists that the 
need for meaning can be satisfied only by values that are socially constructed, shared 
or interpreted as such within the domain of culture (1990a). Thus, the link of needs to 
groups is an essential feature of human needs. The accomplishment of needs occurs 
within the context of groups of different scales (Kelman, 1997). In short, in a human 
needs approach, social networks of individuals, that is, groups, are a basic unit of 
analysis as human needs are pursued and values, interests and power arise through the 
interaction within them (Rosati et al, 1990).  
 
From these viewpoints, it is clear that if groups can be recognized as a basic unit for 
the gratification of human needs, examining group dynamism in conflict would be 
important. It does not mean that the individual dimension in conflict should be ignored. 
However, given that collective needs such as identity, security, and meaning, which 
are derived from belonging to groups, are fundamental for human beings (or 
individuals) to exist, as Fisher insists, the analysis of intergroup conflict and its 
resolution is critical if we are concerned about comprehending human social behavior 
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and ameliorating the human condition (1990a).  
 
2-2-3 Third parties 
Although primary conflicting parties or groups play the most important role in 
determining the direction of conflict, in some cases there can be no opportunity for 
contact between/among parties to a conflict without intervention of a third party that 
promotes communication between/among them (Cairns and Hewstone, 2001). 
Dedring states that the search for a peaceful outcome of conflict situations with the 
help of a third party or parties has been “a frequent phenomenon in world history” 
(2001: 8). According to Ramsbotham et al, in the conflict resolution enterprise, 
various kinds of agency (international organizations, states, non-governmental 
organizations, individuals) get involved, address different groups (party leaders, elites, 
grassroots) and vary in form, duration and objectives (2005). Fisher claims that it is of 
great importance to contemplate all elements of the conflict before surmising which 
form of intervention is likely to be most effective in moving the parties toward 
settlement and resolution (2001).  
 
There have been various types of third party intervention proposed – conciliation,72 
                                                  
72 Fisher explains in conciliation a trusted third party provides an informal 
communication link between the parties in the hope of detecting the central issues, 
reducing tensions and helping them move toward direct interaction like negotiation 
(1990a).  
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arbitration, 73  mediation, 74  consultation, 75  problem-solving. 76  Further, third party 
approaches can be categorized into two levels. According to Kriesberg, so-called 
Track One diplomacy consists of the mediation, negotiations, conciliation, and other 
official exchanges between/among governmental representatives while consultation, 
facilitation and problem-solving approaches are in Track Two diplomacy domain 
(1997). While Track One operates at the highest level of the government, Track Two 
refers mainly to more informal and unofficial efforts by non-governmental parties 
(Reiman, 2004). Though the participants in Track Two level do not hold formal power, 
they are seen as the important links between the high-level leadership and the wide 
society (Fisher, 2001).  
 
Reiman explains that in the past attention had been paid mainly to the differences in 
essence and emphasis between Track One as conflict settlement approaches and Track 
                                                  
73 In arbitration, an accepted authority as a third party imposes a settlement that is 
considered to be fair to both sides of conflict (Fisher, 1990a).  
74 In mediation, a skilled intermediary facilitates settlement to the disputes on a set 
of specific substantive issues (Fisher, 1990a). Bercovitch maintains that mediation 
should be seen as an extension of the negotiation process in which an accepted third 
party intervenes to change the course or result of a conflict (1996).  
75 According to Fisher, consultation is an intervention in which a skilled and 
impartial third party takes effort to facilitate creative problem solving through 
communication and analysis supported by social-scientific knowledge of conflict 
(1990a). Cheldelin and Lyons note that third party consultation emphasizes the 
importance of understanding and improving relationships as a means to resolve social 
conflict (2003). Further, they say that the emphasis is on the negotiation process and 
less on the substance of the outcomes (2003). 
76 Mitchell notes that the objectives of most problem-solving workshops, or sustained 
dialogues attempt to change adversaries’ views of their situation from a “conflict to be 
won” to a “problem to be solved” (2003). He also insists that problem-solving approach 
should be one of involving the parties to conflict in an analytical rather than an 
adversarial process and to get them to undertake a joint search for sauces rather for 
responsibility of the conflict (2003).  
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Two as conflict resolution approaches (2004). However, she also states that there has 
been a shift to an integrative and complementary approach of Track One and Track 
Two strategies. The emergence of integrative and complementary approaches has 
made it essential to synthesize the different models and concepts in the face of the 
various complexities of contemporary violent conflict situations and peacebuilding 
tasks (Reiman, 2004).  
 
Critique of the assumptions on third parties 
According to Fisher, the broadly received view of third-party in intervening in conflict 
is that the third-party should be impartial and neutral and refrain from taking sides 
with one party over the other, influencing outcomes one way or the other (2001). 
However, Bercovitch contends that while even-handedness or impartiality as the 
conspicuous characteristic of effective mediation cannot be denied totally, critical eyes 
should be cast upon the assumptions (1996). Rather, third-parties should make an 
effort to keep in mind that their intervention itself is situated within the structures of 
existing social systems and can result either in maintaining them or transforming them 
(Fisher, 2001).77  
 
As Miall states, most contemporary violent conflicts are asymmetric in terms of power 
                                                  
77 See also Dukes (1999). He insists that adapting a cloak of presumed impartiality in 
the face of power asymmetry and injustice can be a way of reinforcing the status quo.  
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and status between/among conflictual groups (2004).78 In those cases, therefore, the 
role of the third party is to help the transformation of the existing structure of 
relationships, if necessary, confronting elites for the purpose of transforming what 
have been violent and unequal relationships into peaceful, dynamic and balanced ones 
(Ramsbotham et al, 2005).79 As Cheldelin notes, although the ethic of impartiality or 
neutrality is still important in third-party intervention, those ethical qualities such as 
equality, justice and relationship-building toward transformation should be also added 
(2003).  
 
Another aspect that has been generally recognized in the role of third parties is the 
utilization of local knowledge and empowerment of local people. Given the 
complexity of contemporary conflict, as Woodhouse explains, it cannot be expected 
that one third party can deal with all or most elements of a given conflict (1996). 
Rather, as Kriesberg claims, in conflict resolution it has been important to seek for 
long-term processes and outcomes that take into consideration all sides of a conflict 
and maximize the participation of the people directly affected (1997). The long-term 
approach could be sustained if outsiders and experts support and nurture rather than 
                                                  
78 Structural dimension of contemporary conflict will be analyzed in detail later.  
79 Sandole third parties have should facilitate changes in political, economic, social 
and other structures in the human-made world, allowing the relatively more 
disenfranchised parties greater access to what structural violence had previously 
denied them – resources in the human-made and natural worlds for fulfilling their 
needs (2001).   
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displace resources that form part of a peace constituency and if the approach addresses 
all levels of an affected population (Woodhouse, 1999b).80   
 
Ramsbotham et al hold that there has been a shift from seeing third-party interventions 
as the main responsibility of external agencies towards respecting the role of internal 
third parties or indigenous peacemakers (2005). It is crucial to build constituencies 
and capacities within societies and to learn from domestic cultures how to manage 
conflicts in a constructive way over time (Ramsbotham et al, 2005). The internal 
actors from within the conflict zones are seen as the ones who will eventually assume 
the central role in transforming violent conflict into a peaceful situation. As Paffenholz 
remarks, the internal actors are the only actors who can achieve a sustainable peace 
(2004). Therefore, strategies to strengthen internal actors would make resolving 
conflict and sustaining peaceful relationships in the long-term more feasible 
(Paffenholz, 2004).81 
 
 
                                                  
80 Miall also maintains that people within the parties, within the society or region 
affected and outside actors with relevant human and material resources have 
complementary roles to play in the long-term process of peacebuilding (2004).  
81 For instance, Caritas International (1999) proposes several ways to support local 
peacemakers: providing an advisory capacity, facilitating local initiatives, workshops 
and training in a number of fields which local groups might identify as imperative. 
The central aim of the support is to empower people of goodwill in conflict affected 
communities to rebuild democratic institutions and to help in the development of the 
local peacemakers’ inner resources of wisdom, courage and compassionate 
non-violence.  
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2-3 What dynamics have had impact on the understanding of conflict and conflict 
resolution?  
2-3-1 Reassessing Protracted Social Conflicts in the context of the post-Cold War 
era  
According to Azar, approaches to conflict before his concept of protracted social 
conflict had treated only the symptoms of overt conflict without addressing the 
problems of structural inequality and violence (1983). His main point is that without 
analyzing the relationship between conflict and development factors such as structural 
inequality, resource misdistribution, poorly planned and excuted development projects, 
ethnic struggle and colonial experience, we cannot understand the dynamics of war 
and peace (1983).  
 
Azar defines protracted social conflict as the prolonged and often violent struggle by 
communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair 
access to political institutions and economic participation (1991). As Ramsbotham 
argues, the sources of protracted social conflicts lay within and across states with four 
clusters of elements identified as preconditions for their transformation to high 
intensity (2005). The four variables are: the communal content – the identity group as 
the basic unit in protracted social conflict; deprivation of human needs; governance 
and the state’s role as the crucial factor in the gratification or frustration of individual 
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and identity group needs; and international linkages, in particular, political-economic 
relations of economic reliance within the international economic system and the web 
of political-military linkages forming regional and global patterns of clientage and 
cross-border interest (Ramsbotham, 2005).82 
 
In understanding protracted social conflict, it is of great importance to keep in mind 
that for Azar inequality in social structures is mainly responsible for overt hostile 
behavior (Azar, 1983). A protracted social conflict is seen as the product of political 
and economic inequality and ideological dominations of one group over another, as a 
result of which, the unequal access to power is legitimized and the asymmetrical 
structure is maintained (Azar, 1983).  
 
From these perspectives, it could be assumed that a protracted social conflict would 
arise when there is an unequal access to political and economic opportunity 
between/among different identity groups and the systems prioritize one or a few 
groups over others, which could result in the failure to meet the needs of all groups in 
a fair way. From Azar’s protracted social conflict perspective, as the deprivation of 
                                                  
82 Azar claims that although protracted social conflict occurs when communities are 
deprived of gratification of their basic needs based n their communal identity, the 
deprivation results from a complex causal chain involving the role of the state and the 
pattern of international linkage (1990). Further, he insists that initial conditions such 
as colonial legacy, domestic historical setting and the multicommunal nature of the 
society play critical role in shaping the genesis of protracted social conflict (1990).  
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basic needs is intertwined with structural and cultural violence, it is imperative to 
address those two violence in order to fulfill everyone’s basic needs (Kanisin, 2003). 
As Miall assesses, Azar’s studies in protracted social conflict can be understood as 
having major influence on conflict transformation theory by proposing the protracted 
quality of contemporary conflicts (2004). Miall explains that most contemporary 
violent conflicts are asymmetric in nature, marked by inequalities of power and status 
between/among groups (2004). Further, according to Nathan, there are four structural 
conditions that can be generally recognized as characteristic of contemporary 
conflicts: “authoritarian rule; the exclusion of minorities from governance; 
socioeconomic deprivation combined with inequality; and weak states that lack the 
institutional capacity to manage normal and political and social conflict” (2000: 189). 
Thus, it could be argued that examining structural inequality becomes critical in 
understanding contemporary conflict.  
 
If it can be demonstrated that structural inequality, that is, social injustice is a source 
of conflict, then achieving social justice that responds to the needs of all people or 
groups becomes a critical agenda, in which peacebuilding can play an important 
role.83  
                                                  
83 Although Azar himself did not discuss peacebuilding in his works, if we look into 
the contents of peacebuilding, we could see that Azar’s theory of protracted social 
conflict and peacebuilding are interconnected. Azar and Farah claimed that a 
protracted social conflict involves a history of social interactions within an unequal 
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According to Christie et al, peacebuilding is “designed to reduce structural violence” 
(2001: 11). Bush states that the challenge of peacebuilding is to identify and cultivate 
                                                                                                                                               
structures, with sporadic violence representing deep crises in social interactions in the 
economic and political spheres, which makes it necessary to do a critical analysis of 
the structural causes for inequalities, the political power structure and the ways they 
may produce violence (1981). In protracted social conflicts, Azar insists, we can see 
features such as distributive injustice represented by political, economic, and social 
disparities among different groups and any approaches that do not address these 
injustices would rather prolong the conflict (1986). In other words, inequality in the 
social structure is mainly responsibly for over hostile behavior (Azar, 1983), which 
could lead to that structural transformation to achieve fair access of every group to 
political and economic activities is of necessity. Azar also insists that highly 
centralized political structures are sources of conflict since those structures tend to be 
dominated by one or a few groups and do not respond to the needs of all groups (1986). 
Therefore, Azar claims that conflict resolution in protracted social conflict requires an 
open, participatory and decentralized political structures as opposed to highly 
centralized, dominant and exclusive structures since decentralized political systems 
could enable the local authorities to control their political, economic and social 
concerns (1986). Put differently, from Azar’s viewpoints, policy and institutional 
designs should emerge not from the top-down but from the bottom-up (1991). Inputs 
from the grass-roots level concerning various communal actors should be incorporated 
into the overall decision-making process (Azar, 1991). This would show that for Azar, 
achievement of social justice based on the fair participation of all groups in policy and 
decision-making is important in resolving conflict. 
According to Fisher, the basic idea of peacebuilding is transforming the political and 
economic systems of a society so as to overcome the structural inequalities that can be 
seen as a cause of overt violence among different groups (2001). This could show, as 
Christie et al state, that peacebuilding stresses the promotion of social justice (2001). 
In other words, as Botes notes, social systems that are structurally peaceful could be 
created by constructing economic, political and cultural institutions in which 
decision-making power is equally distributed among groups (2003b). Thus, as Christie 
maintains, peacebuilding could be understood as a movement toward social justice 
that can be achieved when political structures become more inclusive by giving voice 
to the groups that have been marginalized in decision-making, as a result of which, 
economic structures is also transformed and everyone could gain access to material 
resources to meet basic needs (2001). Further, Clements states that peacebuilding is 
what most societies do spontaneously – developing effective rule making regimes, 
dispute resolution mechanisms and cooperative arrangements that can gratify basic 
economic, social, cultural and humanitarian needs of all concerned (1997). 
Sustainable peace promoted by peacebuilding approach as Christie et al claims, needs 
peacemaking efforts within the context of long term strategy to produce more 
equitable social structures – both peaceful means of dealing with differences and 
socially just ends (2001). From those perspectives, it could be argued that the basic 
aims of peacebuilding is transforming unequal social structures, empowering those 
who have been marginalized in the society and enhancing the society’s competence to 
deal with conflict in peaceful and constructive manner. Thus it could be seen that both 
Azar’s theory of protracted social conflict and peacebuilding see social justice and 
empowerment of the grassroots as the important factors to resolve conflict in the long 
term. Therefore, exploring the relationship between Azar’s protracted social conflict 
and peacebuilding could be effective.  
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the political, economic and social space, within which groups in conflict can identify, 
develop and adopt the resources necessary to construct a peaceful and just society 
(2004). Further, he claims that the ultimate aim of peacebuilding is to strengthen or 
create democratic structures and processes that are fair and respond to the needs of 
every citizen – institutions that guarantee and promote the political rights and 
responsibilities of state and civil society and buttress human security through the 
promotion of sound and sustainable economic, judicial and social practices (2004).  
 
Azar advocates structural development that is characterized as progressive reform in 
the sociopolitical structures and a redistribution of power, which will lead to the 
foundation of institutions that can promote economic development (1991). The degree 
of distributional inequalities is a matter of the flexibility of power relations: “the more 
flexible they are, the higher is the system’s capacity for integration (the less potential 
for conflict) and vice versa” (Azar and Farah, 1981: 331). The integrative competence 
of social system relies on: “the degree of mobility; the existence of institutionalized 
processes of mediation and arbitration such as a fair judiciary system; the degree of 
political participation; and the degree of inequality socialization (the levels of 
acceptance for the existing inequalities” (Azar and Farah, 1981: 331). As Ramsbotham 
summarizes, recommendations from Azar’s view on conflict resolution are: “the 
importance of managing ethnic dominance, countering lack of economic opportunity 
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and remedying government inability to protect minorities” (2005: 123) and promoting 
the capacity of society itself to resolve conflict in a non-violent and constructive way. 
Thus, it is clear that Azar’s proposals are very essence of peacebuilding.  
 
Azar also emphasizes the linkage between protracted social conflict and the 
international system. He insists that the peripheral integration of developing countries 
into the international economic system has created conditions that promote the rise 
and perpetuation of protracted social conflict (1983). According to him, a growing 
structure of economic inequality, the inefficacy of the economic development model 
and bureaucratic authoritarianism enabling the state to cope with the economic crises 
resulting from the integration into the global economy are examples of the linkage 
(1983). Therefore, restoring equality of economic opportunity among states is crucial 
in resolving protracted social conflict. For him, critical analysis of international 
political and economic systems and eventual transformation of them are essential to 
achieve a peaceful and stable world in the long run.  
 
Azar’s insight into the international dimension of protracted social conflict is still 
important in understanding contemporary conflict. For instance, Duffield insists that 
contrary to the popular view of globalization that sees capitalist relations as 
redoubling their penetration and interconnection of all parts of the globe, the central 
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regions of what is called the liberal world system appear to be consolidating and 
reinforcing the ties between them at the cost of outlying areas (2001).84 Further, he 
argues that in order to struggle with declining development assistance from the North, 
Southern rulers have formulated adaptive and innovative strategies for their economic 
and political survival (1999). These strategies are the formulation of new alliances 
with international actors including commercial ties to create the informal economy 
and those connections have resulted in both semi-legal and illegal parallel activities,85 
which involve the control, coercion or deprivation of people’s (citizens’) assets (1999). 
Consequently he argues that many contemporary internal conflicts are not an irrational 
departure from daily life, but a rational strategy for Southern rulers or those who grip 
the power to survive globalization and changing nature of the nation-state (1999).  
 
Duffield’s analysis shows that at least some contemporary conflicts cannot be fully 
comprehended or addressed without linking them to national, regional and 
international structures. Therefore, in the conclusion chapter of his work, he advocates 
the need for critical analysis of the nature of the political complexes associated with 
the contemporary conflicts, how such complexes are integrated within the liberal 
                                                  
84 See also Christie et al (2001). They maintain that globalization, which is referred to 
as the worldwide push for free markets, has left enormous inequalities on a large 
scale.  
85 In other work (2001), Duffield states while the South has been isolated and 
excluded by the dominant web of global economy, the South has been integrated into 
the liberal world system through the spread and deepening of all kinds of parallel and 
shadow transborder activity.  
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world system, and how the institutions and networks of global governance should be 
reformed in order to address the complexity of global structure (2001). As 
Ramsbotham argues, Duffield’s critical approach to the global system echoes the main 
thrust of Azar’s approach, that is, international linkages of protracted social conflict 
(2005). Besides that, as Miall claims, it should be noted that in the long run, “the 
nature of the international system shapes how conflicts are resolved in many ways” 
(1992: 60).  
 
From these analyses, it could be argued that Azar’s analysis of conflict represented by 
the concept of protracted social conflict and his comprehensive and long-term oriented 
conflict resolution have huge implications for understanding contemporary conflicts. 
This does not mean that we should follow his theory blindly. Rather, the point is that 
the critical and constructive examination of protracted social conflict could give us 
some hints or wisdom to resolve contemporary conflicts.  
 
2-3-2 Social psychology and conflict 
Intergroup dynamism 
As discussed in the previous chapter, social psychology has made a valuable 
contribution to the development of conflict resolution. Besides that, it has also been 
claimed that the group is the essential unit in conflict, and therefore, it is important to 
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examine psychological dynamism between/among groups.  
 
According to Sheriff and Sheriff, the term “intergroup relations” means “relations 
between two or more groups and their respective members” (1979: 8). They also state 
that whenever individuals, who belong to one group, interact with another group or its 
members in terms of their group identification, there arises intergroup behavior (1979). 
In short, intergroup behavior involves actions by member of one group towards 
members of another group (Brown, 2001).86  
 
There are mainly two research agendas social psychology has been engaged in to 
approach the psychological dimension in conflict – social categorization/social 
identity theory and contact hypothesis (Brewer and Gaertner, 2003).  
 
According to Brewer, through categorization, human judgment and cognition 
processes come to be constructed, in which the objects and events are lumped together 
into meaningful groups that enable us to deal with incoming information (2003). 
Categorizing the world into a manageable number of groups not only helps people to 
simplify and make sense of it, but also plays the key role in defining who they are 
                                                  
86 See also Hogg and Vaughan (1995). They define intergroup behavior as intersection 
between one or more representatives of two or more separate social groups.  
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(Brown, 2001).87 In other words, social categorization enables the individual to 
undertake many forms of social action and creates and defines the individual’s place 
in society (Tajfel and Tuner, 1979).  
 
Furthermore, the most important thing in social categorization is that, as Brewer 
maintains, the categorization of a person into a social group creates a division between 
an ingroup (a category to which the perceiver belongs) and an outgroup (a category to 
which the perceiver does not belong) (2003) – the division between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ 
The ingroup and outgroup distinction is the underlying component of social 
psychological theory of intergroup relations (Brewer, 2003) and it is important to 
examine how this distinction affects psychological dynamism.  
 
Turner holds that social categorization can be internalized to change the psychology 
and conduct of the individual, that is, “producing a qualitative shift to a collective 
psychology” (1996: 20). According to Hogg and Vaughan, categorization of people 
into an ingroup (us) and an outgroup (them) causes an accentuation effect: the 
perceptual accentuation of similarities among people within a category and difference 
between people from different categories (1995). So, the perception of people in terms 
                                                  
87 See also Hogg and Vaughan (1995). They hold that social categories provide 
members with a social identity – a definition of who they are and a description and 
evaluation of what his entails and instruct appropriate behavior for members.  
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of social group memberships brings about a tendency to overemphasize the perceived 
similarities within groups and the perceived differences between groups, which causes 
stereotyping88 and prejudice89(Turner, 1996). 
 
Through categorization, people come to be perceived and behave not as unique 
individuals but as group members (Hogg and Vaughan, 1995). Besides that, once 
categories have been formed and become salient, people are biased toward 
information that enhances the differences between members of different categories 
(Brewer, 2003). Further, as Stephan and Stephan argue, “the very act of categorization 
causes the tendency to evaluate oneself and one’s group positively” (1996: 103).90 In 
addition to that, ingroup and outgroup assessments tend to be inversely related, that is, 
the more positively the ingroup is evaluated, the more negatively the outgroup is 
evaluated (Stephan and Stephan, 1996) since the distinctiveness and value of one’s 
group stems from comparison to other group (Brewer, 2003).  
 
                                                  
88 Forsyth defines stereotype as cognitive generalization on the qualities and 
characteristics of the member of a particular groups (1990). He also notes that 
stereotype comes with certain built-in biases since it paints a picture of the out-group 
that is too simplistic, too extreme and too homogenous (1990).   
89 Prejudice can be defined as the holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive 
beliefs, the remark of negative affect or the demonstration of hostile or discriminatory 
behavior towards members of a group on account of their membership of that group 
(Kremer et al, 2003). They also state that prejudice is generally recognized as an 
affectively and emotionally-based negative attitudes (2003).  
90 Hepburn maintains that in the state of people being de-personalized as the 
categorization becomes salient, if they cannot see their groups in a positive way, they 
cannot see themselves in a positive way (2003).  
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In short, members of outgroups are viewed as similar to each other, as different from 
the ingroup and as possessing generally negative features, and through those 
perceptions outgroup members will not be treated as individuals but as generic group 
members (Stephan and Stephan, 1996). This process could be the basis for negative 
stereotyping and for discriminatory actions derived from stereotyping, such as 
dehumanization of the outgroup and antagonistic responses toward them (Stephan and 
Stephan, 1996), as a result of which, mutual distrust between ingroup and outgroup 
can become more serious and intergroup competition can be fiercer. Thus, as Forsyth 
insists, categorization and its psychological dynamism show that even if conflict is 
rooted in objective characteristics of the situation, subjective biases would further 
divide the opposing groups (1990) and exacerbate conflictual situation.  
 
Although categorization and its psychological dynamism are the key elements in 
social psychology perspectives on intergroup conflict, it should be noted that there is 
argument over whether categorization derived from social identity theory is a cause of 
conflict. For example, Tajfel and Turner argue that the mere perception of belonging 
to two distinctive groups – social categorization – is sufficient to touch off intergroup 
discrimination that favors the ingroup (1979). The mere consciousness of the presence 
of an outgroup is enough to give rise to intergroup competitive and discriminatory 
responses on the part of the ingroup (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). 
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However, Turner and Reynolds counter-argue that it is only when the positive 
distinctiveness of the ingroup is threatened that ingroup favoritism in the negative 
domain arises (2003). They claim that social conflict cannot be attributed to 
psychological processes exclusively but should be analyzed in terms of the 
combination of many aspects as conflict is shaped by the historical, social, economic 
and political structure of society (2003). Therefore, intergroup conflict will emerge 
when insecure identities and a socially competitive need for positively assessed 
distinctiveness are correlated with a conspicuous division into groups and a realistic 
conflict of interests (Turner and Reynolds, 2003). From these perspectives, the 
psychological dynamism derived from social categorization is not seen as an 
alternative to conflicting group interests or the impact of the macro-social structure 
(Turner, 1996). Rather, it should be recognized that psychological intergroup 
dynamism is a complementary process and an interacting part of the complex web of 
factors that condition intergroup relations (Turner, 1996).   
 
Contact hypothesis 
According to Brewer and Gaertner, the contact hypothesis is “a general set of ideas 
about reducing intergroup prejudice and discrimination that developed among social 
scientists in the 1940s in the context of inter-racial relations in the United States” 
(2003: 452). The basic assumption behind the contact hypothesis is that since 
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intergroup hostility is caused by unfamiliarity and separation, under the appropriate 
settings, contact among members of different groups will reduce hostility and bring 
about more positive intergroup attitudes (Brewer and Gaertner, 2003). 
 
The contact hypothesis assumes that contact between different groups will enhance 
mutual communication and enable them to discover that they share similar basic 
attitudes and values and to appreciate each other’s way of life and consequently 
mutual hostile attitudes, prejudices, and misconception would be reduced (Niens and 
Cairns, 2001). Thus, theoretically, it can be supposed that contact hypothesis can play 
an important role in resolving intergroup conflict since, as examined, psychological 
dynamism of intergroup relations can exacerbate conflict and it is critical to address 
the psychological negative impact on conflict.91 
 
Gordon Allport, who made a huge contribution to theorization of contact hypothesis, 
states that prejudice will be reduced by equal status between majority and minority 
groups in the pursuit of shared objectives (1954). He also holds that the effect of 
contact will be increased if the contact is provided with institutional support, which 
will provide members of opposing groups with an opportunity to perceive common 
                                                  
91 For instance, Ryan (1995) states that the most simplistic way of peacebuilding is 
the contact hypothesis that is defined as the generally held view that interaction 
between members of different groups will reduce ethnic prejudice and intergroup 
tension.  
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interests and common humanity between them (1954).  
 
From Allport’s original ideas, there are some generally agreed conditions central to the 
formulation of the contact hypothesis: social and institutional support for the contact; 
equal status among participants; promotion of some cooperation over jointly desired 
goals; and enough frequency and duration of contact to promote the meaningful 
relationships (Brown, 1996). Under these conditions, it is expected that the groups in 
conflict will be provided with the opportunity for positive experiences with members 
of the outgroup, which disconfirms previous negative attitudes and eventually changes 
attitudes toward and views on the outgroup as a whole (Brewer and Gaertner, 2003).  
 
Critique of contact hypothesis 
According to Kremer et al, it has been generally hypothesized by social psychologists 
that the ideal contact conditions would improve the interpersonal relationships 
between members of different groups and give them the opportunity to rectify their 
personal negative stereotypes and recognize the basic similarities between them 
(2003). The problem of this assumption is that even if intergroup contact takes place 
under the ideal circumstances, mutually nurtured positive attitudes formed toward 
individual members of the outgroup during the contact often fail to generalize to the 
outgroup in general (Niens and Cairns, 2001).  
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Behind this problem, there is a tendency in contact hypothesis that participants have 
been seen as individuals not as members of respective groups, which blocks the 
cognitive link to the prior groups (Brown, 2001).92 Treating outgroup members as 
individuals, not as group members is unlikely to bring about changes in attitudes 
toward the group in general (Stephan and Stephan, 1996). As Ryan insists, since 
intergroup conflict is a collective phenomenon, an appropriate collective model of 
man is required (1995). The psychological elements of intergroup hostility or 
antagonism will be best dealt with in terms of collective social cognition93 and 
motivation (Ryan, 1995).  
 
By placing social groups in the background, interpersonal contacts will not change 
intergroup relations since individual outgroup members will not be viewed as 
members of social groups (Stephan and Stephan, 1996) Therefore, it should be 
recognized that contact must take place not between individuals as individuals, but 
rather between members of respective groups (Niens and Cairns, 2001). Put another 
                                                  
92 Hepburn analyzes that traditional contact hypothesis derived from Allport’s work 
has understood prejudice as individual problems and, therefore, the solution to 
prejudice is seen in the framework of a liberalist view of society that stresses the 
fundamental nature of individual actions and understanding (2003). While social 
psychology has been motivated by a concern with human betterment and welfare 
including resolving intergroup conflict, it works within an individualist dimension of 
social organization (Hepburn, 2003).   
93 According to Brewer, social cognition is the study of how individuals process 
information about themselves and other individuals, but it is also about the 
perceptions that guide interpersonal exchanges and about cognitive representations of 
social groups (2003).  
 125
way, group identities should be made salient in intergroup interaction to maximize the 
chance that positive changes generated by the contact will generalize to the outgroup 
as a whole (Stephan and Stephan, 1996). Thus, for the improvement or enhancement 
of the effect of contact hypothesis, the shift of focus on individual dimension to group 
or collective dimension is crucial.  
 
Contact hypothesis combined with other elements 
Brewer and Gaertner argue that one of the serious concerns about the contact 
hypothesis is whether the results acquired under the relatively benign settings of 
intergroup relations between experimentally generated groups in the laboratory can be 
generally applied to the real-world social groups with a history of conflict and 
antagonism, inequalities of status and power and political struggle (2003). Stephan 
and Stephan critique that contact hypothesis is generally oriented toward the present 
and less concerned with the historical causes of negative intergroup relations and the 
wider social context that cannot be subject to situational control (1996) 
 
However, as Hewstone and Brown insist, most social conflicts are caused by historical, 
political and economic division in the society (1986). Intergroup discrimination and 
hostility are derived from elements other than mere lack of knowledge or inadequate 
perceptions; rather it should be recognized that a prevalent inequality between/among 
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groups is the background to the contact hypothesis and to any analysis of intergroup 
contact and conflict (Hewstone and Brown, 1986). Therefore, for instance, although 
the equal status between the participants in contact has been recognized as one of the 
critical factors in contact circumstances, the manipulation of equal status within a 
contact situation may be highly difficult or impossible to achieve (Hewstone and 
Brown, 1986) since actual inequality between groups is embedded in wider 
socio-political and socio-economic contexts.  
 
In short, social phenomena including social conflicts have historical backgrounds and 
are affected by economic and political processes that cannot be addressed only by 
social psychological analysis (Brown, 2001). The use of contact hypothesis as a means 
of improving a conflictual situation depends much on the social structure that patterns 
intergroup relations (Pettigrew, 1986). As Ropers insists, the critical concerns of social 
conflicts are not stereotypical perceptions, difference of opinion and cultural standards, 
but rather actual conflicts of interests, structural elements and the struggle for power 
and influence (2004). Intergroup contact can ameliorate intergroup relations in society, 
but given that the social structural dimension has huge impact on intergroup relations, 
the role of contact hypothesis would be limited (Hewstone and Brown, 1986). In order 
to promote the successful intergroup contact, social structural transformation should 
be sought as the ultimate concern.  
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Since prejudice and conflict arise from various interrelated elements, there is no 
simple remedy and any single approach will be limited despite the strength of the 
theoretical basis (Kremer et al, 2003), which is true with contact hypothesis. Contact 
theory like most social-psychological processes does not have causal superiority in 
explaining social conflict (Pettigrew, 1986). As Ryan cautions, contact should be 
understood as a necessary but not sufficient condition for bringing about a positive 
change in intergroup relations and attitudes (1995). This does not reject the idea that 
contact can create a change of intergroup negative attitudes. Rather, other approaches 
need to be added to contact hypothesis to make it more effective as a means of 
reducing stereotypes, preventing scapegoating and reversing dehumanization (Ryan, 
1995).94 
 
2-4 What kinds of conflict have been identified and prioritized for resolution? 
Salience of internal conflict in the post-Cold War era 
According to Woodhouse, the vast majority of armed conflicts occurring in the 
post-Cold War era have been internal conflicts95 (1996). However, it would be 
                                                  
94 For instance, Ryan proposes several steps as peace-building approaches along with 
contact hypothesis: economic development with economic justice, the promotion of 
superordinate goal, education for mutual understanding between/among different 
groups and reconciliation and forgiveness policy. Regarding details of respective 
approaches, see Ryan (1995: 129-152).  
95 Brown defines internal conflict as violent or potentially violent political dispute 
whose origin can be tracked down mainly to domestic factors and where armed conflict 
occur or threatens to come into being generally within the boundaries of a single state 
(1996). 
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missing the point to insist that internal conflicts have emerged only after the Cold War. 
As Duffield claims, for several decades, the majority of armed conflicts around the 
globe have been taking place within the state boundaries rather than between states 
(1999). Further, Harbom and Wallensteen argue that in every year since the end of 
World War Two, ongoing internal armed conflicts have outnumbered inter-state 
conflicts and that general increase in the number of conflicts between 1946 and 1992 
is mainly explained by an increase in internal conflicts (2005). 96  In short, as 
Goodhand and Hulme state, the shift in the patterns of armed conflict from wars 
between states to conflicts within states, which began around the end of World War 
Two, remained the same even in the post-Cold War era (1999) 
 
Why did internal conflicts draw little attention during the Cold War even though the 
number of those conflicts had been increasing? Rothman holds that researchers in 
international relations focused on the causes and resolutions of inter-state war and 
consequently the analysis of internal conflicts was almost neglected (2001). 
Ramsbotham argues that throughout the Cold War, civil-international wars were 
generally framed by the Cold War geopolitics and at superpower dimension, and 
further, the two main blocs were preparing for the possibility of a full-scale military 
confrontation in spite of the nuclear deadlock (2005). It was this possibility of 
                                                  
96 Regarding the detailed data of an increase in the number of internal conflict, see 
Harbom and Wallensteen (2005: 623-635).  
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devastating military encounter of great powers that preoccupied the concerns of 
International Relations and Strategic Studies during the Cold War (Ramsbotham, 
2005), which resulted in little attention being given to internal conflicts.  
 
Although the post-Cold War era has seen an increased acknowledgement of internal 
conflicts, the problem of inter-state war cannot be dismissed. For example, Patomaki 
warns that the possibility of a third world war fought with weapons of mass 
destruction still threatens humanity (2001). Therefore he also insists that it is crucial to 
implement organized and concerted observation of technologies and the control of 
current weapons of mass destruction to prevent the global-scale war (2001).  
 
However, at the same time, internal conflict also has a tremendous impact on the 
international community, which is well demonstrated by Brown. He asserts that the 
examination of internal conflict is significant mainly for five reasons. They are: 
internal conflict has been widespread; it has caused devastating suffering; it so often 
affects and involves neighboring states, which brings about regional destabilization; it 
engages the interests of distant powers and international organizations; and the efforts 
to address the problems put forward by internal conflict have been in the process of 
being reassessed by policy-makers at the national, regional and international level 
(1996). His argument clearly shows that internal conflict can have implications for 
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peace on the global scale.  
 
Woodhouse argues that the basic unit of the internal conflicts in the post-Cold War era 
has been ethnic groups or that an ethnic element has framed contemporary internal 
conflict (1996). Besides that, he claims that there is a close connection between the 
protracted and violent nature of contemporary ethno-nationalist conflict and the 
identity-developing function of membership in ethnic groups (1996).  
 
Behind the salience of ethnic identity in contemporary internal conflict, there is “the 
lack of convergence between ethnic communities and state boundaries” (Woodhouse, 
1996: 37). However, as Harff and Gurr insist, the end of the Cold War cannot entirely 
be blamed for the outbreak of ethnic conflict in the 1990s onwards since the extent of 
conflicts between ethnic groups or between ethnic groups and states increased steadily 
during the Cold War (2004). Put another way, the explosion of ethnopolitical conflicts 
in the post-Cold War era has been an extension of a trend of conflict that began at the 
beginning of Cold War (Harff and Gurr, 2004). The outbreak of ethnopolitical 
conflicts can be understood as a manifestation of the mismatch between the state 
competence to govern and ethnic groups that want to defend and promote their 
collective identity and interests.97 While state is a central component in international 
                                                  
97 Hutchinson and Smith hold that in the modern state there was no room for ethnic 
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relations, it should also be remarked that examination of identity groups or 
collectivities is crucial to gain a clear picture of the dynamics of contemporary 
conflict.  
 
According to Gurr, ethnic groups are “people who share a distinctive and enduring 
collective identity based on common descent, shared experiences and cultural traits” 
(2000:3). An ethnic group can be defined as a collectivity within a larger society 
having real or supposed common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past and a 
cultural focus on symbolic elements defined as the archetype of their people-hood 
(Schermerhorn, 1996).98 Further, Hutchinson and Smith raise two important elements 
of ethnic identities. They are: the importance of shared myths and memories in the 
definitions of ethnic identities and the subjective identification of the individuals with 
the community; and the orientation to the past, that is, the orientation to the origins 
and ancestors of the community and to its historical formation (1996).  
 
Why is ethnic identity important for us? Woodhouse observes historically there seems 
                                                                                                                                               
autonomy that was at odds with the requirement for all citizens to integrate into the 
national state. The ideologies of political nationalism required all the members of a 
nation-state to be united and homogenous, which led to the advent of conflicts in 
states which had various ethnic communities (1996).  
98 Hutchinson and Smith raise several generally seen main features of ethnicities. 
They are: a common proper name to identify and express the essence of the 
community; a myth of common ancestry; shared historical memories or shared 
memories of a common past; one or more components of common culture such as 
religion, customs, language and so on; a link with a homeland; and a sense of 
solidarity on the part of at least some sections of the population (1996).  
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to be a human need for the development of collective identity based on common 
language and the perception of a shared history and culture (1996). Rupesinghe states 
that (ethnic) identity is “a system of belief or a way of constructing the world, that 
makes life predictable rather than random” (1995: 72). He also holds that ethnic 
identity is not only a psychological sense of self but also encompassing a sense of self 
in relation to the world, which may be experienced socially and psychologically 
(1995). In short, the sense of a common ethnicity, that is, ethnic identity has remained 
a major focus of identification of individuals (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996), which 
gives them a sense of security and existence.  
 
Having explored ethnic identity as a key element in contemporary conflict, we have 
one more critical question to discuss: Does the difference or diversity of ethnic 
identity cause violent conflict? 
 
There are three generally recognized approaches to analyze the relationship between 
ethnic identity and conflict. The first approach is primordialism. 99  From a 
primordialist viewpoint, violent conflict arises from ethnic differences or is ultimately 
                                                  
99 According to Kaufman, primordialism sees basic group or ethnic identity as 
consisting of the ready-made set of endowments and identifications every individual 
shares with other from the moment of birth and by the chance of the family into which 
he/she is born (2001). From the primordialist perspective, ethnic identity is seen as 
fixed and less malleable.  
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rooted in ethnicity itself since ethnic splits and tensions are normal (Lake and 
Rothchild, 1998).  
 
The second approach is instrumentalist. From an instrumentalist viewpoint, the central 
objectives of a group are material and ethnic identity is invoked primarily as a means 
to gain those goals (Harff and Gurr, 2004). The instrumentalists consider ethnic 
identity as a tool used by individuals, groups or political elites to acquire some larger 
material ends (Lake and Rothchild, 1998). Ethnic identity is understood as one of the 
various alternative bases of identity (Gurr, 2000). 100  The major point of 
instrumentalists is that ethnic identity becomes significant when ethnic symbols are 
invoked and manipulated by political entrepreneurs in response to group threats or 
opportunity (Gurr, 2000). On an instrumentalist view, conflict is mainly stimulated by 
political elites who activate ethnicity to pursue their political interests (Lake and 
Rothchild, 1998).  
 
The third approach is generally called constructivist. One of the conspicuous critiques 
of the instrumentalist approach is that individualistic understanding of identity 
formation could ignore the larger social dimension or social impact on constructing 
                                                  
100 Hutchinson and Smith state that one of the main ideas of instrumentalist is that 
individuals can freely cut and mix from various ethnic heritage and cultures to 
construct their own individual or group identities (1996).  
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ethnic identity (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996). From a constructivist standpoint, 
ethnicity is not necessarily what can be decided upon by individuals at will, like other 
political groups, but is embedded within and influenced by larger society (Lake and 
Rothchild, 1998). Therefore, the webs of social interactions form ethnic identity and 
violent conflict arises from social systems beyond individuals’ control (Lake and 
Rothchild, 1998).  
 
From a constructivist point of view, the differences of ethnic identities themselves are 
not the causes of conflict. Rather, the salience of ethnic identity is aroused by socially 
derived inequalities in material well-being or political participation (Jeong, 2000). 
Smith maintains that features of ethnic identity, such as shared historical experiences, 
myths, religious beliefs and so on, become decisive as a result of comparisons with the 
members of other groups (2004). In particular, experiences of discrimination 
compared with other groups and political mobilization to protect the group’s perceived 
interest make those features salient (Smith, 2004). As Harff and Gurr hypothesize, the 
more strongly a person is identified with an ethnic group that is subject to 
discrimination, that is, social, political and economic inequality, the more likely he/she 
will be determined to take violent action (2004). In short, in the constructivist 
approach, social structural inequality between/among different ethnic groups should 
be addressed to resolve violent conflict.  
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Although those three approaches have distinct understandings of ethnic conflicts, they 
have complementary aspects. The primordialist approach helps to elucidate the 
intensity and persistence of ethnic action (Harff and Gurr, 2004). While it can be 
understood that ethnic identities are a flexible social construction, intense ethnic 
violence creates conditions that make exclusive ethnic boundaries and strengthen 
inter-ethnic antagonism (Kaufman, 2001). In the middle of ethnic violence, narrow 
and exclusive ethnic identities can come to be perceived as a powerful tool for 
survival (Francis, 2002). So, the dimension of exclusive ethnic identities cannot be 
denied at some stages of ethnic conflicts. At the same time, as the instrumentalists 
claim, we cannot deny the group material and political interests as the key elements in 
conflict. Besides that, the emergence of political competition between elites can be the 
proximate causes of violence, which has been seen in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda 
and so on (Brown et al, 2001).  
 
However, we have to explore the question of why the appeals of political elites or 
leaders can be attractive to the members of ethnic groups. Here social structural 
problems can be crucial. As Wilmer argues, elites’ or leaders’ appealing to the fears 
associated with exclusive ethnic identities will not necessarily instigate mass violence 
without the social structural variables – political and economic inequalities that arouse 
the sense of insecurity (2002). Structural insecurity causes uncertainty within the 
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group and strengthens its bonds, which makes it easy for political elites or leaders to 
appeal to the group members since they believe that their appeals reflect their own 
grievances and hardships. In short, political mobilization based on exclusive ethnic 
identity arises along with social injustice (Smith, 2004).  
 
Thus, ethnic groups are most likely to mobilize or to take action including violence 
when various factors such as an exclusive ethnic identity, manipulation of political 
elites, group disadvantages derived from social inequalities and other factors, are 
combined together. Therefore, it is important to examine ethnic conflicts from a 
combined view point of those three concepts as it enables us to comprehend their 
complex combination of causes.     
 
2-5 The formation of conflict models: examining dimensions of conflict 
2-5-1 Objective dimension 
As Mitchell states, the possibility of resolving a conflict hinges on how we understand 
the basic nature of human conflict (1981). Firstly, there is the objective approach to 
conflict. According to the objectivist perspective, there are essential objective 
standards that exist independently of any single situation or relationship (Mitchell, 
1981). Objectivists have traditionally believed in metaphysical realism: there is a 
world of objective reality, existing independently of human beings (Beckett, 1997). In 
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other words, there is the distinction between the subject and the object (Beckett, 
1997).  
 
From the objectivist viewpoint, conflicts are caused by a scarcity of resources and 
attempts to gain control over those resources (Fetherston, 2000). Additionally, 
“conflicts are objective, caused by knowable, measurable, reducible objects, outside of 
and separate from the subject” (Fetherston, 2000: 2). Since conflicts over material 
resources or real interests are an objective phenomenon that cannot be altered by the 
subjects, only temporary compromise settlement is logically possible (Mitchell, 1981). 
Therefore, so-called conflict settlement would be the main approach to conflict. 
 
According to Ramsbotham et al, conflict settlement is defined as the achievement of 
an agreement between/among the parties, which prevents or ends an armed conflict 
(2005). Reiman argues that since conflict settlement is based on the tenets of 
management, most research in conflict settlement defines conflict as a problem of 
political order and of the status quo and supposes that conflict is attributed to the 
incompatible interests and the competition for scarce resources (2004). Conflict 
settlement is a way of managing armed conflict that stresses power and material 
interests and therefore, the emphasis is placed on getting parties in conflict to the 
negotiating table, agenda-setting, and reaching a agreement regarding the future 
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distribution of resources and power between/among parties (Fetherston and Parkin, 
1997).  
 
For the achievement of those objectives, the conflict settlement approach uses the 
methods such as arbitration, more or less powerful mediation, and negotiation 
(Beckett, 1997). Settlement approach can be understood as the intervention by mainly 
powerful third parties who have the power and the resources to put pressure on the 
conflictual parties to induce them to settlement (Miall, 2004).  
 
Critique of objective approach 
One of the critiques of settlement approaches is that they focus exclusively on 
material interests or resources and overlook the importance of relationships 
between/among groups in conflict and their mutual perceptions (Fetherston, 2000). 
For instance, Lake and Rothchild criticize that violence is misattributed exclusively to 
competition over scarce resources (1998). They argue that eventually violence is 
costly for groups: people are killed; factories, farms and any properties are devastated; 
and resources that might have been utilized for economic growth are diverted to 
destructive purposes (1998). Their insight shows that conflict settlement approaches, 
which revolve around the presumption that people compete for material resources, 
cannot explain the seemingly contradictory phenomenon: while groups seek to gain 
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resources, they destroy those resources or use them for violence. This is the point at 
which subjective elements play an important role. 
 
Further critique of conflict settlement approaches is that they are integrated into 
asymmetric power structures and connected to maintaining those unequal power 
structures (Fetherston and Parkin, 1997). From the objective approach, since conflicts 
arise over the absolute amount of valuable resources, the outcome would be a 
compromised allocation or all going to one of the rival groups (Mitchell, 1981). In this 
understanding of conflict, social structure is not taken into account since the focal 
point is the competition for material resources. Therefore, for conflict settlement, 
success is “the containment of the violent conflict and a return to a status quo” 
(Fetherston and Parkin, 1997: 26). The settlement approach is aimed at removing the 
threats to the stability of the existing order and keeping the peace within the existing 
social framework. Therefore, the problem of conflict settlement is that while a 
resource-based settlement approach may enable conflictual parties coexist temporarily 
by means of more or less coercive or powerful third-party intervention, it ends up as 
short-term, material fixes that leave the structural inequalities between/among 
conflictual groups unresolved (Rothman, 2001). 
 
These critiques do not deny the significance of objective approaches represented by 
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conflict settlement to resolve conflict. Rather, what should be emphasized is that 
exclusive adherence to objective elements can miss the full picture of conflict thereby 
missing the broad dynamism of conflict.  
 
2-5-2 Subjective dimension 
Vayrynen states that “every participant in a social interaction replies to the other in 
terms of his/her perceptions and cognitions of the other” (1991: 28), which is also true 
with conflict. As Miall mentions, almost everyone tends to see conflicts from their 
own perspectives, to identify with their own side and to neglect the concerns of the 
other (1992). Accordingly, examining attitudes and perceptions are crucial in 
understanding conflict dynamics. 
 
According to Kelman, the premise of psychological analysis is that subjective 
elements play a role in the perception and interpretation of events (1997). In a conflict 
situation, the subjective factors may intensify the conflict by creating differences in 
the way the parties in conflict perceive reality and by imposing constraints on the 
rational pursuit of their interests (Kelman, 1997). Clearly, conflict about real interests 
or material resources occurs under certain psychological dispositions and in 
psycho-cultural contexts101 that have a huge impact on the intensity and duration of 
                                                  
101 Utterwulghe explains that psycho-cultural conflict theory stresses the role of 
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conflict and consequently contribute to determining the outcome (Utterwulghe, 1999). 
 
Mitchell argues that in conflicts, and in particular, intense conflicts, there emerges a 
need for those involved to activate certain psychological processes and develop 
specific ranges of beliefs and attitudes for the easy utilization of a range of defensive 
processes and development of a range of attitudes to cope with the situation (1981). 
Fisher states that it is commonly seen that in inter-group conflict each group has 
simplified beliefs or stereotypes of the other, or has a less differentiated image of the 
other than of itself (1999). Besides that, as more and more information comes forth 
regarding the intentions, motivations, strategies, frustrations, concerns, complexity 
and variety of the other groups, each side experiences cognitive dissonance between 
incoming information and its existing images and attitudes (Fisher, 1999).  
 
Intergroup perceptions, images and attitudes will be influenced by both motivational 
and cognitive biases, which result in a selective and distorted view of the social world 
(Fisher, 1990a). Further, cognitive structures such as beliefs, expectations, and 
stereotypes, play a decisive role in perceiving, interpreting and assimilating incoming 
information (Fisher, 1990a). Thus, as Fisher concludes, distorted and self-justifying 
                                                                                                                                               
culturally shared, profound ‘us-them’ oppositions, the conceptualization of enemies 
and allies and deep-seated dispositions on human action deriving from earliest 
development (1999).  
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images of own and other group replace reality and eventually create their own reality 
(1990a). This does not deny the objective factors as the source of violent conflict: 
rather, what should be highlighted is that the distinction between the subjective 
dimension and the objective one eventually will be of little help in analyzing 
dynamics of conflict (Reiman, 2004).  
 
Emotions as well as perception and cognition affect the dynamism of conflict. 
According to Crawford, emotions are the innate states which individuals convey to 
others as feelings, and those emotions are subjective experiences that are composed of 
physiological, intersubjective and cultural components (2000). Human beings have 
relationships with each other that are characterized by the type and degree of 
emotional involvement (Crawford, 2000).  
 
Protraction of conflict tends to leave deep scars of anger, grief, hatred, mistrust, and 
feelings of victimhood (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004) and these emotions cripple 
community cohesion, interdependence and mutual protection between/among different 
groups (Kumar, 1997). In short, when groups are in conflict, especially violent 
conflict, they encounter serious difficulty in overcoming bitterness and grievances that 
have been built up through conflict as well as in altering their hostile perceptions and 
mutual fears, and consequently stabilized peace relations cannot be achieved 
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(Bar-Simon-Tov, 2004). Therefore, reconciliation could be recognized as a critical 
factor in achieving lasting stabilized peace. Jeong claims that the removal of residual 
hatred, mistrust and a sense of having been wrong is important since all these feelings 
remain latent sources of future conflicts and violence unless they are tackled as part of 
a conflict resolution process (1999). If they remain unaddressed, desire for expressing 
grievances with revenge could be high.  
 
One of the vital elements of peace is that different groups respect each other, 
recognize mutual interdependence and appreciate differences. In order to achieve that, 
mutual negative feelings should be transformed into positive ones so that each group 
can see the other as sharing the same human nature.  
 
2-5-3 Structural dimension 
One of the critiques of subjective approaches to conflict is that while misperceptions, 
emotions and a lack of communication between/among different groups are critical 
elements in conflict, structural factors need to be examined in comprehending the 
generation, escalation and outcome of a deep-rooted conflict (Jeong, 2003). In the 
previous chapter, the work of Johan Galtung was examined, which showed that one of 
his contributions to conflict resolution and peace studies was the proposition of the 
concept of structural violence. The rise of the concept of structural violence has 
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enabled us to broaden the meaning of violence. In other words, “violence has come to 
mean more than physically violent behavior” (Botes, 2003b: 273). Further, Botes 
analyses that since its advent, the term ‘structural violence’ has been used to delineate 
and investigate how political systems and social and organizational structures act as 
sources of social conflict (2003b).102 
 
Dukes maintains that how people behave and live their lives are shaped by larger 
social circumstances in which they find themselves (1999). Therefore, individual or 
interpersonal conflicts should be analyzed in the context of a larger framework of 
social structures and those conflicts reflect the interplay of forces beyond the control 
of individuals (Dukes, 1999). Structural conflict is the outcome of a patterned social 
relationship that fails to gratify the basic needs and secure the vital interests of the 
parties concerned (Rubenstein, 1999). In short, from structural perspectives, the cause 
of violent conflict can be attributed to the mismatch between social values and the 
social structure of the society, that is, unequal distribution of political, economic and 
social goods between/among different groups (Mitchell, 2005).  
 
Jeong argues that since power is located within a society, its impact spreads around the 
                                                  
102 According to Kriesberg, a social conflict arises when two or more persons or groups 
show the belief that they have incompatible objectives (2003). Social conflicts are 
concerned with conflicts among interacting people and parties in social conflicts view 
each other as adversaries in achieving their own goals (2003).  
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social structure as a whole (2003). Therefore, from a structural point of view, the 
distribution of power between/among groups has a great impact on the course and 
conduct of conflict (Northrup, 1989).103 Northrup also maintains that policies and 
structures play the major role in keeping status quo that results in consistent 
inequalities in power and opportunities (1989).  
 
Serious social conflict is embedded in an unequal social and economic system, an 
unequal access to political decision-making and cultural marginalization of certain 
groups (Jeong, 2000). The disparity of political and economic opportunities 
between/among groups and the destruction of cultural identities of certain groups are 
closely associated with the imposition of dominant and asymmetric power relations 
(Jeong, 2000). Asymmetric power relations generate (between/among groups) unjust 
ability to control events and these asymmetric relationships are embedded in a 
complex network of social and material arrangements that produce the very structure 
of everyday life (Jeong, 2003). Therefore, as Dukes states, social conflict is a 
structural phenomenon that requires structural confrontation with marginalization of 
any other effort (1999). In short, when structural dimension is taken into account, 
social injustice should be the crucial element in understanding conflict.104 
                                                  
103 Montiel also states that a structural perspective is sensitive to social power 
differentials between/among groups (2001).  
104 Smith holds that political mobilization emerges around the theme of injustice 
(2004). He states that people do that because they believe that it is just or because 
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Therefore, if conflict resolution does not include the need for structural transformation, 
that could result in perpetuating the status quo characterized as inequality or social 
injustice and could not contribute to resolving social conflict (Botes, 2003b). Rather, 
since conflictual relationships stem from political, economic and social divisions that 
serve as the basis of power differentials between/among groups, the deconstruction of 
dominant power relations through transformation of values and institutions can be 
seen as the crucial elements in removing antagonistic relationships (Jeong, 2003).  
 
Structural transformation is strongly associated with peacebuilding. According to 
Bush, peacebuilding, in its broadest sense, refers to those initiatives that promote 
sustainable structures and processes which beef up the prospects for peaceful 
cohabitation and reduce the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence of violent conflict 
(2004). Furthermore, Christie holds that peacebuilding can be conceptualized as 
activity toward social justice that occurs when political structures become more 
inclusive by giving voice to those who have been marginalized in decision-making 
and economic structure is transformed, which enables those who have been exploited 
to gain more access to material resources that satisfy their needs (2001). In short, as 
Montiel states, structurally peaceful social systems are marked by equally-distributed 
decision-making powers in the production, allocation and utilization of economic, 
                                                                                                                                               
they at least consider that it will redress the injustice they experience in their own 
daily lives. (2004).  
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political and cultural resources (2001).105 In order to achieve structural transformation, 
the foundation of participatory, democratic politics and the development of a culture, 
structures and skills for the positive handling of conflict will be of great importance 
(Francis, 2004).106  
 
While it should be appreciated that the application of psychological approaches has 
made a huge contribution to eliminating misperceptions and enemy images that 
impede negotiations between/among adversaries, discussion on structural 
transformation needs to be developed more (Jeong, 2003). As Jeong claims, conflict 
resolution needs to make effort to engage in a critical analysis of the origin and the 
nature of an existing order and explore alternative strategies for dealing with human 
conflict that is attributed to institutional problems (1999). Thus, as Yordan argues, 
from the structural perspective, one of the important tasks of conflict resolution would 
be to transform social systems and create or reform social structures to meet with the 
changing needs of the people (1998).  
                                                  
105 According to Christie et al, culturally, peacebuilding requires the transformation of 
cultural narratives or beliefs that legitimize the dominance of one group over another. 
From a political perspective, peacebuilding occurs when political systems that oppress 
some groups are transformed so that there are equal opportunities for political 
representation and voice. And from economic viewpoints, structures that exploit and 
deprive people of resources necessary for optimal growth and development should be 
transformed, which enables everyone in the society to have enough material amenities 
such as decent housing, jobs, education, health care and so on (2001).  
106 Bush says that it is crucial to buttress or create democratic structures and 
processes that are fair and responsive to the needs of everyone in a society, that is, 
establishing institutions that secure and promote the political rights and 
responsibilities of state and civil society (2004).  
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2-6 What have been the foundations of the understanding of contemporary 
conflict resolution? 
2-6-1 What is epistemology? 
In the previous sections, while the scope of contemporary conflict resolution has been 
explored, it has been also revealed that there are various approaches to analyze 
conflict, which has been demonstrated especially in the section of dimensions of 
conflict. Through that section, it has been shown that each dimension has its own 
distinctive approach to conflict: each dimension has its own specific approach in 
analyzing the same conflict. This raises the basic questions: “Why is there a diversity 
of approaches to conflict? What are the causes of the varieties of means to understand 
conflict?” 
 
One of the valid answers to these questions is the difference of epistemological 
assumptions underpinning each approach to conflict. In other words, when there are 
different epistemologies, we have different understandings of conflict even when we 
are looking into the same set of dynamics or relations.  
 
According to Greco, there are, first of all, two essential questions related to 
epistemology: “What is knowledge?” and “What can we know?” (1999: 1). Then, if 
we consider that we can know something, there arises the third question: “How can 
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we know what we do know?” (Greco, 1999: 1) and these three questions are the 
central themes in the study of epistemology. Put another way, epistemology examines 
the nature, extent and justification of knowledge (Rosenberg, 1995). 107  Thus, 
epistemology pertains to providing a philosophical foundation for deciding what kinds 
of knowledge are possible and how we can make sure that they are both adequate and 
legitimate (Maynard, 1994). Therefore, epistemology can be defined as the theory of 
knowledge concerned with how we know what we do, what justifies us believing what 
we do, and what standards of evidence we should use in seeking truth about the world 
and human experience.  
 
According to Crotty, ontology is the study of being, which is concerned with ‘what is’, 
with the nature of existence or with the nature of reality as such (1998). How are 
epistemology and ontology related? Crotty claims that ontology and epistemology are 
interconnected since to talk of the construction of meaning is to talk of the 
construction of meaningful reality (1998). Any understanding of reality is supported 
by epistemological assumptions of how we know that reality as such. Therefore, 
epistemology can be recognized as the frameworks or models behind our experience 
of the world and ourselves from which we understand or analyze any phenomena or 
give certain meanings to them.  
                                                  
107 See also Crotty (1998: 8). He states that epistemology deals with the nature of 
knowledge, its possibility, scope and general basis.  
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Knowledge is a valued state in which we engage in cognitive contact with reality 
(Zagrebski, 1999). Therefore, knowledge can be understood as a relation or interplay 
between a conscious subject and some portion of reality and the majority of 
epistemological attention has been devoted to the subject side of the relation 
(Zagzebski, 1999). Put differently, the existence of a world without a mind is possible, 
but meaning without a mind is impossible (Crotty, 1998). Recognizing a world and 
things in the world independently of our consciousness of them does not mean that 
meanings of them exist apart from our consciousness (Crotty, 1998). Accordingly, 
epistemology is connected with the nature of our consciousness and appearance of 
reality.   
 
2-6-2 Why is epistemology important? 
Rothman insists that we regularly say one thing, which corresponds with our adopted 
theories, while acting differently, conforming with our theories in use, which are 
derived from tacit conceptual frameworks that lead to certain actions for 
accomplishing clear purposes (1992). The idea of tacit knowing suggests that actions 
people take are seldom accidental but are established upon certain epistemological 
frameworks (Rothman, 1992) 
 
As Chia claims, since epistemology examines how and what it is possible to know, in 
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epistemological inquiry we should contemplate the methods and standards through 
which we produce reliable and verifiable knowledge (2002). Our epistemological 
assumptions form and orient us towards particular strategies for knowledge production 
and action (Chia, 2002). Therefore, as Gray insists, the choice of methods of any 
research will be affected by the chosen methodology and the methodology will be 
influenced by the theoretical standpoint which is further based on the researcher’s 
epistemological stance (2004).  
 
Cheldelin et al state that the role of research can be described as a goal-driven 
undertaking whose aim is to discover new knowledge (2003). The objective of the 
discovery or proposal of new knowledge is to contribute to theory – understanding of 
a phenomenon – and practice – use of knowledge to improve conditions (Cheldelin et 
al, 2003). However, justification of our choice of methods, methodology and theory in 
creating knowledge lies in epistemological stance. Accordingly, it is of great 
importance to start by contemplating epistemological foundations in order to create or 
produce knowledge. Put differently, from a certain epistemological framework, a set 
of method, methodology and theoretical viewpoint is produced, which leads to the 
creation of knowledge. Further, it can be seen that to know the epistemological 
foundation enables us to understand how certain knowledge has come into being.  
 
 152
2-6-3 What is the implication of discussing epistemology in conflict resolution? 
As Bryman holds, methods of research are tied to different visions of how social 
reality should be examined (2004). Accordingly, they are intimately connected with 
the ways in which the researchers envisage the relationships between different 
viewpoints about the nature of social reality and how it should be analyzed (Bryman, 
2004). In other words, each researcher has his/her own distinctive method to examine 
the same phenomenon, which gives the various meanings to it and this difference 
derives from the different epistemological assumptions. In short, different 
epistemologies or epistemological frameworks result in creating the various 
understandings of the same phenomenon, which is also true with the studies of 
conflict resolution. 
 
According to Ramsbotham et al, conflict resolution is concerned with addressing the 
deep-rooted sources of conflict, which implies that when behavior is no longer violent, 
attitudes are no longer antagonistic and the structure of the conflict has been 
transformed (2005). This definition can be seen as generic and there have been many 
people who are devoted to conflict resolution in terms of both practice and 
theory-building: Burton (1990), Azar (1990), Fisher (1990 and 1997), Jabri (1996), 
Avruch (1998), Vayrynen (2001) are the good examples although they are only a part 
of those who have been engaged in the area.  
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Further, there have been various ways identified in which different theories of conflict 
propose different understandings of the root causes or origins of conflict, which result 
in the different explanations of conflict mechanisms for tackling or transforming 
violent conflict. Behind these distinct approaches to conflict, there is the difference of 
epistemological frameworks of those who are engaged in conflict resolution.  
 
By examining the epistemologies that have played the crucial roles in framing 
contemporary conflict resolution, we will be able to know how conflict has been 
understood in terms of the root causes and how they should be addressed. Further, the 
critical analysis of those epistemologies will reveal what areas have been 
underdeveloped in contemporary conflict resolution: what kinds of elements have not 
been explored as the root causes of conflict.  
 
Therefore, in the next chapter, several epistemologies that have established the 
framework of contemporary conflict resolution will be critically examined and this 
critical challenge will eventually enable us to explore what epistemologies can be 
added to existing ones in order to expand the contemporary framework of conflict 
resolution. When new epistemological assumptions have been added to those 
epistemologies that have framed contemporary conflict resolution, new views on 
conflict dynamics and resolution of conflict can be constructed, which might empower 
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us to explore new theoretical and practical arguments in the future.  
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Chapter Three: Critical Analysis of Epistemological Foundations of 
Contemporary Conflict Resolution 
3-1 Objective epistemology 
3-1-1 Nature of objective epistemology 
Knowledge as universal applicability 
According to Gray (2004), Western thought has traditionally been categorized into two 
antithetical views of reality. Heraclitus who lived in Ephasus in ancient Greece put a 
strong emphasis on a constantly or continuously changing and emergent world. 
Contrary to this view, Parmenides who succeeded Heraclitus emphasized quite 
differently a permanent and unchanging reality.108 Consequently, there have been two 
types of ontology: a Heraclitean ontology of becoming and a Parmenidean ontology of 
being (Gray, 2004).  
 
This division of ontological view affects the epistemological approach to understand 
the world. From a Heraclitean view of reality, knowledge could be understood as a 
process, that is, knowledge or truth should be constantly changed or transformed. 
However, if a Parmenidean view of reality is taken, knowledge or truth could be 
recognized as stable and immutable. From a Parmenidean approach, that knowledge 
                                                  
108 See also Tarnas (1991). He explains that while Heraclitus stressed the constant 
flux of the sensible world, Parmenides insisted on the changeless and unitary nature 
of intelligible reality.  
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or truth that can be eternally and universally applied would be presupposed, which is 
the fundamental feature of objective epistemology. 
 
Williams explains that objectivism is a philosophical view that there can be a 
permanent, universal and ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can always 
appeal in judging the nature of truth and reality (2004). Crotty argues that objectivism 
is the epistemological perspective that things exist as meaningful entities 
independently of human consciousness and that meaningful reality exists as such apart 
from the operation of any human consciousness (1998). Thus, in the objectivist 
epistemology it is assumed that reality exists independently of human consciousness 
and that the aim of research from an objectivist epistemological perspective is to 
discover the objective truth that applies universally and explains every phenomenon 
systematically (Gray, 2004). In order to discover the objective truth, a careful and 
scientific approach is supposed to be adopted (Crotty, 1998), in which positivism 
plays an important role in such an approach.  
 
Positivism 
According to Gray, positivism was the principal epistemological paradigm in social 
science mainly from the 1930s through to 1960s, the main argument of which is that 
the social world exists externally to us and that its features could be measured through 
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observation (2004). Blaikie explains that positivism is a philosophy of science that 
rejects metaphysical speculation and emphasizes systematic observation by the human 
senses in order to unearth universally applicable knowledge or truth (2004). From an 
objectivist point of view, as Chia argues, reality is believed to be existing externally to 
perceptions, beliefs and biases of human beings (2002). Further, knowledge can be 
reached through the collection of facts that provide the basis for laws, the reason being 
that since human subjectivity should be under control in order to acquire knowledge, 
what is collected for analysis is supposed to be not value-oriented data but facts. 
 
Positivist knowledge of the world is, therefore, based on “generalizations from the 
observation that, given sufficient number and consistency, are regarded as producing 
laws of how phenomena co-exist or occur in sequences” (Blaikie, 2004: 836). In other 
words, the fundamental tenet of positivism is that all sciences including social 
sciences are concerned with establishing or discovering universal laws or general 
propositions that can explain any phenomena, as a consequence of which, any 
phenomenon could be explained by showing that it is a specific case of such universal 
laws (Blaikie, 2004). From positivist perspectives, the world is considered as highly 
systematic and well-organized that is characterized as regularities, constancies, 
uniformities and absolute principles (Crotty, 1998). The ultimate purpose of social 
analysis by objective epistemology is to explore universally applicable knowledge that 
 158
can explain social phenomena and so that various social phenomena that ostensibly 
look different can be understood in a systematic and unified manner.  
 
3-1-2 How has objective epistemology influenced conflict resolution? 
Basic human needs approach 
As argued, the central character of objective epistemology is the presupposition that 
there are universal truths or knowledge that can allow us to expound on all social 
phenomena in a systematic and comprehensive way. How has this supposition been 
applied to contemporary conflict resolution? The answer to this question would be the 
concept of basic human needs and its application to conflict resolution, which has 
been advocated mainly by John Burton. 
 
Burton and Sandole insist that there are certain patterns of behavior for whatever 
reason, which are universally observed and this perception makes them believe that 
we can create conflict resolution that can be applied universally (1987). They also 
claim that such an approach to construct universally and cross-culturally applicable 
conflict resolution is established upon a generic theory (1986). They explain that 
generic theory, allows “explanation that transcends observable differences in human 
behavior – racial, cultural, and institutional” (1986: 334). In other words, a generic 
approach to analyze a problem is one that tries to uncover the universal and common 
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characters or attributes that give rise to the observable data of differences (Burton and 
Sandole, 1986). They hold that the existence of patterns of behavior that can be 
universally seen is a foundation for conflict resolution that can explain violence of 
many kinds (1987).  
 
According to Burton, conflict is a universal phenomenon that affects all cultures and 
societies, at all phases of political, social and economic development and at all social 
dimensions from the interpersonal to the international and therefore, (from Burton’s 
view), the study of conflict is supposed to discover a generic or overarching 
explanation of conflict from which to deduce the axioms of treatment (1990). Based 
on this universal feature of conflict, Burton insists that conflict resolution is capable of 
addressing all kinds of conflict at all social levels and in all systems, the central 
hypothesis of which is that there are generic or all-embracing explanations of human 
behavior that enable us to construct means of resolving problems that can be applied 
to all social dimensions in all societies (1991).  
 
Burton states that conflict resolution means eradicating conflict by analytical methods 
that get to the root of the problem (1991), which upholds the argument that if we 
tackle its fundamental cause, we can bring a conflict to an end. Further, he insists that 
since it is a means of getting to the fundamental root of problems, conflict resolution 
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is not just a way of resolving immediate social conflict in the short term, but it also 
presents insight into the generic nature of conflict and consequently contributes to 
uprooting the source of conflicts and preventing their recurrence (1991) more 
generally through basic human needs theory because basic human needs theory sites 
conflict at a every low, all-embracing level.  
 
Burton states that basic human needs theorists claim that there are certain ontological 
and other biological human needs that will be sought for by any means available and 
that socialization processes, if they are not compatible with those needs, will cause a 
strong sense of frustration among those who live in the society and eventually lead to 
anti-social behavior including violence (1990). Although there are various kinds of 
basic needs, Burton argues that those who engage in conflict are struggling to gratify 
primordial and universal needs such as security, identity, recognition and development 
and this struggle cannot be repressed since those needs are primordial (1991). 
Furthermore, Burton maintains that the distinguishing character of basic human needs 
is that they are believed to be inherent in humanity and in other species and 
accordingly universal and not culturally or socially bound (1997).  
 
How can basic human needs theory be seen as primordial and be universally applied? 
Vayrynen states that basic human needs are crucial in becoming a human being since 
 161
the priority of basic needs derive from primary emotions109 that are indispensable for 
the survival of the physiological organism and psychological self (2001). Sites argues 
that it is essential for animals including human beings to establish conditions or states 
of existence that can reduce the three negative emotional states of fear, anger and 
depression and consequently realize the positive emotional state of satisfaction 
(1990a). Accordingly, he insists that human needs are ontologically grounded in 
emotions and that a threat to the survival of either the physical organism or the 
developing self can arouse negative emotions (1990a). Human beings need to alleviate 
the suffering triggered off by negative emotions, which will increase the possibility of 
satisfaction that is essential for healthy and sound physiological and psychological 
survival (Sites, 1990a).  
 
As Sandole argues, basic human needs are organically and biologically programmed 
predispositions that are embedded in all human beings and therefore, the needs are 
universal and common to all humankind across time and space, although the means or 
satisfiers by which those ontological and primordial needs are met may vary across 
time and space (1990). The fundamental point of basic human needs is, as Vayrynen 
states, biology, that is, basic needs are assumed to stem from the biological nature of 
human beings and since needs are biological, they are universal (2001). Put another 
                                                  
109 According to Sites (1990b), primary emotions are fear, anger, depression and 
satisfaction.  
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way, the assumption of universalistic needs thinking is that what is true of the 
biological dimension of human nature must be true of all individuals in all cultures 
and societies (Vayrynen, 2001). 
 
From these points of view, the superficial level of personal, cultural or social 
differences of behaviors and interests is not the focal point. Rather, it is the revelation 
of the ultimate goals - the universal, ontological and biological goals of individual and 
social group, that is, the satisfaction of basic human needs that are universal across all 
cultures and societies - that enables us to address conflict correctly (Burton and 
Sandole, 1986). As Jeong insists, (from the viewpoint of basic human needs theory) if 
the gratification of basic needs is imperative for human development as well as the 
survival of human beings in physical and psychological terms, the real source of 
conflict can be attributed to the frustration of primordial, ontological and universal 
needs since the lack of ontogenic or biological needs causes an imbalance in human 
life (2000). Put another way, basic human needs can provide objective, rational and 
universally applicable criteria for examining and assessing an emergent social 
condition that may contain the potential for generating conflict (Jeong, 2000).  
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3-2 Subjective epistemology 
3-2-1 Characteristics of subjective epistemology 
Knowledge by subject 
According to Baronov, the most conspicuous distinction between inanimate objects 
and human beings is “human subjectivity” (2004: 11). In comparing natural sciences 
and social sciences, Bryman insists that the fundamental difference between them is 
that social reality, that is, the field of social sciences, has a meaning for human beings 
and consequently human action is meaningful (2004). Human beings behave based on 
the meanings which they attribute to their acts and those of others (Bryman, 2004).  
 
As is generally recognized, a synthetic position between rationalism 110  and 
empiricism111 was founded by Immanuel Kant (1729-1804). This integrated view 
insists that both human reason and observation are essential to comprehend the world 
(Smith, 1998). What should be emphasized regarding this synthesized standpoint is 
that, as Tarnas assesses, the nature of our human mind is not passively receiving 
sense-data. Rather, it actively digests and structures them to make sense of them 
(Tarnas, 1991). Our mind, in order to make knowledge possible, actively attributes its 
own cognitive dispositions to the data of experience, which means that our knowledge 
                                                  
110 Smith explains rationalism as the belief that human reason will lead us to the 
truth (1998).  
111 Smith defines empiricism as the idea that observation and experimentation will 
lead us to the truth (1998).  
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is not a pure description of external reality as such, but a construction of our own 
mind (Tarnas, 1991). In other words, phenomena can be known through 
mind-dependent perception of them (Williams, 2004). Truth and meaning do not exist 
independently somewhere in the external world, but are constructed by subjects’ 
interactions with the world (Gray, 2004). In short, as Smith argues, the human subject 
can be understood as an active, creative and purposive actor in the construction of 
knowledge, and this constructive character of human beings is the legacy of Kant’s 
philosophy to social sciences (1998).112 
 
From these points of view, it can be supposed that the main theme of subjective 
epistemology is that, human subjects, that is, our mind is the source of knowledge. 
Rather than discovering absolutely objective or transcendental truth beyond human 
reach, our minds construct truths or meanings of reality: “Subjective experience is the 
true object of human knowledge” (Harre, 2000: 252).  
 
 
                                                  
112 It is also interesting to note here that Burr assesses that in spite of the differences, 
Kant, Nietzsche (1844-1900), Marx (1818-1883) shared the idea that knowledge is to 
some extent a product of human thought rather than grounded in an external reality 
existing independently of human beings (2003). Further, other great philosophers, 
such as Heidegger (1889-1976), Wittgenstein (1889-1951) to name a few, have also 
analyzed subjective dimensions of human beings as a source of knowledge. Therefore, 
it can be stated that one of the most notable characteristics of modern Western 
philosophy has been the studies in human subjects in terms of how they are related to 
creation (or construction) of knowledge.   
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Intersubjectivity 
So for some theorists, the human subject has been recognized as a source of 
knowledge.  The subjective dimension, that is, our mind constructs truths or 
meanings of reality. However, there is one more thing that should be analyzed: how 
does the human subject construct or create knowledge? 
 
While Kant made a valuable contribution to social science by making the human 
subject a central actor constructing knowledge, as Harre states, the Kantian 
constructionist philosophy focused mainly on the individual mind in terms of the 
origin of the empirical world and of the contents of consciousness in the integrated 
undertaking of the mind (2000). However, as Baronov insists, “individuals do not live 
in isolation” (2004: 117). Rather, as Schutz and Luckmann claim, our world is not just 
private one, but a social one (1974). In other words, each human subject does not live 
alone, but lives in intersubjectivity.  
 
According to Crossley, intersubjectivity means “the existence of a between-world, 
connecting individual human subjectivities” (2005: 168). Intersubjectivity indicates 
the character of our world as a public world (Gurwitch, 1975). Further, Crossley 
insists that the central question of intersubjectivity is how, as an individual mind or 
ego, one can know that others are conscious subjects and know the elements of their 
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conscious subjective lives (2005). So, individual subjectivity comes to make sense 
through the interaction with other subjectivities (Crossley, 2005). Human subjectivity 
can be comprehended in the context of one’s social and cultural life, which is 
mentioned as one’s personal lifeworld (Baronov, 2004). In short, in order to 
understand how human subjectivity constructs truths or meanings of reality, 
intersubjective social interaction must be examined and phenomenology is of great 
significance to this intersubjective analysis.  
 
Phenomenology 
The starting point of phenomenology113 is that we, human beings, are conscious 
subjects (Fay, 2003). According to Stewart and Mickunas, an appearance or a 
phenomenon is anything of which one is conscious (1974), which can be termed 
“intentionality of consciousness.”114 This means, as Vaitkus states, that all conscious 
acts have a directional feature toward some objects, whether real or imaginary, which 
indicates that all consciousness is consciousness of something (2000). Therefore, the 
main focus of phenomenology is the analysis of the content of consciousness (Stewart 
and Mickunas, 1974) since our consciousness frames what we experience (Follesdal, 
                                                  
113 According to Vaitkus, the term phenomenology derives from the Greek 
“phainomenon” and means the analysis of phenomena, the appearance or what shows 
itself as meaningful sense and knowledge to human beings (2000). Stewart and 
Mickunas state that phenomenology means a reasoned examination that identifies 
the inherent essence of appearances (1974). In other words, phenomenology explores 
how phenomena come to make sense to human beings.  
114 See for instance, Follesdal (1998) and Vaitkus (2000). 
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1998). This does not mean that phenomenology denies the existence of objects 
external to human subjects. However, in order for the objects to have some meanings, 
human subjects must play the central role. In short, phenomenology is “concerned 
with the cognitive reality which is embodied in the process of subject human 
experiences” (Wagner, 1970: 13).  
 
How can the subjective experience be constituted? According to Baronov, in 
phenomenology it has been assumed that there are certain structures inside our 
consciousness that provide the world around us with form and meaning and that those 
basic structures are present in everyday life experiences (2004). Consequently, the 
central concern of phenomenology can be understood as analyzing and 
comprehending how the human mind structures experience and makes it accessible to 
each individual in his/her daily lives (Baronov, 2004). 
 
Since the concept of the lifeworld is the basis of phenomenological philosophy and 
the task of it is to explore the basic nature of human experience, “the lifeworld, that is, 
the world as lived and experienced, is its primary datum” (Crossley, 2005: 184). In 
other words, understanding the nature of the lifeworld and its relation to the 
construction of human mind is the central task of phenomenology.  
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Berstein argues that the lifeworld denotes the intersubjective world which everyone 
experiences and participates in during his/her daily life (1976). It is intersubjective 
since everyone lives in it as a person and among other persons, is bound to them 
through shared influence and work, and understands them and is understood by them 
(Berstein, 1976). Consequently, a phenomenology of the lifeworld aims to examine 
how we come to interpret others and their actions, in the complex ways in which we 
understand our own actions and those of others within a social context (Berstein, 
1976).  
 
The view that the everyday lifeworld is an intersubjective and a social reality has 
some important implications for the construction and structure of the subjective stock 
of knowledge (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974). As Gray argues, human interaction with 
the world is reflected in the process of meaning-making and interpretation (2004). We 
interpret the meanings of objects and act according to those interpretations and those 
meanings are produced through by social interactions (Gray, 2004).  
 
However, some schemes are required to provide our lived experiences with meanings 
and interpretations. Berstein insists that those schemes are essentially social and 
intersubjective ones since our lifeworld experiences are basically intersubjective 
(1976). According to Baronov, the experience of the social world is structured by 
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frames of reference that guide people living there, which are referred to “as categories 
of life” (2004: 117). Consequently, our everyday experience of social lifeworld is 
made organized and understandable (Baronov, 2004).  
 
As Fay states, our social lifeworld entails the cultural and taken-for-granted 
framework of social life, which enables us to understand and interact with each other 
(2003). Our social lifeworld consists of “the knowledge of certain skills, typifications 
and routines that are socially prescribed and distributed” (Fay, 2003: 46-47). Put 
differently, our social lifeworld is a habit-world, a world of experience constituted by 
our habitual ways of perceiving, comprehending and acting on it (Crossley, 2005). An 
essential point is that from birth, we enter a social milieu in which a system of 
intelligibility prevails and we inherit a system of significant symbols that have been 
socially recognized to lead an intersubjective life (Crotty, 1998). In short, through the 
significant symbols such as language, signs, marks, and so on, which have been 
socially inherited and shared, one communicates with others and constructs the 
meanings of reality. 
 
Therefore, when we see the world in a meaningful manner, we are viewing it through 
lenses endowed by our culture (Crotty, 1998). We do not perceive the world directly; 
rather our perception and understanding of the world is mediated through a social 
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stock of knowledge. Our subjective stock of knowledge is mainly “derived from 
elements of the social stock of knowledge” (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974: 262). The 
elements of knowledge of individuals that at first glance seem to have been obtained 
through direct and independent experience are embedded in the context of an 
extensively socialized subjective stock of knowledge (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974).  
 
3-2-2 How has subjective epistemology influenced conflict resolution? 
As shown in chapter two, identity, especially, social identity has been recognized as 
one of the essential elements in analyzing dynamism of conflict. For instance, 
Rothman insists that the role of social identity in examining conflict and its resolution 
has gained a great deal of attention in international society (2001). Fisher also states 
that the central analysis in contemporary protracted social conflict is the social identity 
group defined in ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic or other lines since it is through the 
social identity group that essential human needs are most forcefully expressed (1997). 
Therefore, it can be observed, as Black states, that “regardless of the direction of the 
causal arrow, many deep-rooted conflicts seem to involve parties organized around 
competing social identities” (2003: 123).  
 
Although basic human needs including identity as key factors in contemporary 
conflict resolution have been analyzed by epistemologically objective means, its 
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approach has been principally biologically-oriented. Consequently, the human 
subjective dimension has been lacking in examining how identity, in particular, social 
identity is formed. Therefore, an analysis of the relationship between subjective 
elements in the construction of social identity and how it influences the dynamism in 
conflict should be made, as part of which, social psychology and culture assume an 
important role. However, social psychology and culture will not be analyzed 
separately; rather, a synthetic or complementary analysis will help to comprehend the 
dynamism of conflict. 
 
Brown states that the most important assumption of social psychology is that “the 
meaning people give to their experiences guides their behavior” (2006: 2). How we 
behave relies on how we interpret, construe, appraise or perceive the situation (Brown, 
2006). However, generally we do not behave at random based on a haphazard 
understanding of our experiences and environments. Rather, we try to understand the 
phenomena including ourselves in a systematic manner upon which we act reasonably 
and identity, especially, social identity becomes a constitutive element in establishing 
a systematic understanding of the world.  
 
Tajfel explains that one of the basic ideas of social identity is that it is part of an 
individual’s self-concept that derives from his/her knowledge of his/her membership 
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in a social group together with value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership (1981). Oakes argues that social identity functions to shape the causal 
understanding of the social environment as a guide to action, which provides us with a 
system of orientation of self-reference, establishes and defines our place in society 
(2003). Social identity works to align each of us with the realities of the social context 
and construct dynamic and content-specific definitions of self and others which reflect 
and make possible the variable patterns of human social relations (Oakes, 2003). 
Through interdependence and interaction with others, social identity that provides us 
with shared understanding of social world is constructed. 
 
In short, social identity, as Northrup insists, can be understood as a system of beliefs 
as a way of framing the world that makes life predictable (1989). Further, Brown 
argues that segmenting the world into a manageable and predictable number of 
categories provided by social identity not only helps us to simplify and make sense of 
it but also functions to enable us to define who we are (2001). Social identity can be 
more than a psychological sense of self to be extended to include a sense of 
self-in-the-world, that is, a sense of being-in-the-world (Northrup, 1989). Social 
identity brings about more than a psychological sense of self, which means that it 
makes us feel that we are safe in the world physically, psychologically, socially and 
even spiritually (Northrup, 1989). As Northrup summarizes, the formation of social 
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identity or the process of construing the world can be recognized as more than a 
cognitive process since it embraces all dimensions of human experience including 
emotions, values and behaviors as well as cognitions (1989).  
 
From the above points of view, there is a case that in understanding identity, especially 
social identity, we need to look into the subjective dimension, especially 
intersubjective perspectives, since a construction of shared reality or common 
understanding of the social world is pertinent to the establishment of existential 
dimension of “Who we are.” Therefore, although biological factors cannot be denied 
categorically in examining basic needs including identity, from subjective 
epistemology viewpoints, intersubjective formation of social identity, that is, 
construction of shared reality and its relationship with conflict dynamism, should be 
explored, in which culture would be the central element.  
 
Black insists that in cultural analysis we need to understand categories of meaning 
used in our everyday lives by which participants themselves comprehend their 
experience and orient themselves toward one another (2003). In other words, as its 
starting and fundamental point, daily interaction and meaning-making through that 
interaction are presupposed in understanding the nature of culture. Culture is, as 
Avruch explains, conceived as an evolved component of human cognition and social 
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action, which constitutes social worlds, that is, intersubjective worlds as well as is 
constituted by those actors living in those worlds (2003).  
 
Vayrynen claims that since the life-world is the world within which we act, within 
which we understand fellow men and women and are understood by them, it is “our 
paramount reality” (2001: 92). It is through this social world that we create or 
construct the shared meanings to make sense of the environment (Avruch and Black, 
1991). In short, we, human beings, do not experience reality directly; rather, our 
experience (of reality) is mediated by our perceptions that are structured culturally 
(Avruch and Black, 1993), which means that cultural patterns condition how the world 
is represented to us (Vayrynen, 1998). Culture plays the central role in bridging our 
consciousness and the external environment through intersubjectively constructed 
understanding of reality. 
 
Further, LeBaron argues that cultures exist within larger systems called worldviews, 
which embrace the following cultural dimensions: “social, practical and material and 
transcendent and spiritual” (2003: 11). Worldviews are profoundly embedded in our 
consciousness and frame and inform our identities and our meaning-making (LeBaron, 
2003). They provide us with “big-picture ideas of the meaning of life and give us 
ways to learn as well as logic for ordering what we know” (LeBaron, 2003: 11). 
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Culture provides ways of seeing, thinking and feeling about the world which prescribe 
normality for us, that is, the ways things are and the way things should be (Avruch and 
Black, 1993). Culture is a lens or a grammar for the production and structuring of 
meaning-making. In short, culture is recognized as a fundamental feature of human 
consciousness, “the sine qua non of being human” (Avruch and Black, 1993: 132).  
 
From subjective epistemological viewpoints, as Vayrynen claims, human beings, 
instead of being guided by biologically-oriented derives or needs, orient themselves in 
the world through cultural patterns that are essential for social groups and function to 
members of the group as a natural scheme of reference (1998). Human beings are 
basically creatures that assign meaning in order to make sense of our worlds and 
ourselves in the worlds (LeBaron, 2001). Through culture or intersubjectivity, we 
construct the meaning of reality and consequently provide ourselves with the answer 
to the fundamental existential question of “Who are we?” Thus it can be seen that 
culture plays a central role in forming our social identity and in providing us with the 
ways of meaning-making (LeBaron, 2003). Therefore, from subjective 
epistemological perspectives, in order to understand fully the dynamism of social 
identity, the biological dimension is not enough: the intersubjective or cultural 
dimension is of great significance.  
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Through culture, we create a shared understanding of reality and know who we are, 
which implies that in the process of the construction of social identity based on culture, 
the epistemological dimension of identity – how we can know or understand reality – 
and ontological or existential perspective of identity – who we are – are interfused 
with each other. Accordingly, as LeBaron insists, conflict emerges when social 
identities and meaning intersubjectively constructed are under threat (2003). We care 
to protect our social identities and shared meanings we nurture (LeBaron, 2003) since 
they are fundamental for our existence. Therefore, in order to gain a picture of the 
dynamism of conflict, the relationship between conflict and subjective perspectives, in 
particular, the intersubjective standpoint should be examined.  
 
As Northrup claims, generally subjective elements contribute to conflict since, 
whenever people are engaged in relationships, they are interpreting events and 
ascribing meanings to the events (1989) and culture helps us to interpret phenomena 
and to attribute meanings to them. According to Deutsch, the expectations, beliefs, 
languages, practices, rituals, norms and values that members of a group have 
collectively define their shared culture and then culture constructs the symbolic 
meaning of actions and defines a type of action as appropriate or inappropriate, good 
or bad, friendly or hostile and so on (1991). Culture provides us with systems of 
symbols by which shared meaning is asserted and formed in the world (Avruch and 
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Black, 1993) and the world to which shared meaning has been assigned through 
systems of symbol comes to be recognized as the reality.  
 
Further, Crawford states that although emotions are subjective experiences, they have 
also “physiological, intersubjective and cultural components” (2000: 125). Although 
emotions are strong feelings such as love, hate or anger, they are presented with 
attitudes such as beliefs, judgments and desires and these attitudes do not arise 
naturally but are based upon cultural beliefs and values (Crawford, 2000). Expressing 
emotions is a universal phenomenon, how they are expressed varies according to 
cultures. This means that emotions are constructed to “serve sociocultural functions, to 
restrain undesirable attitudes and behavior and to sustain and endorse cultural values” 
(Crawford, 2000: 129) that construct and maintain social identity. Put differently, 
cultures are, as LeBaron insists, systems of shared understandings or symbols that 
bind people together, providing them with unwritten messages on how to express and 
how to make meaning of their lives (2003). Consequently, the shared symbolic 
meanings attached to phenomena, which have been created and nurtured in culture, 
play key roles in conflict. 
 
Kaufman argues that in understanding social identity that has been recognized as the 
core unit in contemporary conflict, myth and symbol should be in focus (2001). 
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According to him, a myth is a belief held in common by a large group of people that 
gives events and actions a particular meaning, the aim of which is to help one to 
understand what a set of events means to him/her (2001). Therefore, the core element 
of social identity that gets involved with violent conflict is the myth-symbol complex, 
that is, the combination of myth, memories, values and symbols that define who 
belongs to the group as well as what it means to be a member (of the group), as a 
result of which, the existence and security of the group come to be understood to rely 
on the status of group symbols (Kaufman, 2001).115 Therefore, how the culturally or 
intersubjectively shared symbolic meanings are treated influences the direction of 
conflict.  
 
According to Kaufman, hostile emotions such as hatred and anger can be seen as 
rooted in pre-existing ethnic myths or symbols justifying hostility against the ethnic 
out-group (2006a). People choose emotionally among contesting values by responding 
to the most evocative or emotive symbol presented to them (Kaufman, 2006b). 
Symbols or myths, as Kaufman states, play central role in giving events and actions a 
specific meaning – typically by defining enemies or heroes and binding the ideas of 
                                                  
115 See also Kaufman (2006a) and (2006b). According to Kaufman (2006b), (in relation 
to the myth-symbol complex) a symbolist approach notes that each ethnic group is 
defined by a myth-symbol complex that identifies which elements of shared culture 
and what interpretation of history bind a group together and distinguish it from other 
and these definitions of identity are always subjective, or more precisely, 
intersubjective.  
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right and wrong with people’s identity (2001). Symbols simultaneously refer to an 
interest of a group and to an emotionally loaded myth, which tends to form a conflict 
of interest as a struggle against hostile, evil or even subhuman forces (Kaufman, 
2006b).  
 
Furthermore, Kaufman argues that a group’s myth-symbol complex encompasses 
prejudice or bias against the other group – stereotypes about the competing group, 
enhanced by negative feelings about that group (2001). When a group feels that its 
own myth-symbol is threatened, various values and emotions are simultaneously 
evoked, in particular, shared feeling of superiority over the out-group will be aroused 
(Kaufman, 2001) to protect or secure the identity of its own. Prejudice or bias derived 
from a myth-symbol complex can lead a group to form further distorted images and 
see other groups as more hostile and aggressive or even barbaric than they actually are 
(Lake and Rothchild, 1998) and eventually extreme violence including massacre or 
genocide could be justified.  
 
In short, deep-rooted or intractable conflict entails more than visible material 
resources: rather, as LeBaron claims, it is intricately connected with the symbolic 
level of identity and meaning-making which are difficult to transform since identity 
and meaning or meaning-making are fundamental to our sense of self and position in 
 180
the world (2001). Human subjectivity, especially intersubjectively formed and shared 
meanings of reality represented by myth or symbol are common in conflict. Truly, 
conflict involves tangible resources, but from an intersubjective viewpoint, as 
Rothman maintains, “tangible interests play a secondary or derivative role in the 
conflict” (2001: 297). Rather, what makes conflicts intractable are “the intangible: 
myths and fears that lead the parties to demand political and military dominance or 
superior status” (Kaufman, 2006a: 214), which could provide the group with 
legitimacy or justification to harm other group(s). Therefore, the emotional and 
symbolic processes that affect significantly how tangible issues are perceived or 
provided with meanings should be addressed in order to understand and eventually 
resolve conflict (Kaufman, 2006a).  
 
3-3 Critical epistemology 
3-3-1 Nature of critical epistemology 
Critique of eternal and universal knowledge 
There are some existing philosophies and theories that can be acknowledged as the 
foundational elements shaping critical epistemology: postmodernism, 
poststructuralism, social constructionism and critical theory are of great significance 
in forging critical epistemology. There are some significant differences among them, 
but we can also see common features among them, which constitute the essence of 
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critical epistemology. However, the various philosophical elements which inform 
critical epistemology do not aim to impair the distinctive characters of each of them. 
Rather, the aim is to promote further critical thinking by exploring complementary 
relationship among them.  
 
Although it is difficult to generalize what postmodernism is, it can be acknowledged 
as the strong critique of modernism and structuralism. According to Crotty, 
modernism puts a great emphasis on the power of reason, especially the instrumental 
reason to discover the absolute forms of knowledge (1998).116 Reason is praised as 
the source of progress in knowledge and society, as well as the privileged locus of 
truth and the underpinning of systematic knowledge (Best and Kellner, 1991). Science 
and scientific methods are appreciated and recognized as the supreme and most 
authentic way to discover the universal or eternal truth (Crotty, 1998).  
 
Further, the search for the absolute truth is based on the conviction that there are rules 
or structures that underlay the surface features of the world (Burr, 2003). It is believed 
that since the hidden structure or rule could be revealed as the fundamental reality 
underlying the surface features of the world, the truth about the world can be found by 
                                                  
116 See also Burr (2003). She states that so-called the Enlightenment project was to 
search for truth and to comprehend the true nature of reality through the application 
of reason and rationality.  
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examining the underlying structures in a certain way (Burr, 2003), that is, by means of 
reason. In other words, as Baronov insists, Enlightenment thought sought to uncover 
the intrinsic and universal structure of the physical and social worlds (2004). It was 
assumed that a common denominator could be established for all belief and value 
systems, which implies that the world is a unified field and can be explained by a 
single system (Ermarth, 1998).117 In short, the central assumption of modernism and 
structuralism is that there are so-called metanarratives or grand theories that enable us 
to understand the whole social world in terms of all-embracing principles (Burr, 
2003).  
 
Postmodernism rejects both the idea that there can be an ultimate and eternal truth and 
the structuralist idea, that is, that the world as we see it is the consequence of hidden 
universal structures (Burr, 2003). While modernism aims to base itself on generalized 
and eternally applicable truths about the way things really are, postmodernism denies 
the epistemological basis for any such claims to truth (Crotty, 1998) by rejecting 
metanarratives or grand theories. The denial of the grand theories or metanarratives of 
ultimate truth that explains every phenomenon in a systematic manner, which was 
advocated in modern era, warranted a rejection of any undertaking to probe for reality 
                                                  
117 Baronov states that the legacy of post-Enlightenment idea is the image of an 
orderly world held together by regular patterns, universal laws, stability, linear 
progress, common understanding and predictability based on certainty (2004). 
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or truth in any ultimate sense (Spears, 1997). Ahistoric and acultural ultimate and 
eternal truth that can be applied universally is dismissed. 
 
By rejecting grand theories that are believed to explain all phenomena in a systematic 
way, postmodernism “emphasizes the co-existence of a multiplicity and varieties of 
situation-dependent ways of life” (Burr, 2003: 13).118 Each situation is different and 
requires specific understanding, which means that there is no single foundation for 
truth: rather it changes from one episteme to another (Rosenan, 1992). On a 
postmodern perspective, it should be acknowledged that there are diverse worlds that 
are inhabited by different people, and that those different worlds construct diverse 
ways of knowing, distinct sets of meaning and various realities (Crotty, 1998). 
 
The negation of ultimate or universal truth and the recognition of diversity of truths or 
realities are also the main themes of social constructionism. According to Burr, social 
constructionism claims that all ways of understanding reality are historically and 
culturally relative, which indicates that people in a society or culture construct their 
own knowledge and shared ways of understanding reality (2003). It is through the 
everyday social interactions between/among people that certain knowledge comes to 
be formed (Burr, 2003). In short, from social constructionism point of view, rather 
                                                  
118 See also Chia (2002). Chia states that postmodernism stresses the heterogeneous, 
multiple and alinear character of real-world happenings.  
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than discovering119 universal, eternal and overarching truth, we construct the meaning 
of reality through social interaction. From these points of view, one of the central 
features of critical epistemology can be seen as the insistence that universal and 
eternal truth and metanarratives or grand theories are denied; rather, from critical 
epistemological viewpoint, respectively distinct forms of truth or knowledge are 
constructed by culture and society.  
 
Social construction of knowledge 
Spears insists that from a social constructionism viewpoint there is no objective 
window on reality, through which entities in the social world can be directly and 
objectively perceived or known (1997).120 Rather, as Bryman argues, the social world 
and the categories or classifications people apply to understand the social world are 
not external to them but are constructed in and through interactions between/among 
those who live in the social world (2004). How can people construct a shared 
knowledge of their social world? 
 
Ibanez argues that de-naturalization of social phenomena is of particular importance 
since social phenomena are inherently historically and culturally-oriented and the 
                                                  
119 Burr explains that the word “discover” presupposes an existing and stable reality 
that can be uncovered by observation and analysis (2003).  
120 See also Burr (2003). She states that social constructionism rejects the claim that 
our knowledge is a direct perception of reality.  
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historicity of social phenomena implies that every phenomenon arises from linguistic 
conventions and the cultural traditions that constitute a way of life (1997). From a 
social constructionist perspective, as the knowledge or understanding of reality is 
constructed through the intersubjective daily interactions between/among people in 
the social or cultural world, social interaction of many kinds, especially language, is of 
great significance (Burr, 2003). The language people use in their daily lives constitutes 
the framework of the way they think, the categories and concepts that form the 
meanings of reality (Burr, 2003). In short, from a social constructionist view, language 
is a basic condition for our construction of knowledge in a society. 
 
The central role of language or discourse in constructing the meanings of social world 
is also one of the essential features of postmodernism.121  Alvesson states that 
discourse is referred to as language-use anchored in an institutional context, 
articulating structured understanding or a line of reasoning with active and productive 
effects of providing meanings to the social phenomena (2002). Spears also argues that 
discourses can be understood as providing a repertoire of resources which people use 
                                                  
121 For instance, according to Smart, basic figures of postmodernism are: the crisis of 
representation and associated instability of meaning; the denial of certain foundation 
for knowledge; the analytic centrality of language, discourses and the texts; the 
inappropriateness of the Enlightenment premise of autonomous subject and a 
contrasting concentration on the ways in which individuals are formed as subjects 
(2000). Alvesson also insists that one of the basic elements of postmodernism is the 
centrality of discourse, which stresses the constitutive power of language and the view 
that natural objects are discursively produced (2002). Thus it can be seen that an 
examination of how discourse and language used in society construct the meanings of 
the social world is a crucial issue for both social constructionism and postmodernism.  
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to interpret the social world (1997). Put differently, as Crossley insists, discourse 
could be understood as engaging in communication with others by a variety of means 
available (2005).  
 
From the perspectives of social constructionism and postmodernism, as Gergen claims, 
the emphasis should be put on the ways in which conventions or structures of 
language, that is, discourses, are employed to construct the frameworks of meanings 
of a social world and consequently bring about some social effects (1999). We see the 
world through language that acts as a lens and sense-making tool that enables us to 
make sense of the world (Alvesson, 2002). Language, especially, the activities of 
naming and symbolic representation, gives the first ordering impulse for the 
systematic construction of our human life-worlds (Chia, 2002). In short, for 
postmodernism and social constructionism, the social world as conventionally 
understood, that is, social systems, structures, agents, shared meanings, and a 
prevailing social order are based on discourse or language with strong constructing 
effects (Alvesson, 2004).  
 
Critique of social construction of knowledge 
As argued, critical epistemology emphasizes socially constructed discourse as the way 
to understand reality and insists that discourse or language is not a mirror of the world 
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external to us, but is constructed in and through intersubjective interaction 
between/among people in society to make sense of the social world. However, there is 
one more thing that represents the central feature of critical epistemology: a critical 
attitude towards socially constructed discourses themselves. 
 
Although discourse or intersubjective use of language is recognized as the source of 
understanding of the social world, in critical epistemology, a representationalist 
epistemology is denied. According to Chia, the gist of representationalist 
epistemology is that signs and linguistic terms represent an external world of discrete 
and distinguishable objects and phenomena (2002). From this perspective, social 
phenomena would be considered as stable and immutable entities. Further, this 
representationalist approach to discourse is relevant to structuralist approach to 
language or discourse. 
 
Ritzer and Stillman explain that the root of structuralism lies in the idea that “language 
acquires its meaning from the juxtaposition of elements within a linguistic system” 
(2004: 1093). They also argue that one of the main themes of Ferdinand de Saussure, 
the leading figure in structuralism, is that the proper approach to language is to 
analyze the underlying rules and models of the linguistic systems that enable real-life 
speech, as a consequence of which, language can be understood as a static and stable 
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system of collective rules (2004).  
 
According to May, for Saussure, signs or discourses are divided into two parts: “the 
signifier (the sound) and the signified (the idea or concept to which the sound refers)” 
(2004: 846). Further, Saussure believed that the sign has a natural and direct relation 
to its referent and that the signifier has a unitary and stable relationship with the 
signified (Best and Kellner, 1991). From a structuralist viewpoint, the relationship 
between the signifier and the signified is considered as fixed and consistently stable 
(Baronov, 2004). Since the relationship between the signifier and the signified is fixed 
and unchanging across a society, everyone (in the society) can determine the meaning 
of any statement no matter who the speaker is (Baronov, 2004). Put differently, the 
meaning of any term is believed to be fixed through language as a self-referential 
system (May, 2004). While, as Best and Kellner state, structuralism made a huge 
contribution to describing social phenomena in terms of linguistic and social 
structures, rules, codes and systems (1991), its understanding of discourse based on 
the fixed and invariable relation between the signifier and the signified has led to the 
establishment of an immutable and deterministic view of discourse (Gergen, 1999), 
which should be problematized from the standpoint of critical epistemology.  
 
While structuralism insists that there is a fixed and stable system that underlies the use 
 189
of language, post-structuralism and postmodernism challenge the assumption that 
there are systems that are self-sufficient structures and consequently call into question 
the possibility of precise and fixed definitions upon which systems of knowledge can 
be based (Gutting, 1998a). Rather, post-structuralism, postmodernism and social 
constructionism stress the instability and contingency of the structural context of 
social interaction and discourses that arise from the interaction; consequently, they 
question the fixed and unchanging link between the signifier and the signified (Torfing, 
1999). While we tend to regard the sign as a tight and stable integration of the signifier 
and the signified, that is, the word and the object it refers to create a concept or an 
image, from postmodernist and post-structuralist perspectives, there is no one-to-one 
fixed relationship between the use of language and objects in the world (Alvesson, 
2002). In other words, it is insisted that there are no fixed and immutable relationships 
between the signifier and the signified (Baronov, 2004) and consequently, the arbitrary 
nature of everything that is socially constructed – discourse, culture and social 
structure itself – is emphasized (Best and Kellner, 1991). 
 
Gergen argues that generally, discourse in the social world appears to its users as well 
structured, that is, as a set of conventions, habits or ways of life that are stable, 
recurring and fixed (1999). Crossley insists that the key point of discourse is the 
assumption that those who participate in it are generally unconscious of the system of 
 190
conventions to which they have got accustomed and are also mostly unaware of the 
specific consequences that their use of the discourse may bring about (2005). In short, 
the discourse that is prevalent in society tends to be taken-for-granted. However, as 
Burr remarks, we should take a critical attitude toward our taken-for-granted ways of 
understanding the world (2003) since power relations underlie the social construction 
of knowledge.  
 
Gergen insists that since language is a critical aspect that represents power relations in 
a society, it is important to critically examine the discourse of knowledge prevalent in 
society (1999). Burr insists that our constructions of the social world are tied up with 
power relations since they have important implications for what it is acceptable for 
different people to do and for how they may treat others (2003).122 As Alvesson 
argues, power relations inhere in the discursive formulation itself, that is, the 
combination of a set of linguistic distinctions, ways of reasoning and material 
practices that structure social institutions and produce specific forms of subjects 
(2002). In short, social construction of knowledge or socially constructed knowledge 
creates a particular version of reality that is generally recognized as such (Alvesson, 
2004). Consequently, as Burr states, description or construction of a particular view of 
the social world can be understood as maintaining some fixed patterns of social action 
                                                  
122 May (2004) holds that discourses provide the limits to what may be experienced as 
well as the attribution of meanings to those experiences.  
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as normative and excluding others (2003). 
 
It is unavoidable that socially constructed knowledge basically derives from seeing 
reality from some perspective and consequently can be viewed as serving some 
interests rather than others (Burr, 2003). However, the danger of this is that by 
representing certain interests of a particular group over other groups, socially 
constructed knowledge itself can cause an unequal inter-group relationship in society. 
Discourses that are prevalent in the social world, therefore, can be understood as being 
mediated by power relations in society: through socially constructed discourses, 
certain groups in society are privileged over other groups and exercise some 
oppressive force on subordinate groups (Gray, 2004). Consequently, what are 
recognized as facts in society cannot be isolated from ideology and the self-interests 
of dominant groups (Gray, 2004). 
 
Deconstructing socially constructed knowledge 
From a critical epistemological point of view, the connection between social 
construction of knowledge and power relations is unavoidable and consequently, 
knowledge loses a sense of innocence and neutrality (Alvesson, 2004). However, it 
does not mean that we should abandon constructing knowledge. Rather, as an ultimate 
goal, understanding socially constructed knowledge or the dominant discourse in the 
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social world should be explored. 
 
As Smith (1998), Smart (2000), Alvesson (2002) to name a few argue, from 
post-structuralism, postmodernism and social constructionism viewpoints, there is no 
absolute and ultimate foundation for knowledge. Put another way, grand theories or 
metanarratives that secure the absolute or overarching status of one truth would be 
denied, so any assertion of one truth in the world should be critiqued. Therefore, the 
discourses that are dominant in a social world cannot be seen as absolute but as 
relative since there is no firm foundation that secures their absolute position. If there is 
no firm foundation for the discourses that are dominant in a social world, how those 
discourses are established should be put into critical examination, in which 
deconstructionism could play a significant role.  
 
Lockyer states that deconstructionism aims at specifying and problematizing the 
categories and strategies that construct particular versions of reality, which is to 
demonstrate that images of people, places or objects which we consider as natural or 
taken-for-granted are neither universal nor fixed, but particular ones (2004). 
According to Baronov, a main task of deconstruction is to reveal the fundamental 
indeterminacy of meaning within language (2004) and in order to implement this 
essential undertaking, deconstructionism focuses on texts and tries to show that the 
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meaning of a text is always indeterminate, open-ended and interactional (Burr, 2003). 
Best and Kellner argue that traditionally there have been the binary oppositions 
governing Western philosophy and culture – such as subject/object, appearance/reality, 
speech/writing, man/woman and so on – that have worked to construct a hierarchy of 
values that attempt to secure truth as well as to serve to exclude, marginalize or 
devalue allegedly inferior terms or positions (1991). However, deconstructionism 
gives a critical eye to the logic of fixed categorizations, especially the either/or logic 
of binary oppositions (Lockyer, 2004) and attempts to uncover the fragility of the 
logic.  
 
For instance, Lockyer provides three steps for deconstructing text or discourse. The 
first step identifies binary oppositions or polarities in the text and demonstrates how 
one particular pole is privileged; the second step transposes the subordinate pole of the 
opposition into the dominant position, which serves to reveal how the privileged pole 
relies on and could not exist and operate without the opposition; and finally the 
opposition is reconsidered and new concepts and practices could be explored 
(2004).123 In other words, as Butler claims, when we look at particular systems or 
                                                  
123 See also Gergen (1999). He argues that word meaning depends on differentiating 
between a presence and an absence, that which is designated by the word against 
what is not designated and that the presences are privileged, that is, they are brought 
into focus by the words themselves and the absence might only be existing by 
implication or forgotten totally. However, he claims that those presences cannot make 
sense without the absences. Following this analysis, it could be argued that the 
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discourses that are believed to describe the world correctly, the concepts they privilege 
or make central and the hierarchies constructed by them are not certainly in the right 
and stable order but are dependent on those that are considered as inferior or 
under-privileged (in the systems or discourses) (2002), which reveals that there cannot 
be any absolute and stable status of discourses in the social world: rather they are 
relevant to and dependent on others. 
 
The deconstructionist approach to the categories of language or discourse insists that 
any attempt to fix or stabilize the meaning of a sign will never succeed since “there is 
always a surplus meaning – a supplement – which leaves the meaning of a sign open 
to contestation” (Smith, 1998: 57). As Rosen highlights, deconstructionism’s approach 
to demystifying a text or discourse would be to uncover its internal arbitrary 
hierarchies and its presuppositions (1992).124 From a deconstructionist viewpoint, 
there is no stability in any of thought or concept’s fundamental opposition: their 
exclusive alternatives turn out to be highly connected and consequently their implicit 
hierarchies are fragile and reversible (Gutting, 1998a). Thus, the pinnacle of 
deconstruction is to call into question the seemingly fixed and stable systems of 
                                                                                                                                               
discourses that privilege some ideas or groups rely on what are excluded or left out 
from the discourses.  
124 See also Alvesson (2002). He insists that deconstruction functions mainly to 
challenge the belief of representation by recalling the suppressed term (in discourse) 
that provides the system and consequently allows the positive term to appear to stand 
for an existing object and order.  
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representation (Harvey, 1999), which could enable us to realize that since there can be 
no firm foundation or fixed rules, all forms of representation can be rearticulated and 
transformed (Smith, 1998). 
 
By this means, discourse can be recognized as a tool to construct shared meanings or 
common understanding of social world. However, at the same time, a fixation or 
belief in the largely unchanging solidity of the discourse is denied in critical 
epistemology. Rather, since critical epistemology emphasizes the historicity of 
knowledge, that is, the negation of the invariability and universal applicability of 
knowledge, knowledge should be recognized as a process, not as a substance: from a 
critical epistemological perspective, there is no end-state of the construction of 
knowledge. Put differently, knowledge can be understood as what is being open to 
constant critique, revision and transformation done by those who live in a specific 
history.  
 
3-3-2 How has critical epistemology influenced contemporary conflict resolution? 
As demonstrated, critical epistemology denies the existence of truth or knowledge that 
can be eternally and universally applied to everyone. Rather, in critical epistemology, 
it is maintained that knowledge or truth is constructed by those who live in a society 
or culture: in each society or culture, specific knowledge or truth is constructed by the 
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inhabitants. In short, the social construction of knowledge is presumed in critical 
epistemology.  
 
Conflict transformation 
From a critical epistemological viewpoint, the values or narratives that are seen as 
taken-for-granted in society and the structures that maintain the society or social order 
should be open to critique and eventually be transformed since those narratives or 
values and social structures themselves marginalize some of those who live in the 
society and cause inequality among them. In the context of contemporary conflict 
resolution, this critical view of the discourses and structures that are prevalent in the 
society is pertinent to conflict transformation. As examined in the first chapter, 
conventional conflict resolution represented by a problem-solving approach has been 
criticized since it is inclined to ignore structural and cultural aspects of conflict. It has 
been critiqued that traditional conflict resolution is implemented with existing social 
structures and discourses intact. Critical epistemology challenges this approach and 
advocates transforming those structures and discourses and consequently the critical 
epistemological approach to resolving conflict revolves around the concept of conflict 
transformation.  
 
Mitchell states that the underlying assumption of conflict transformation is that there 
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is nothing sacrosanct about the status quo; rather, it starts with analyzing and 
critiquing the existing system and assuming that it is crucial to construct new systems, 
structures and relationships (2005). Francis argues that conflict transformation can be 
understood as counter-cultural by aiming to tackle the pressing manifestation of 
violent conflict as well as its structural and attitudinal sources, eventually to achieve 
long term transformation (2004). Conflict transformation seeks for the transformation 
of oppressing, unequal and violent relationships and structures and manifestations of 
violence (Francis, 2004). 
 
In short, conflict transformation can be recognized as a holistic or synthetic approach 
to conflict by dealing with visible direct violence and more importantly, by 
overcoming structural violence and cultural violence.125 Conflict transformation does 
not downplay direct violence or visible armed conflict: rather, what should be 
emphasized is that structural and cultural dimensions, that is, human subjective 
dimensions play a critical role in causing and protracting conflict since social 
structures and cultural narratives and values create unequal relationships 
between/among those who live in the society. In other words, conflict transformation 
starts by problematizing the dominant social frameworks and aims at constructing 
                                                  
125 According to Reiman (2004), structural violence can be defined as the social, 
political and economic structure of a conflict situation when asymmetric power 
relations, domination and dependency are maintained, whereas cultural violence 
means the social and cultural legitimation of direct and structural violence.  
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alternatives that could transform the predominant social institutions and social 
meanings that are regarded as taken-for-granted: conflict transformation seeks to 
transform the basis on which everyday life and meaning are constructed and practiced 
(Fetherston, 2000). Thus, critical analysis and transformation of social structure and 
socially constructed discourse is the essential task for conflict transformation.  
 
Critical analysis of social identity and construction of discourse 
In contemporary conflict resolution, identity, especially social identity is one of the 
essential elements in understanding the dynamics of conflict, and in critical 
epistemology, the critical analysis of identity is crucial in transforming conflictual 
situation or relationships into peaceful ones. Especially, a critical examination of the 
relationship between the construction of social identity and discourses or narratives in 
a society can be regarded as crucial.  
 
As Neumann states, identification or construction of identity can be considered as an 
essential aspect of all social interactions (1999) since as Jabri argues, identity is “the 
medium which bridges the self-society nexus” (1996: 125). Therefore, through the 
construction of social identity, social reality is also formed, as in the process of 
construction, those who live in a society negotiate the meanings for actions and 
situations (Rogers, 2003). Social reality framed through the construction of social 
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identity is a complex of socially constructed shared knowledge – meanings, cultural 
symbols and social institutions and those meanings and interpretations arrange and 
structure social human relationships (Rogers, 2003). In short, social identity is not 
merely a matter of existence: rather, as Jabri argues, construction of social identity 
encompasses the construction of shared memories, myths, symbolic orders and 
self-imagery that shape a constitutive part of the practical consciousness of situated 
individuals and they provide knowledgeable human agents with meaning in the daily 
encounters (1996). In other words, shared or socially constructed discourses, 
narratives or symbols come to be the core elements in the formation of social 
identity126 and they should be considered as critical in analyzing conflict. 
 
As Crossley notes, the formation of collective or social identity accompanies the 
creation of narratives of collective history, symbols and rituals that promote strong 
emotional bonds between members (2005). Further, narratives and symbols, as 
Baronov states, function as frameworks of belief that legitimize and structure social 
institutions and practices by formulating the rules of interaction and setting the criteria 
for judgements (2004), which enable us to lead an intersubjectively constructed life.  
                                                  
126 For instance, Jeong and Vayrynen insist that the subsistence of a society is based 
on a cognitive scheme of collective self, i.e., social identity supported by symbols, 
myths and ideologies (1999). Their argument shows that subjective perspective of 
social identity is crucial in understanding or examining social identity. Examining 
how symbols, myths or discourses are constructed means comprehending how social 
identities are framed.  
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However, what should be remembered is that “the construction of identity implies 
active selection of particular modes of representation” (Jabri, 1996: 131). Furthermore, 
the active selection does not refer to free selection: rather, it is constituted through 
dominant societal norms, symbolic orders and structures of domination (Jabri, 1996), 
which could be termed as symbolic power. According to Crossley, symbolic power is 
“a concept used to challenge both the neglect of questions of representation and 
symbolic culture in many analyses of power, politics and inequality and the neglect of 
questions of power and politics in many analyses of representation and symbolic 
culture” (2005: 316). Language, discourse and symbolic culture play a critical role in 
defining social situations or framing reality, that is, framing social identity of those 
who live in the society and shaping social practices and structures, but the practice of 
defining and forming reality is never an open or equal process (Crossley, 2005). 
Rather than reflecting or describing some objective and neutral reality, language, 
discourses and symbols are used to construct meanings (Gough and McFadden, 2001), 
which is accompanied by power relations. 
 
Fetherston and Parkin argue that power is exercised partly through the production or 
creation of truth and knowledge, that is, through the distribution of discourses of truth 
or narratives that exert control through fixing norms (1997). Consequently, production 
of truth or construction of discourses on reality come to be seen as exercise of power, 
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which is dominated by some particular social groups. So, the emergence of dominant 
patterns of discourses or narratives is pertinent to asymmetric power relations in 
which structures of signification or modes of discourses are used to legitimize some 
particular interests of hegemonic or dominant groups (Jabri, 1996). Consequently, 
some social groups are sanctioned or privileged to make definitions or constructions 
of social meanings (Crossley, 2005). As a result of this, some discourses or narratives 
of reality come to be prioritized over the others and further, those that do not accord 
with dominant or prevalent ones can be marginalized or eliminated as deviations from 
society.  
 
As a corollary of construction of dominant discourses or narratives, there emerges a 
singular dominant mode of social identity and accordingly the relationship between 
identity and the outbreak of violent conflict is thought to reflect how conflict is 
implicated in establishing a strict boundary between friend and enemy (Neumann, 
1999). Social identity is, as Jabri claims, formed through deeply embedded 
institutional and discursive continuities which places itself within bounded 
communities, the definition of which is based on mode of inclusion and exclusion 
(1996). As Jeong and Vayrynen insist, the networks of signs, symbols or images are 
employed to establish a system of inclusion and exclusion (1999). In a social world, 
particular ways are used to perceive and interpret others as well as to present the self 
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to others (Jeong and Vayrynen, 1999) and the multiple identities that individuals are 
supposed to possess come to be expressed in terms of one dominant identity (Jabri, 
1996) in that process.  
 
In short, through the construction of dominant discourses or narratives on reality, more 
specifically on ingroup and outgroup, narrow and exclusionist social identities are 
formed.127 The production of a dominant or exclusive modality of representation or 
discourse precludes other possibilities in discourses and narratives and consequently 
invalidates the pluralities of social identity (Jabri, 1996), which can lead to the 
distorted or simplistic views of both oneself and others and consequently violence of 
many kinds and discrimination could be justified. 
 
The emergence of a singular dominant mode of representation excludes other 
possibilities in discourses or narratives and denies the multiple identities that are 
possessed by every individual (Jabri, 1996). Conflict establishes a discourse of 
exclusion based on intersubjectively constructed identity that involves strong sense of 
separation and strict boundaries (Jabri, 1996). The production of dominant 
constructions of social identity within particular locations or societies demonstrates 
the structures of domination as implicated in the construction of hegemonic identity 
                                                  
127 Francis argues that narrow and exclusionist identities have powerful weapons in 
the struggle for survival in conflict situations (2002).  
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defining discourses (Jabri, 1996). Consequently, the dominant discourses or narratives 
and social identity derived from those hegemonic discourses fixate the views on 
ingroup as well as on outgroup and strengthen sense of inclusion and exclusion 
between them. Further, what should be stressed is that once they have been established, 
dominant discourses and identities based on asymmetric power relations become part 
of the taken-for-granted social world (Nordstrom, 1995). The asymmetric power 
relations and the dominant discourses can be so strongly fixed as to influence the 
course of social life and could be perceived as the way life is (Nordstrom, 1995). Put 
differently, the predominant discourses or narratives accompanied by power relations 
come to be naturalized, which prevents us from viewing oureselves and others in 
different ways. Therefore, it is imperative to critically analyze and challenge the 
dominant discourses or narratives and power relations that are associated with them.128 
From these points of view, as Jeong and Vayrynen argue, the critical examination of 
narrowly defined social identity and the exploration of alternative possibilities are 
crucial in transforming violent situations and relationships (1999). The transformation 
of a singular dominant social identity into diverse and multiple identities, which 
requires adversarial groups to perceive ingroup and outgroup in an interdependent and 
self-constituting relationships (Jeong and Vayrynen, 1999), must entail transforming 
                                                  
128 For instance, Nordstrom insists that true conflict transformation can come only 
when the cultures defining conflict and power relations are critically examined and 
consciously revised (1995).  
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the dominant discourses or narratives and asymmetric power relations that prop up the 
fixed social identity and strongly bounded dichotomy between inclusion and exclusion. 
In other words, the beliefs, norms, values and symbols that have been seen as 
taken-for-granted in everyday social interaction should be thematized and subjected to 
critique by those who live in the society (Crotty, 1998), as a consequence of which, 
there could emerge the transformative possibilities for the multiple voices or 
discourses in group or society.  
 
In order to challenge and eventually transform the singular dominant discourses, 
narratives or symbolic meanings that constitute fixed social identity with strong 
exclusionist perspectives, critical thinking must be nurtured. According to Crotty, 
critical thinking understands reality as process and transformation, not as a static 
entity (1998). In the context of critical thinking about dominant identities and 
discourses or narratives, we must be conscientized that the boundaries of identity are 
fixed and can be reorganized with the construction of new meanings and perspectives 
(Jeong and Vayrynen, 1999).  
 
How can dominant discourses, narratives or symbolic meanings be subjected to 
critique or critical inquiry and how can transformative counter-discourses or new 
meanings be explored? Jabri insists that the exploration of counter-discourses or the 
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transformation of dominant discourses or narratives should be located in the public 
space or sphere (1996). Crossley explains that the public sphere means “a space, real 
or virtual, in which individuals, who otherwise live private lives and have their own 
private concerns, come together to discuss issues of common concern with the 
purpose of thrashing out their different views and arriving at a common position” 
(2005: 227).  
 
Fetherston and Parkin insist that it should be recognized that the transformation of a 
conflict situation must entail the repair or promotion of communicative networks that 
enable citizens to participate in the reconstruction or reconfiguration of shared cultural 
knowledge, social solidarities and socialized personalities (1997). Further, they also 
argue that the communicative repair work can be achieved partly by local social 
movements or community groups that function to open up public spaces for more 
inclusive and unrestricted discourses (1997). Put another way, local people should be 
empowered to construct or secure the democratic social space or sphere to explore the 
transformative discourses or narratives, which could challenge the dominant 
discourses, narrowly defined social identity and deformed or distorted power relations 
that construct and sustain the dominant discourses disguised as taken-for-granted or 
natural.  
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A true transformation of conflictual and violent situations should involve an 
integration of all who have been affected by conflict into the mainstream of social life 
including public discourse (Fetherston and Parkin, 1997), which could enable them to 
critique the dominant discourses, narratives or cultural symbolic meanings that have 
been assumed to be natural or absolute and to explore the alternatives. Consequently, 
rather than recognizing monolithic views of identity, people would recognize diversity, 
the articulation of multiple subjectivities and explore the possibility of cross-cutting 
modes of discourses or narratives that transcend or breakthrough strong demarcation 
of inclusion and exclusion (Jabri, 1996).  
 
Thus we need to explore “complex, flexible and inter-subjectively produced responses 
to violent conflict which intend to create emancipatory social transformation” 
(Fetherston, 2000: 23). The renewal of cultural knowledge, social solidarity and social 
identity could be achieved through intersubjective action oriented to reaching 
understanding (Fetherston and Parkin, 1997) and cultivating capacity to have a critical 
eye to the existing discourses or narratives. Interactions that are interwoven in a 
network of everyday intersubjective communicative practice can be the medium 
through which culture or discourse, society and identity are reproduced (Fetherston 
and Parkin, 1997). Put it another way, empowerment of local people or people in 
grassroots level through the promotion of daily communicative action, could enable 
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them to critically examine the dominant discourses or narratives that control their 
society and to explore new discourses or narratives.  
 
Critique of social structure 
As Jabri insists, human conflict is “a social continuity sustained by deeply embedded 
discursive and institutional structures existent in patterned social systems” (1996: 146). 
Existing social structures should be subjected to critical analysis and eventual 
transformation: any status quo based on an existing dominant social structure should 
be problematized and transformed into new one since social structure itself is seen as a 
source of conflict. In other words, critical epistemology tries to problematize 
functionalism. 
 
According to Jeong, the main presupposition of functionalism is that “component 
actors are motivated to act in accordance with their role requirements to maintain the 
integration of the system” (2003: 157). From this functionalist viewpoint, conflict can 
be managed by reforming the components of a system, which implies that 
functionalism is oriented toward maintaining the status quo (Jeong, 2003). On this 
view, the status quo is taken-for-granted. However, from a critical epistemological 
perspective, the social structure that sustains the status quo is not neutral: rather it is 
based on asymmetric power relations between/among the component actors in the 
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social system in which some actors or groups are prioritized or privileged over others. 
Accordingly, the maintenance of the existing social structure is understood as 
fundamentally maintaining the unequal relationships.  
 
As Jeong argues, since unequal power relations between/among those who live in a 
society are located within a society itself, its effects can be understood as being spread 
around the social structure as a whole (2003). Asymmetric power relations are 
embedded in a complex web of structural and material elements, which constructs the 
fabric of everyday life itself (Jeong, 2003). 
 
If the deformed social structure derived from the asymmetric power relations 
between/among different groups is considered as a source of conflict, serious conflict 
should be recognized as being often embedded in an unequal social, political and 
economic system that reflects prolonged exploitation backed by coercion (Jeong, 
2003). Structural conditions for the emergence of conflict are unequal economic 
opportunities and unjust access to political power or a lack of political openings 
(Smith, 2004). Hierarchical and asymmetric social relations or structures are 
institutionalized in ways that prevent those who are subordinated or underprivileged 
from effective participation in social, political and economic activities (Jeong, 2000). 
Consequently, an exploitable sense of social injustice, which has derived from the 
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underlying inequality of power and prosperity in a society, is the central factor for 
violent political mobilization (Smith, 2004). Put differently, as Wilmer claims, social 
structural insecurity that arises out of asymmetric social, political and economic 
opportunities between/among those who live in a society causes psychological 
uncertainty of those who are underprivileged and weakens their psychic defenses 
against the cognitive processes that triggers fear and eventually drives them to resort 
to violence (2002).  
 
Therefore, approaches that ignore structural transformation would result in 
perpetuating the status quo and consequently would not contribute to resolving 
conflict but might prolong and worsen it (Botes, 2003b). In other words, the 
achievement of social justice through the transformation of existing social structures 
and of asymmetric power relations between/among the habitants in a society is of 
great significance. As Mitchell claims, social structural changes are necessary 
conditions for successful effort to address the conflict: only by seeking structural 
transformation, we could prevent future conflict (2005). In short, a great deal of 
conflict resolution is based upon the belief that overcoming structural violence is the 
core element of social justice. 
 
According to Kanisin, tackling structural violence in terms of addressing conflict 
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means “breaking down the structures of exploitation, marginalization and 
fragmentation of people in society” (2003: 4).129 As Reimann insists, the political 
imperative to build a new infrastructure to recognize and empower the 
underprivileged people or group of people should be emphasized in order to foster 
social justice (2004). Put differently, structural accommodation entails formal means 
of securing inclusiveness and respect for diversity in the political system, institutions 
and the law (Nathan, 2000). However, as Nathan argues, justice in the socioeconomic 
domain is also crucial in addressing conflict since where underdevelopment is 
combined with extreme inequality, sporadic violence can occur accompanied by 
negative feelings such as anger, frustration and fear (2000).  
 
In short, as Montiel elucidates, structurally peaceful social structures can be 
characterized by “equitably-distributed decision-powers in the production, allocation 
and utilization of economic, political and cultural resources” (2001: 285). Structural 
transformation is a process of transforming relatively enduring asymmetric 
relationships between/among collectivities in a social structure to new sets of 
intergroup relations where all groups can enjoy more equal control over 
political-economic resources within the society (Montiel, 2001). Since vertical 
                                                  
129 Nathan, for instance, raises four structural conditions for conflict: authoritarian 
rule; the exclusion of minorities from governance; socioeconomic deprivation combined 
with inequality; and weak states that lack the institutional capacity to manage 
normal political and social conflict (2000).  
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relationships between/among groups are deeply embedded in the asymmetric social 
structures, by transforming the asymmetric structures into more equitable ones, those 
vertical relations could be reconfigured into more horizontal ones. As Wilmer insists, 
transformation of the asymmetric power relations in which ethnic majority enjoys 
social and cultural privilege, greater access to power, control of the political 
institutions and economic privilege into more civic polity in which diversity and 
equality can be guaranteed, is essential for sustainable peace and social stability 
(2002).  
 
Thus, dynamic changes of social structures that are marked by asymmetric power 
relations should be included as the core of resolution of conflict in the long run 
(Bachler, 2004). From a critical epistemological perspective, the status quo should be 
critiqued and transformed. It should be recognized that the existing state of affairs 
does not exhaust all other possibilities: our human world is a product of human action 
and therefore it should be acknowledged that it is the product of some actions among 
wide varieties of possibilities (Calhoun, 2000). Consequently, it should be understood 
that existing social structures are not what will last eternally; rather, since they have 
been constructed by human beings themselves, they can be transformed even if it 
takes time to carry out the transformation.    
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3-4 Problems of existing epistemological approaches to contemporary conflict 
resolution and exploring the potential of new epistemologies as complementary to 
existing ones 
3-4-1 Critique of objective epistemological approach 
Achievement of objective epistemological approach 
The most distinct achievement of objective epistemological approaches to addressing 
conflict, that is, the application of basic human needs theory to conflict resolution, is 
that by challenging the traditional approaches represented by conflict settlement, and 
providing an alternative to them, it has enabled us to explore the possibility of 
resolving conflict, the basic assumption of which is that since conflicts have root 
causes, if we address the causes, we can resolve conflict. 
 
According to Rubenstein, a traditional or conservative view of human nature is that 
human beings are creatures inherently driven to engage in violent conflict by sinful 
rebelliousness, innate aggressive instincts or a lust for power (2001). Further, Burton 
insists that traditionally it has been held that human beings are aggressive mainly in 
order to pursue material goods, in particular, resources and territories that are in 
limited supply (1998). Therefore, it has been believed that “conflicts are caused by 
knowable, measurable and reducible material objects” (Fetherston, 2000: 2). In other 
words, conflict emerges from substantive issues such as power-sharing, territory, 
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natural resources, economic control and so on (Fetherston and Parkin, 1997).  
 
Consequently, some approaches to conflict have concentrated on minimizing the worst 
excesses of violence, which can be termed conflict settlement (Fetherston, 2000). 
According to Fetherston and Parkin, conflict settlement is “to distinguish a way of 
managing violent conflict which emphasizes power and interests” (1997: 24). Beckett 
explains that the conflict settlement approach entails reaching agreement over specific 
material or substantive matters, in which the parties to the conflict have an interest, 
using various ways of bargaining processes to achieve a compromise (1997). 
Fundamentally, conflict settlement embraces the suppression of conflict by coercive 
means, concretely focuses on methods such as arbitration, power mediation and sees 
sanctions and rewards as important instruments to manage or control further conflict 
(Beckett, 1997).  
 
A basic assumption of conflict settlement is that since human beings are inherently 
evil and/or biologically aggressive, mechanisms for control are essential (Jeong, 2000). 
As Rubenstein states, because human impulses to aggress or dominate, which have 
been biologically embedded, cannot be eliminated categorically, all that we can do is 
to control or balance them by countervailing force (2001). Although human violent 
and destructive behaviors cannot be completely overcome as they are inherently 
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embedded in human beings, they can be controlled by disciplinary or coercive means 
(Jeong, 2000). Thus it can be supposed that from the conflict settlement perspective, 
what we can do is to control biologically programmed human violence through 
powerful or coercive methodologies, but it is impossible to resolve violent conflict 
completely, let alone prevent it.   
 
However, the basic human needs approach has criticized the assumption of conflict 
settlement and insisted that conflict can be resolved if the root-source of violent 
conflict is addressed. Fetherston and Parkin explain that conflict resolution, which is 
concerned with addressing root-causes of conflict, developed out of a critique of 
conflict settlement approaches (1997). From a conflict resolution viewpoint, there is 
the deeper or more profound idea that conflicts fundamentally are not fought over 
substantive material issues, but could be rooted in basic human needs (Fetherston and 
Parkin, 1997). From basic human needs perspective, it is believed that people conflict 
when they feel that their basic needs have not been gratified (Dunn, 2001) and the 
distinguished view on basic human needs is that they are assumed to be inherent in 
human beings and universal (Burton, 1997). Consequently, it can be supposed that 
aggression is not inherent but only an outcome of the failure to satisfy basic human 
needs that are not malleable (Fetherston, 2000). Furthermore, while conflict, at first 
glance, might be viewed as being interest-oriented (territory, material resources and so 
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on), it will come to be recognized as being human needs-based, which is ontologically 
and universally common to all human beings (Burton, 1991).  
 
An epistemologically objective view, in which conflict is seen as ‘win-lose’ or ‘all or 
nothing’ phenomenon, can turn into ‘win-win’ as people engage in conflict not over 
visible material resource but over basic human needs that are common to all (Burton, 
1986). Basic human needs theory has contributed to the development of a process that 
would enable parties to conflict to discover the real motivations and intentions, that is, 
the satisfaction of basic human needs, not the acquisition of material interests and to 
explore the means by which human needs held in common can be gratified (Burton, 
1986). By introducing basic human needs theory to conflict analysis, conflict has 
come to be recognized as a problem that could be resolved rather than a situation in 
which violent behaviors that are genetically or biologically embedded must be 
controlled or suppressed coercively (Burton, 1998).  
 
Problem of objective epistemological approach 
While the objective epistemological approach to contemporary conflict resolution, that 
is, basic human needs approach, has made a huge contribution to creating and 
developing conflict resolution by proposing that conflict has root causes, there has 
been a grave problem with the approach: the analysis of the relationship between 
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subjective dimension and the basic human needs has been underdeveloped. 
 
The core idea of basic human needs approach is, as Burton and Sandole insist, that 
there are generic or genetic drives and motivations toward human goals that cannot be 
suppressed: the satisfaction of basic human needs is a universal phenomenon (1986). 
Consequently, it is presumed there exist universal patterns of behavior and that 
enables a generic approach to resolving conflict, that is, basic human needs approach, 
to be applied to all conflicts (Burton and Sandole, 1987).  
  
Further, the fundamental theme of basic human needs theory is that in ontological 
terms, all individuals are conditioned by biology or by a primordial drive to pursue the 
same human needs (Burton, 1990). In other words, as Sandole argues, basic human 
needs are biologically and genetically embedded elements and the needs are universal 
and common to all humankind across time and space (1990), as a result of which, the 
same pattern of conflict resolution can be applied to any conflict. 
 
However, as Rubenstein points out, the attempt to establish an objective basis for 
basic needs in human biology or in unalternable human nature has been critiqued as 
“indefensibly essentialist, de-contextualized, a-historical” (2001: 4). As Clark states, 
human beings have an essential need for social intercourse through life (1990). Further, 
 217
as Vayrynen claims, humans are basically “self-interpreting and self-defining beings, 
who live in the world of cultural meaning” (2001: 8). In understanding the dynamism 
of basic human needs, intersubjective social interaction and the construction of shared 
meaning must be taken into account, which has been underdeveloped in objective 
epistemological approach to contemporary conflict resolution.  
 
The central assumption of objective epistemology has been that there is universally 
applicable knowledge or truth that transcends time and space and accordingly even 
conflict could be explained from the viewpoint that there is a common root cause of 
conflict, that is, the frustration of the satisfaction of basic human needs, especially 
needs for security, identity, recognition and development. However, as Rubenstein 
claims, while the need for identity might be a universally seen phenomenon, the way 
to gratify the need (for identity) will be determined essentially by local or cultural 
histories or environments (2001). Further, Wedge insists that the need for recognition 
is rooted in the psychology of social self (1990). Groups seek the acknowledgement of 
their unique existence, in the process of which, they adopt various kinds of shared 
symbols and exhibitions that represent their uniqueness and attract attention (Wedge, 
1990). Our ability to share together questions about the meaning of events, or the 
construction of shared meanings of events plays a central role in sustaining our sense 
of self (Clark, 1990). The symbols embedded in each culture or society form a cultural 
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bond through which an individual attains self-identity (Clark, 1990).  
 
In short, by constructing intersubjective or shared meanings and projecting them onto 
objects, phenomena or historical events, our based human needs are satisfied, in a way 
that is subjective-oriented, but also cultural and social. From these arguments, it can 
be seen that while it might be a universal phenomenon that human beings seek the 
gratification of basic human needs, especially in the context of contemporary conflict 
resolution, needs for security, identity, recognition and development, how those needs 
are gratified should be explored in the domain of human subjectivity that is locally, 
culturally and historically specific, which has been left out from the objective 
epistemological approach to contemporary conflict resolution.  
 
3-4-2 Critique of subjective epistemological approach 
Significance of subjective epistemology 
The most important contribution of subjective epistemology to knowledge is the 
proposition that knowledge is constructed by human subjects, in particular, by the 
process of intersubjectivity. From a subjective epistemological viewpoint, there is no 
objective knowledge that is independent of the human subject: rather, human subjects 
construct knowledge or meaning of reality and that becomes their reality. Nevertheless, 
subjective epistemology insists that human subjects do not construct knowledge or 
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truth individually: since human subjects are inherently social beings, knowledge, truth 
or meaning of reality is constructed through social interaction. In other words, 
intersubjective or social construction of knowledge has been assumed as the starting 
point and cultural dimension and social psychological perspective play crucial role in 
the social construction of knowledge. Although subjective epistemology does not deny 
the importance or significance of basic human needs in conflict analysis, the 
relationship between the subjective dimension and basic human needs has never been 
well articulated in objective epistemology, which could be complemented by 
subjective epistemology.  
 
From subjective epistemology, as Gray states, “human interaction with the world is 
mediated through the process of meaning-making and interpretation” (2004: 21). 
Human beings interpret the meaning of objects and actions in the world and act on 
those interpretations (Gray, 2004). Furthermore, this human subjective activity 
represents a person’s central aim and understanding of who he/she is (Baronov, 2004). 
In short, subjective understanding of reality is interconnected with the existential 
matter of “Who am I?” However, this subjective activity is not carried out individually 
but collectively.  
 
As Schutz, the leading figure of sociological phenomenology, states, human beings are 
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born into a world that existed before their births and this world is from the beginning 
not only a physical, but also a sociocultural one (1970). That everyday life-world is, 
from the outset, not a private but an intersubjective and consequently a social or 
cultural reality, has important influences on the constitution and structure of the 
subjective stock of knowledge (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974). Culture plays a central 
role in constructing the framework of human subjectivity.  
 
According to Gudykunst, culture constitutes “a system of knowledge that allows us to 
know how to communicate with others and how to interpret their behaviors” (2004: 
43). Culture refers to “widely shared practices and to commonly held assumptions and 
presumptions that individuals and groups hold about the world, which involves the 
social structuring of both the world outside the self and the internal world” (Vayrynen, 
2001: 3). In short, culture conditions how the world is represented to a person 
(Vayrynen, 1998). As Fry and Fry explain, through socialization within his/her culture, 
one obtains views on what the world is like, embraces a specific set of values and 
understands the cultural meanings of events and actions (1997).  
 
As Gurwitsch argues, our personal identities are, to a great degree, socially 
constructed and derive from a stock of knowledge at hand; and the socially accessible 
stock of knowledge forms the framework of reference, interpretation and orientation 
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for our life in the world of everyday experiences (1975). Further, as long as social 
stock of knowledge enables us to acquire desired specific results, it is applied and 
compiled with without doubt: it will not be put into question unless the results fail to 
materialize (Gurwitsch, 1975). Accordingly, it can be seen that cultural identities are 
our central social identities (Gudykunst, 2004). 
 
From the viewpoint of the intimate connection between the construction of social 
identity and the formation and acquisition of shared reality derived from culture, how 
can conflict be understood? As LeBaron argues, human beings care to maintain and 
protect their ways of life and their views of the world derived from culture (2003) 
since they reflect or constitute social identity. When conflict emerges because of social 
identity being under threat, it actually means that culturally formed shared reality or 
an intersubjectively constituted common view of reality is entailed. Therefore, as 
Vayrynen holds, conflict inevitably involves the struggle to impose one’s definition or 
view of reality upon the other, the central question of which is whose definition of 
reality is taken seriously and acted upon (2001). What Vayrynen states clearly 
demonstrates that identity, especially social identity should be examined not in the 
biological dimension but in the socio-cultural dimension, which means that socially 
constructed knowledge, that is, intersubjectively constructed shared view of reality 
plays the core role in conflict dynamics since the parties in conflict take any effort 
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including violence to protect and maintain their cultural reality. The reason for that is 
if their culturally constructed and preserved view of reality is impaired, it would 
threaten their existence. Thus, from the subjective epistemological viewpoint, in 
understanding conflict dynamics, an intersubjectively constructed view of reality 
should be taken into serious consideration.  
 
3-4-3 Critique of critical epistemology 
Significance of critical epistemology 
The most distinguished contribution of critical epistemology to studies of knowledge 
is the demonstration that knowledge is a process: there is no universally or objectively 
applied knowledge that transcends time and space, as a result of which, knowledge 
has come to be recognized as what should be constructed by people who live in a 
specific or particular time and history or society. The construction of knowledge has 
come to be understood as the enterprise with no end-point, that is, a never-ending 
process, which has contributed to the promotion of conflict transformation that 
essentially challenges existing discourses and social structures and seeks to transform 
them into ones that treat all of the habitants in the society in equal manner.  
 
According to Hoffman, traditionally, knowledge was seen to derive from the activity 
of describing the world: it had been presumed that knowledge understands the world 
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as a set of ready-made facts waiting to be discovered through the application of 
objective or scientific methodology and those facts are independent of the social 
framework (1987). However, from a critical epistemological viewpoint, there is no 
way to acquire direct knowledge about the real world, and consequently there will be 
no one single reality, that is, one true or absolute knowledge (Rogers, 2003). On the 
contrary, people construct various kinds of knowledge: knowledge is constructed or 
made real by human meaning-making (Rogers, 2003). Social reality is recognized as 
the product of processes by which those who live in a society collectively negotiate 
the meanings for the actions and situations: it is the symbolic world of meanings and 
interpretations (Rogers, 2003). More specifically, the social world as conventionally 
understood – systems, structure, agents, shared meanings, a predominant social order 
and so on – is taken over by discourse, that is, language with strong constructing 
effects, images and interpretations in circulation (Alvesson, 2004). 
 
Further, critical epistemology maintains that social construction of knowledge is 
linked with power relations. Crotty argues that all discourses or narratives are 
essentially mediated by power relations that are social in nature and historically 
constituted (1998), as a consequence of which, a particular version of reality is 
produced and affects and shapes how people in the society should relate to their social 
worlds (Alvesson, 2002). Consequently, certain perspectives come to be legitimized 
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and others are marginalized or excluded from society (Baronov, 2004) and certain 
groups in the society will be prioritized and others will be unreasonably subject to 
discrimination or abuse and given little opportunity to participate in society (Gough 
and McFadden, 2001). 
 
Therefore, the crucial task of critical epistemology is to critique the existing socially 
constructed discourses and to show the possibility of transforming them into new ones. 
Since socially constructed knowledge or discourses on reality are based on 
asymmetric power relations, they could maintain or even promote unequal 
relationships between/among the habitants in a society (Butler, 2002). From critical 
epistemological viewpoints, as Butler argues, when we examine the particular social 
systems and discourses, which in general claim to describe the social world correctly, 
it can be clear that the concepts they privilege or make central and the hierarchical 
orders they maintain, are not so certainly in the right order (2002) since those that are 
privileged are dependent on those that are underprivileged or marginalized for their 
existence. The privileged discourses or the views on reality can be undermined by 
careful attention to the role in it of marginal features (Gutting, 1998a). In short, 
existing discourses and social structures do not possess absolute states and rather are 
fragile in essence.  
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The upshot of critical epistemology is that while social interaction occurs within a 
context of socially constructed economic and political structures, those structures lack 
a privileged center and do not or cannot totalize and exhaust the field of identity and 
accordingly they are exposed to constant contestation and transformation (Torfing, 
1999). Put differently, the instability and contingency of the structural context of 
social interaction are emphasized (Torfing, 1999). Further, the instable and contingent 
nature of the structure reveals the arbitrariness and non-referential character of the 
sign (Best and Kellner, 1991), which leads to that we should break from the traditional 
presumption that there is a literal connection between words and reality: rather, the 
fundamental indeterminacy of meaning within language should be recognized 
(Baronov: 2004). 
 
However, the arbitrary and non-referential nature of the sign or the indeterminacy of 
meaning within language should not be understood as nihilistic: rather, it should be 
realized that everything social – language or discourse, culture, practice, social 
structure and so on – is arbitrary and instable in essence (Best and Kellner, 1991), and 
can be transformed into new ones. The existing social forms and interactions are not 
natural or given, but are the products of a historical process that can be critically 
challenged and transformed eventually (Best and Kellner, 1991). Further, it can be 
appreciated that, as Smith argues, since the meanings of event or representations of 
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reality, that is, the discourses in society, are contested and open to reinterpretation in 
nature (1998), social identities can be seen essentially as fluid or flux and open to 
continual transformation (1998).  
 
Thus, a critical epistemological approach calls for active thought that can constantly 
challenge or examine critically the existing state of affairs in social world (Dant, 
2003). The praxis of critical consciousness could lead to change in the way society is 
lived (Dant, 2003). Although it is difficult to challenge the existing social structures 
and discourses and social identities derived from them, critical epistemology has 
succeeded in revealing their fundamental fragility and instability and possibility of 
their transformation. Through critical epistemological analysis, construction of 
discourses and social structures has come to be seen as the constitution and 
reproduction of social relations of power, domination and exploitation. However, at 
the same time, as Fairclough holds, the fundamental arbitrariness or instability of 
structures and discourses derived from the impossibility of clear connection of 
language and reality makes it possible to transform them and explore and eventually 
promote social emancipation and enhance social justice (2004), which enables those 
marginalized to participate in society more actively and this is the upshot of conflict 
transformation.  
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Limitations of critical epistemological approach 
The most noticeable problem of critical epistemology is that it has underdeveloped the 
potential of agency or individual subjects while it emphasizes the importance or 
necessity of critiquing and transforming socially constructed knowledge since (from a 
critical epistemological perspective) knowledge is to be recognized not as a substance 
but as a continual process.  
 
According to Gutting, critical epistemological perspectives represented by 
poststructuralism, postmodernism or social constructionism have retained 
structuralism’s elimination of the human subject from any role as a foundation of 
reality or construction of knowledge130 while they have challenged the structuralist 
assumption that systems are self-sufficient structures and questioned the possibility of 
the precise definitions on which systems of knowledge must be founded (1998a). The 
core of structuralism is “the treatment of distinctively human domains as formal 
structures in which meanings are constituted not by conscious subjects but by relations 
among the elements of a formal system” (Gutting, 1998b: 600) and critical 
epistemologists critique this presumption, stating that the seemingly formal or fixed 
systems are in essence fragile and open to transformation.  
 
                                                  
130 See also Best and Kellner (1991). They hold that poststructuralists continue to 
reject the concept of the spontaneous, rational and autonomous subject.  
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However, as Spears points out, while critical epistemologists have spent much time in 
critically examining the power of social structure, language and discourses, there 
seems to have been little for the arguments on the individual agent, and as a corollary 
of that, individual agents have come to be considered easily as passive bearers of 
social structure or discourses (1997). In other words, exploration of the potential of 
individual agency or subject has been lacking or downplayed in critical epistemology, 
which, it could be argued, has unearthed a contradiction and limitation of critical 
epistemology itself.  
 
Butler argues that in Western thought, there has been a tendency to privilege or rely on 
particular transcendental signifiers such as God, reality, the idea of man to construct 
discourses (2002), which has had huge impact on the binary thinking in the West. As 
Best and Kellner state, there have been the binary oppositions affecting Western 
philosophy and culture – for instance, subject/object, appearance/reality, 
speech/writing, God/human beings, man/women, and so on - to construct discourses 
(1991). However, they also claim that these binary oppositions have worked to 
constitute a far-from innocent hierarchy of values that attempt not only to secure truth 
but also serve to marginalize and devalue allegedly inferior terms or positions (1991). 
Further, the conceptual binary oppositions have made us get fundamental relations 
rigidly fixed (Butler, 2002) and believe that the unequal hierarchy of values and its 
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fixity are natural.  
 
Critical epistemology has been concerned with giving a critical eye to binary thinking 
and challenging the hierarchies of systems based on it. It is argued (from a critical 
epistemological viewpoint) that the allegedly opposing dichotomy has no absolute 
status since the alternatives it offers are neither exclusive nor exhaustive (Gutting, 
1998a). Rather, as Alvesson insists, the deconstruction approach, which is an 
important methodology of critical epistemology, functions to “critique the ideal of 
representation  by recalling the suppressed term that provides the system and thus 
allows the positive to appear to stand for an existing object” (2002: 59). Put another 
way, the status of binary opposition is not so fixed as it is believed and rather fragile 
since one binary is dependent upon the other of the binary and vice versa for its 
existence.  
 
Therefore, there is no stability in a fundamental binary or dichotomy in any mode of 
thought since the allegedly exclusive alternatives find themselves to be inextricably 
interconnected and consequently the hierarchies derived from the binary thought is 
made reversible or overturned (Gutting, 1998a). Thus it could be seen that an essential 
nature of critical epistemology is the denial or critique of binary or dichotomous 
thought of any kind.  
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However, as pointed out, since it has downplayed or underdeveloped the potential or 
quality of agency or the human subject in the construction of knowledge, critical 
epistemology faces a contradiction: while critical epistemology attempts to criticize 
and eventually transform the traditional Western binary thinking or dichotomous way 
of constructing discourses or knowledge, there is still the binary relationship of 
structure/agency in critical epistemology itself, in which the former has been 
prioritized over the latter. From critical epistemological perspectives, the complex and 
deep-seated patterns of social meanings and relations that govern interaction within a 
social system are referred to in terms of structure and while the structure is 
instantiated or constituted by the actions of individual agencies, it is not reducible to 
individual action (Torfing, 1999). Rather it is maintained that processes or phenomena 
of social conventions are operated not within individual minds, but intersubjectively, 
that is, between people, within shared conventions or rules and mediated by and 
through the meanings or discourses that are shared by people that possess a common 
culture or mutual social relationship (Rogers, 2003).  
 
However, the fundamental thesis of critical epistemology is that socially constructed 
knowledge itself must be subject to constant critique and transformation since in its 
nature socially constructed knowledge is fragile and does not have absolute status or 
eternality and in this dimension of understanding of knowledge as a process, the 
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binary relations of structure/agency and its prioritization of structure reveals the 
limitations of critical epistemology: since critical epistemology lacks an adequate 
theory of agency, of active and creative self mediated by social structures, discourses 
and other people (Best and Kellner, 1991), how agency can critically examine and 
eventually transform the existing discourses and social structures has been obscured. 
Critical epistemology rejects the notion of the autonomous, self-determining 
individual with a unitary identity as the center of the social world, which is based on 
the assumption that there is never a core or an essence of human nature or a stable and 
fixed sense of subjectivity (Alvesson, 2002). Consequently, it can be assumed that 
since there is no fixed or monolithic nature of human beings, agency is not at the 
mercy of social and cultural forces (Gough and McFadden, 2001).  
 
However, by ignoring the potential of agency and maintaining the binary relationship 
of structure/agency with the former prioritized over the latter, a deterministic nature of 
human agency has been revealed in critical epistemology since the power or potential 
of agency has not been explored. Truly, since human beings are social beings, they are 
affected by social conventions such as prevalent discourses, rules, social structures 
and so on, for their understanding of reality. However, if the aim of critical 
epistemology is the critique and transformation of socially constructed knowledge, as 
Burr recommends, how we should understand the self or agency qualitatively must be 
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explored (1998). How we should conceive of the person as an agent and director of 
critique and transformation of knowledge must be analyzed (Burr, 1998). In short, in 
order to make the main theme of critical epistemology, that is, constant critique and 
transformation of socially constructed knowledge, more coherent, the binary thinking 
of structure/agency, which still remains actually in critical epistemology, should be 
broken. The creation of a critical and self-reflective subjectivity of agency must be 
explored.  
 
3-4-4 What kinds of epistemological approach are missing or underdeveloped? 
Exploring new epistemologies to complement the existing epistemological 
approaches to contemporary conflict resolution theories 
In previous sections of this chapter, two issues have been analyzed: how Western 
epistemologies that are categorized into three types have contributed to contemporary 
conflict resolution theories; and the critique of those approaches. It has been seen that 
Western epistemologies, through self-critique and self-reflexivity, have evolved and 
enriched understandings of reality, which has made a crucial contribution to 
developing conflict resolution theories.  
 
Traditionally it had been considered that since conflict is attributed to inherently 
embedded human aggressiveness, it is impossible to resolve conflict although we 
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could control or suppress violence by coercive means. However, objective 
epistemology challenged this traditional belief. Objective epistemology claims that 
there are basic human needs that are universal and common to all human beings. It 
insists that there are  root-causes of conflict, that is, the frustration of the satisfaction 
of basic human needs and if basic human needs are gratified, conflict can be resolved, 
which means that objective epistemology has demonstrated that conflict is not 
something beyond human reach, but what can be addressed by human beings 
themselves. 
 
Nevertheless, the subjective dimension has been lacking in objective epistemology. In 
particular, while identity is generally recognized as one of the central elements in 
conflict dynamics, how identity is formed has been unclear in objective epistemology. 
This has been addressed by subjective epistemology. Subjective epistemology insists 
that human beings are the creatures that make or construct meanings, of the world and 
of themselves. Since human beings are social or cultural beings, they construct 
meanings of the world intersubjectively, so, through social interaction, we construct 
shared reality of everyday experience. Thus, intersubjectively constructed or formed 
meaning or understanding of reality constitutes the core of our identity, which is the 
subjectively-oriented element. Therefore, it has come to be understood that at least in 
some instances, conflict arises when the shared reality or intersubjectively formed 
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understanding of reality is broken down or under threat since that reflects that identity 
is under threat.  
 
Further, critical epistemology has succeeded in critiquing socially constructed 
knowledge. Subjective epistemology and critical epistemology share the idea that 
knowledge is socially or intersubjectively constructed. However, critical epistemology, 
as its fundamental theme, argues that social construction of knowledge produces 
power relations in which some views are prioritized over the others and consequently 
some people of group of people are privileged and others are subordinated or 
discriminated in society. Nevertheless, critical epistemology has demonstrated that 
existing socially constructed knowledge that sustains the status quo is fragile and 
unstable in its nature, which has been shown by deconstructionist methodology. This 
deconstructionist approach has succeeded (theoretically and conceptually) in proving 
that there is no socially constructed knowledge that has an absolute or eternal status: 
rather, it has been shown that knowledge is not a substance but a process. As a result, 
constant critique and transformation of socially constructed knowledge has been 
recognized that existing social identity and social structure are not absolute or an 
end-point: social identity and structure are fluid in essence and consequently it is 
possible for us to transform them. 
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However, as critically examined, critical epistemology, while it makes the constant 
critique and transformation of socially constructed knowledge its own central theme, 
has not elaborated the potential of individual agency. In other words, critical 
epistemology, like structuralism, has consciously or unconsciously prioritized 
structure over agency, and consequently, how individual mind can critically examine 
and transform socially constructed knowledge has been underdeveloped.  
 
Based on these contributions of Western epistemologies to contemporary conflict 
resolution theories through self-critique and self-reflexivity and the critiques of those 
epistemological approaches, what has been missing or underdeveloped? It could be 
argued that in contemporary conflict resolution theories and the Western 
epistemologies that have shaped them, human mind has been exclusively 
socially-oriented. Put differently, as their understanding of human mind focuses rather 
exclusively on its social orientation in Western epistemologies, the quality of human 
mind has never been well explored.  
 
It is generally held, as Matsuo claims, that traditionally in Western philosophy, “the 
search for truth was keyed to something external to the self or within the Logos” 
(1981: 4). It had been considered that truth or knowledge exists exterior to the human 
mind and the task of human mind is only to reflect or discover the truth or knowledge 
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that exists objectively external to human mind. However, this traditional assumption 
has been challenged within Western philosophies, which has been shown by 
subjective epistemology and critical epistemology.  
 
Through the emergence of these epistemologies, it has come to be recognized that 
mind is not the passive reflector of objective knowledge that exists independently of 
human subjects. Rather it has been acknowledged that human mind actively constructs 
knowledge or truth. Both subjective epistemology and critical epistemology have 
placed social construction of knowledge at their center: intersubjective or social 
dimension of human mind has been on exclusive focus for their analysis of human 
mind. As a result of this, while the construction of knowledge by the human subject or 
mind has been appreciated as one of the core elements of Western philosophy, the 
quality of human mind has been confined to the intersubjective or social level, which 
has made it highly difficult to explore how individual agency or individual mind can 
be engaged in critique and transformation of existing socially constructed knowledge 
and truth.  
 
The world is not a set of facts to be discovered, but a set of experiences to be 
interpreted and our interpretation relies on what perspectives and inner powers we 
bring to our experience (Said et al, 2006). Accordingly, to make a constructive critique 
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and transformation of the world around human beings, first of all, they must make a 
constructive and positive transformation of their ways of knowing (Said et al, 2006). 
Transformation is “a process involving a change in our conscious beliefs and in the 
structure of underlying unconscious symbols that hold our word in place” (Said et al, 
2006: 113). Therefore, if we want to make a constructive critique and transformation 
of socially constructed knowledge, our socially-oriented or socially constructed ways 
of knowing ourselves must be broken through. This does not mean that a 
socially-oriented mind-set or mind-state is denied or impaired: rather, it should be 
accepted that socially-oriented human mind is a part of mind that possesses more 
profound and broader quality that can transform and expand our way of knowing. This 
has been underdeveloped in subjective epistemology and critical epistemology that 
have played the central role in the studies of human mind in Western conflict 
resolution.   
 
Therefore, in order to explore the quality of human mind, non-Western epistemologies 
or philosophies could be of significance and one of them is Buddhist philosophy. 
According to Matsuo, from a Buddhist perspective, rather than engaging in 
metaphysical speculations about an external and objective world, philosophy is a 
critical study of human thoughts that build a meaningful reality (1981). From this view, 
the purpose of philosophy is “to know thyself in terms of understanding the structure 
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of one’s own thinking process (Matsuo, 1981: 4). Knowledge can be obtained in 
various ways: by reflection, by rational consideration, by intuitive induction, by 
creative thinking and so on (Said et al, 2006). Knowing the nature or quality of one’s 
mind or understanding the principles of epistemic function is a central theme of 
philosophy: knowing, first of all, reality as a construct of the mind-base or 
mind-structure, critically reflecting its potential danger or limitation and finally 
exploring how it can be addressed constitute the nature of epistemology (Matsuo, 
1981). Critical and constructive examination of the potential or power of the human 
mind is the essence of epistemology.   
 
Exploring the structure or quality of mind is the central theme of Buddhist 
epistemology. Buddhist epistemology does not negate subjective epistemology and 
critical epistemology, that is, the socially constructed mind-structure or 
socially-oriented mind quality, but it insists that human mind cannot be confined 
exclusively to its social orientation. Rather, from a Buddhist epistemological 
perspective, the premise is that although social or cultural influence of human mind 
cannot be denied, the exploration of the quality or structure of human mind should be 
carried out from more profound and broader angles. From these points of view, the 
central theme of this work is not the denial of Western epistemologies and 
contemporary conflict resolution theories based on them. Rather, what this work 
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wishes to emphasize as its intellectual crux is that by complementing Western 
epistemologies from a Buddhist philosophy that explores the structure and quality of 
human mind as the central source of knowledge and truth, it is possible to expand the 
framework of contemporary conflict resolution theories that have been mainly 
socially-oriented.  
 
The essential point of social science is not to judge which theories and philosophies 
that are the bases of theories are superior to others. Rather, as Calhoun insists, one of 
the enduring and everlasting challenges for social science is “to go beyond the 
affirmation and reconstitution of the familiar world to recognize other possibilities” 
(2000: 506). New perspectives, new theories and novel empirical information, which 
are proposed by exploring new epistemologies, can enable us to see and understand 
how things can be different from the ways they first present themselves to us and 
explore how things could be different from the ways they are (Calhoun, 2000). In 
other words, as Alvesson argues, the fundamental theme of social science is to keep 
challenging the existing guiding assumptions, fixed meanings and relations and to 
enhance the formative capacity of human beings in relation to others and the world 
(2002).  
 
Epistemological scrutiny and challenges are part of the routine development of any 
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systematized human intellectual endeavor, which has been shown in this chapter. 
Objective epistemology, subjective epistemology and critical epistemology, by 
challenging and critiquing the preceding epistemologies respectively, have expanded 
the understanding of conflict resolution. However, critical epistemology is not the 
end-point of the enterprise of epistemological analysis and accordingly new 
epistemological ground should keep being broken. Put another way, as Chia states, the 
intellectual enterprise of knowledge creation and legitimation is never a static 
substance but an ever-lasting process that keeps renewing itself (2002) and the 
intellectual endeavor of this work is not an exception.  
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Chapter Four: An introduction to Buddhism: Examining its central 
themes 
 
4-1 The Four Noble Truths 
The central aim of Buddhism is solving and overcoming the problem of suffering 
(Burton, 2002). This has been the unchanging purpose of Buddhism since its 
foundation by Gautama, the Buddha, who according to Bhatt and Mehrotro, “was led 
to philosophizing by an intense longing for the eradication of suffering” (2000: 2). 
Gautama, the Buddha and subsequent Buddhist masters have never been interested in 
metaphysical or speculative philosophies: their aim has been consistently concerned 
with overcoming suffering by the means of the eradication of its cause (Burton, 2002). 
The central concern of Buddhism is suffering, its origin, its cessation and the way to 
its cessation (Cheng, 1982); and the Four Noble Truths play the central role in 
showing the means to eliminate suffering and to achieve enlightenment.  
 
The Four Noble Truths are a fundamental element of all Buddhist teachings and are 
the core doctrinal framework of every school of Buddhism including Theravada, 
Mahayana and Vajrayana (Yun, 2002). According to Pereira and Tiso, the Four Noble 
Truths are “truths of pain, origin [of pain], suppression [of pain] and the way [to 
suppress pain]” (1988: 172). The first noble truth states that from Buddhist 
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perspectives, life is nothing but suffering and pain (Rahula, 1974). According to Rubin, 
what the first noble truth claims is that “awryness and unsatisfactoriness are inherent 
features of the universe” (2003: 43). However, the central aim of the first noble truth 
is not to reveal a pessimistic and hopeless view of life. Rather, by realizing that our 
existence is suffering, we must comprehend suffering in terms of what suffering 
actually is or what is the nature of the state of suffering (Shinohara, 1998). In short, 
the statement that life or this world is filled with suffering does not signify the end of 
the world or a nihilistic view of reality: what is emphasized is the importance of 
knowing the fundamental unsatisfactory and agonizing feature of reality, which 
arouses a deeper and more profound question of “What is the cause of suffering?” and 
this is the second noble truth.  
 
The second noble truth presents the cause of suffering (Rubin, 2003). Suffering is 
caused by craving, that is, a mental state that leads to attachment (Burton, 2002), 
which can be characterized as the tendency of mind to cling or stick to some specific 
objects or views (Rubin, 2003).131 Besides craving, ignorance is recognized as a 
fundamental cause of suffering (Cho, 2002). According to Shinohara, ignorance means 
                                                  
131 Burton (2002) argues that craving and attachment take various forms. For 
instance, he states that there is desire for one’s eternal existence and strong 
attachment to one’s own self. There is also craving for and attachment to various other 
internal and external entities. One will stick to his/her opinions and one can crave and 
be attached to particular emotions.  
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“lack of self-awareness and correct knowledge of the world and human life” (1998: 
15).132 One’s failure to understand the way things really are results in his/her craving, 
strong attachment and consequently suffering (Burton, 2002). Thus, the second noble 
truth is that ignorance and craving are the fundamental causes of suffering. Further, 
these two elements give rise to three mental defilements: greed, anger and delusion 
(Shinohara, 1998).133 Olendzki argues that these three are representative mental 
afflictions derived from ignorance and craving (2003). Accordingly, it can be seen that 
Buddhist understanding of suffering is psychologically or subjectively-oriented. In 
other words, Buddhism can be understood as “the codification of the insights about 
human psychology developed by Gautama Buddha” (Rubin, 2003: 42).  
 
By knowing the cause of suffering, human beings will be inspired to overcome its 
cause (Yun, 2002), which is the main thrust of the third noble truth. The third noble 
truth states that suffering can be eliminated (Rubin, 2003). What the third noble truth 
expresses is that suffering or affliction is not everlasting: rather, it stems from our 
temporary craving and ignorance (Yun, 2002) and accordingly can be overcome if 
                                                  
132 Ignorance, “avidya” in Sanskrit, is one of the most important elements in 
Buddhism in terms of its soteriological and intellectual enterprise. Details of the 
contents of ignorance will be examined in the next chapter.  
133 See also Rahula (1974). Olendzki explains that delusion is the effect of the 
distortions of mind (2003). Furthermore, he specifies that delusion is a mind-state 
that sees impermanent phenomena as stable or permanently existing and sees 
phenomena that (from Buddhist views) have no self (or no fixed or permanently 
unchanging self). Impermanence of phenomena including human beings and the 
no-self of phenomena are key elements in Buddhist teachings.   
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addressed properly. 
 
While the third noble truth clarifies that the cause of suffering can be eliminated, one 
question remains to be addressed: “How can we attain the eradication of the cause of 
suffering?” The answer is the fourth noble truth. The fourth noble truth provides us 
with the way to address suffering and restore mental health or tranquility (Rubin, 
2003), which is generally called the noble eightfold path. The eightfold path is: right 
view or understanding,134 right thought,135 right speech,136 right action,137 right 
livelihood,138 right effort,139 right mindfulness,140 and right concentration141 (Rahula, 
                                                  
134 According to Yun (2002: 33), right view or understanding means “correct 
understanding of dependent arising of phenomena; the awareness that all phenomena 
are empty in their true nature and thus are impermanent.” Since dependent arising 
(pratityasamutpada in Sanskrit) and emptiness (sunyata in Sanskrit) are the 
fundamentals of Buddhism, they need careful and in depth analysis. Therefore, they 
will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter.  
135 Yun explains that right thought indicates “correct perception hat our bodies will 
eventually decay, sensations cause suffering, thoughts are momentary and 
impermanent and that the nature of all phenomena is without a self.” (2002: 33). 
Shinohara argues that right thought is established as a consequence of right view 
(1998: 21).  
136 Rubin states that right speech means “speaking trustfully and compassionately.” 
(2003: 43).  
137 Shinohara explains that right action signifies refraining from needless killing, 
staling, committing adultery or other sexual misconduct (1998).  
138 Yun states that right livelihood means “correct living of a reasonable economic life, 
an altruistic life, a harmonious communal life and an unadulterated life.” (2002: 33).  
139 According to Yun (2002: 34), right effort denotes “correct diligence in developing 
wholesomeness that has not arisen, increasing wholesomeness that has arisen, 
preventing the arising of unwholesomeness and eliminating unwholesomeness that 
has arisen.”  
140 Shinohara explains that right mindfulness signifies “constant awareness of things 
or phenomena that are happening at present and careful recollection of things that 
occurred in the past” (1998: 22). Yun adds that right mindfulness includes “correct 
determination in one’s belief, non-attachment to phenomena, misconception of the law 
of cause and effect and not giving rise to the confusion of birth and death” (2002: 34).  
141 Shinohara states that right concentration means “spiritual unification, 
concentration and mental tranquility achieved through the act of meditating in order 
to recall the action in the path, perceive the mind at present and cultivate goodwill.” 
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1974).  
 
There are three essentials of Buddhism for attaining liberation from suffering: ethical 
conduct, mental discipline and wisdom (Rahula, 1974) and they are embodied in the 
fourth noble truth, that is, the eightfold path. Right view or understanding and right 
thought are categorized into wisdom while right speech, right action and right 
livelihood are in ethical conduct (Khong, 2003). Accordingly, mental discipline 
indicates right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration (Khong, 2003). The 
eightfold path categorized into three pillars embraces everything we do and aims at 
the achievement of eradication of suffering, as a result of which we can enjoy an 
authentic way of being in the world (Khong, 2003). Further, what should be 
emphasized is that these three essentials are interdependent and interconnected with 
each other: without one, the other two cannot be actualized.  
 
From the above depiction of the Four Noble Truths, it can be understood that 
Buddhism teaches us suffering in order to enable us to realize the truth about suffering 
and lead us to eradicate it (Yun, 2002). However, recognizing the existence of 
suffering should be only a part of the process (Yun, 2002): what is stressed as the core 
of Buddhist teachings is that suffering is not beyond human reach or beyond solution: 
                                                                                                                                               
(1998: 22).  
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through a holistic approach represented by the three pillars of Buddhist discipline – 
ethical conduct, mental discipline and wisdom – suffering can be eradicated by human 
beings themselves.  
 
4-2 Exploring the implications of the Four Noble Truths for Buddhist 
epistemology 
4-2-1 Liberation by human beings 
Generally, it can be demonstrated that in the West, religion is that which has to do with 
the worship of superhuman beings (Herbrechtsmeier, 1993). Religion, in the 
understanding of the West, presupposes the existence of a transcendental entity like 
God as the foundation of religious beliefs. Furthermore, Rahula mentions that almost 
all religions are based on faith or blind faith (1974). In other words, (in many 
religions) faith in established creed or dogma is a main feature of them. From these 
views, a general non-Buddhist understanding of religion is that the fundamental 
element is the existence of transcendental being(s), that is, God(s) as the final judge of 
truth and that human beings are supposed to abide by the creed or dogma that has been 
traditionally maintained: human beings are rather secondary actors or subordinate to 
superhuman or transcendental being(s).   
 
However, Buddhism has different characteristics. The most conspicuous feature of 
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Buddhism, which is a clear contrast with other religions that possess a transcendental 
entity as their foundation, is that the central actors or figures in Buddhism are human 
beings themselves. Put another way, while in Buddhism transcendental or divine 
agency that brings about liberation to human beings has been denied, human 
autonomy has been emphasized as a central element for attaining liberation (Bhatt and 
Mehrottra, 2000).  
 
The reason for the Buddhist emphasis on human beings, not on transcendental ones, as 
the fundamental actors that create liberation can be attributed to the Buddha 
Gautama’s approach to liberation. The interest of the Buddha was not in metaphysical 
speculations on the nature of reality: rather, his most important intellectual concern 
was showing the way to liberation from actual human suffering in daily lives (Chang, 
1971). The basic source of exploration for attaining liberation from suffering is the 
analysis of direct experience of daily lives.142 As a result, the fundamental reference 
point for all doctrinal formulations of Buddhism which aim to achieve liberation is 
that it is open to all human beings to the extent which they can contemplate their own 
existential situation (Skiotis, 2004). In short, the underlying spirit of Buddhism is the 
affirmation that liberation is not bestowed upon human beings by transcendental 
entities represented by God but attained by human beings’ cultivation of an insight 
                                                  
142 For instance, Komito (1987) states that the Buddha taught about his own direct 
experience.  
 248
into the truth about their actual world (Chang, 1971). Buddhism could be recognized 
as a religion about understanding reality and demonstrating the truth of the 
understanding through our own experience (Khong, 2003). Thus, in the Buddhist 
approach to achieving liberation, transcendental entities are not required: rather, we 
human beings should look into ourselves to conceive or acquire the truth of reality in 
relation to our own lives. We should seek for truth not exterior to ourselves, but within 
ourselves.  
 
This fundamental Buddhist theme that truth lies in human beings themselves has been 
clearly stated in the Sutras. 143  For instance, The Platform Sutra of the Sixth 
Patriarch144 states, “All of you return to your rooms and look into yourselves. Men of 
wisdom will of themselves grasp the original nature of their prajna145 intuition” 
(Yampolsky, 1967: 128).146 The sutra also states, “The sutras tell us to take refuge in 
the Buddha within yourselves; they do not say to rely on other Buddhas. If you do not 
rely upon your own natures, there is nothing else on which to rely” (Yampolsky, 1967: 
146). In order to demonstrate that Buddhism is a human-based religion, it is stated, 
                                                  
143 According to Chang (1971: 261), sutras are defined as “the holy scriptures of 
Buddhism.” Further, he states that all sutras were supposedly preached by Buddha 
himself.  
144 Luk assesses that this sutra is essential for Buddhists, especially for Mahayana 
Buddhists who adhere to the doctrine of mind (1962).  
145 Prajna means “wisdom.”  
146 Although original text was written by Huineng (638-713), one of the most 
important Chinese Chan (Zen) monastic around 7th century, there are various English 
translations. The version cited in this dissertation is translated by Yampolsky.  
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“All sutras and written words, Hinayana, Mahayana, the twelve divisions of the canon, 
all have been postulated by men. Because of the nature within man, it has been 
possible, therefore, to postulate them. If we were without this wisdom, all things 
would, from the outset, have no existence in themselves. Therefore, it is clear that all 
things were originally given rise to by men” (Yampolsky, 1967: 151). Throughout its 
history, Buddhism has encouraged and inspired each person to develop him/herself 
and explore his/her own liberation since human beings possess the power to 
emancipate themselves from all bondage by their own personal effort and intelligence 
(Rahula, 1974). 
 
Further, the essential foundation of Buddhist philosophy that emphasizes human 
beings themselves as the central actor to achieve liberation is the strong belief in the 
power inherent in human beings, which is called “Buddha-nature.”147 For example, 
The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch states, “Good friends, enlightenment and 
intuitive wisdom are from the outset possessed by men of this world themselves” 
(Yampolsky, 1967: 135). The Sutra of Complete Enlightenment states, “By Buddha 
power is meant the inner power influenced by the absolute Buddha nature which is 
fundamentally inherent in ourselves” (Luk, 1962: 236-237).148 These statements 
                                                  
147 For instance, see Lai (1977) and Chang (1971).  
148 This dissertation owes English translation of the Sutra of Complete 
Enlightenment to Charles Luk’s Ch’an and Zen teaching.  
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demonstrate that in Buddhism it is of great importance to look into oneself and know 
one’s power that exists intrinsically in order to attain liberation.  
 
As Cho reveals, the meaning of Buddha is “an awakened one” (2002: 429) and it is 
fundamental that everyone can be awakened to the truth for liberation to the degree 
he/she makes the necessary effort for attaining liberation (Skiotis, 2004). The 
teachings expounded in Buddhism could be a benefit for every human being since 
each person innately has the capacity to realize truth for liberation. In short, Buddhist 
religious goals can essentially be attained by one’s realization of the Buddha-nature 
that exists within all sentient beings intrinsically (Chang, 1971).  
 
4-2-2 On the relationship between religion and philosophy in Buddhism 
The human-oriented dimension of Buddhism is intimately connected to its attitude 
towards the relationship between religion and philosophy. One of the significant 
characteristics of Buddhism is that in Buddhism religious enterprise and philosophical 
contemplation or intellectual enterprise are mutually interdependent. In Buddhism 
there is not necessarily a clear and categorical division or separation between religion 
and philosophy. 
 
The central goal of religious pursuit is, as Scutton argues, “liberation or salvation from 
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the unsatisfactoriness of human condition or existence” (1993: 26). Buddhism is not 
an exception. As a religion, the central objective of Buddhism is an achievement of 
liberation (Ng, 1993). In the case of Buddhism, since liberation is established as the 
goal to be attained by human beings, it would be appropriate to state that this is a 
religious aspiration (Cho, 2002). The major concern of Buddhism as religion is 
salvation from suffering through human self-effort. 
 
Philosophy can be understood as an intellectual enterprise to explore knowledge that 
can enable human beings to explain or comprehend a fundamental nature or feature of 
reality, or phenomena including human beings.149 Schilbrack argues that in general a 
main interest of philosophy is “an inquiry into the character of being qua being” 
(2000: 34). He also states that if one disagrees with the idea that all things are 
substances, one can say that “metaphysics150 concerns the character of reality qua 
reality as such” (2000: 34).  
 
In the West, generally it has been considered that a clear-cut boundary or demarcation 
should be maintained between philosophies and religions (Herbrechtsmeier, 1993). 
                                                  
149 For instance, Olson (1975) argues philosophy is an intellectual endeavor to frame a 
coherent, logical and necessary system of general ideas in terms which every element 
of our experience can be interpreted. 
150 Smith, for instance, defines metaphysics as a worldview that provides a sense of 
orientation (1989). He also argues that historically, philosophy has assumed 
responsibility for articulating worldviews systematically while metaphysics has been 
its branch that dealt with them directly..  
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Derived from this general proposition, a philosophy (in the West) can be understood 
as “a system that lends perspective to human existence through beliefs and practices 
derived from the efforts of human reason, introspection and community discourse” 
(Herbrechtsmeier, 1993: 4-5), while religion can be recognized as worship of 
transcendental entities like God and that transcendental or superhuman objects are 
considered as the fundamental source of ultimate reality and truth. Cho insists that this 
general tendency to separate philosophy from religion can be attributed to the 
“traumatic experience of the domination of the Church during the Medieval period” 
(2002: 434).151 In the West, while philosophy has been seen as sited in a human realm, 
religion has been sited a superhuman or transcendental realm, as a consequence of 
which it has been generally recognized that religion and philosophy are in different 
fields for their intellectual enterprise, since what counts as knowledge and/or truth is 
different in nature or quality.  
 
However, the clear demarcation between religion and philosophy seen in the West is 
not a universal phenomenon. There is no distinct boundary between religion and 
philosophy in Buddhism: rather, Buddhism is both a religion and a philosophy (Inada, 
2000). The reason for Buddhism being both a religion and a philosophy can be 
                                                  
151 Regarding the details of general history of the relationship between religion and 
philosophy, especially, a kind of tension between an institutionalized Church-based 
religion and modern Western philosophy, Tarnas’s work (1991) would be of great use.  
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attributed to its nature as a religion.  
 
As argued, Buddhism is a human-oriented religion. In Buddhism, there is no 
transcendental deity or superhuman being (Inada, 2000). Further, as Cho explains, 
Buddhist texts are “not holy scriptures meant to reveal the intent of a God or gods: no 
divine origin or authority is attributed to them” (2002: 430). In short, Buddhism as a 
religion is neither study in transcendental entities nor aims at uncovering superhuman 
beings as the ultimate source of reality: Buddhist soteriology is not derived from 
transcendental entities.  
 
Being a religion that does not rely on transcendental entities for liberation or 
soteriological achievement, Buddhism defines the human condition of the tangible 
world as one of suffering and aims to attain liberation from suffering (Foshay, 1994). 
Liberation must be achieved only in this empirical world in which we lead our daily 
lives (Ng, 1993). In short, the religious phenomenon of soteriology and the daily 
phenomenon of our lives cannot be separated, which means that in Buddhism as a 
religion, the transcendental realm and the human realm, which have been separated in 
the West, are interfused in Buddhism since the Buddhist focal point is the 
soteriological attainment by human beings in their daily lives. There is nonduality 
between the human realm and transcendental sphere since the only reality that should 
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be in focus is our daily reality. This nondual relationship between these two realms 
results in establishing a foundational theme of Buddhism: it depends on human beings 
themselves whether they achieve liberation or not.152 
 
While Buddhism as a religion can be characterized as human-oriented soteriological 
undertaking, how can Buddhism as a philosophy be understood? Since the 
fundamental aim of Buddhism is the attainment of liberation by human beings 
themselves, its philosophical statements and arguments should be subject to 
soteriological purpose (Conze, 1963). The central objective of a Buddhist philosophy 
is, as a religion, soteriological achievement. Accordingly, the central goal of the 
Buddhist philosophical enterprise is “not to make a report about the world but to help 
people to get rid of ignorance153 and illusions so as to obtain salvation” (Cheng, 1982: 
5). Put another way, Buddhist philosophy is not an intellectual enterprise that tries to 
represent some external reality or world, but an intellectual endeavor that aims to 
acquire right knowledge to achieve enlightenment or liberation in this world. Thus, the 
pursuit of a Buddhist philosophy, like that of Buddhism as a religion, by obtaining 
right knowledge of this experiential world, aims at changing our way of life or views 
                                                  
152 Buddhism does not necessarily deny superhuman beings. Rather, the way they are 
understood is different from religions that recognize God as final judge. For instance, 
Herbrechtsmeier (1993) argues that in Buddhism, superhuman beings are important 
to the extent they are able to manifest the truth of dharma (phenomena, events or 
things), which enable us to attain liberation.  
153 This term, (avidya in Sanskrit) is one of the key words and details of this term will 
be analyzed in the next chapter.  
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of life (Sharma, 1993). As Klostermaier states, a Buddhist philosophy “takes over 
existing notions of the physical universe and fills them with existential and 
soteriological meaning” (1991: 31). 
 
Because Buddhist liberation or soteriological achievement must be realized by each 
human being who has inherent Buddha-nature, a Buddhist philosophy should be 
recognized as philosophy for every human being. The knowledge acquired by Buddha 
and other great masters of Buddhism should appreciated as knowledge for the benefit 
for all sentient beings who possess the innate power to obtain the knowledge for 
emancipation from suffering (Bhatt and Mehrotra, 2000). The upshot of Buddhism as 
a religion and a philosophy is that there is nonduality between the religious realm and 
philosophical realm in Buddhism.  
 
4-2-3 The human mind as a source of knowledge for liberation 
From the preceding arguments, it is clear that Buddhism is a human-oriented religion 
and philosophy, the fundamental aim of which is to achieve liberation from suffering 
by human beings. Although the human-based nature of Buddhism both as a religion 
and a philosophy for liberation has been demonstrated, there are important questions 
that remain to be clarified: How can human beings achieve liberation or realize their 
soteriological aspirations? What is meant by “liberation by human beings 
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themselves?”  
 
A central answer to those fundamental questions is that mind assumes the core role in 
the Buddhist religious and philosophical enterprise. Looking into our own mind is the 
key to salvation from suffering. The Buddhist understanding of mind as the key 
element in its religious and philosophical enterprise is demonstrated in sutras or texts. 
The Platform Sutra states, “If you know the mind and see its true nature, you then 
awaken to the cardinal meaning” (Yampolsky, 1967: 132). The Sutra also asserts, “To 
understand the original mind of yourself is to see into your own original nature” 
(Yampolsky, 1967: 137). These two statements show that in Buddhism mind is the 
focal point to realize one’s own nature. Further, The Surangama Sutra states, “The 
Tathagata154 has always said that all phenomena are manifestations of mind and that 
all causes and effects including (all things from) the world to its dust, take shape 
because of the mind” (Luk, 2001: 16).155 This shows that (as a central component of 
reality) our mind plays an essential role in making meaning of phenomena: mind gives 
us insight into the nature of reality and our interpretation of experience.  
 
                                                  
154 According to Chang (1983), Tathagata is a title of the Buddha. He also states that 
Tathagata signifies one who has attained full realization of suchness or who has 
acquired right knowledge of phenomena. It could be understood that Tathagata is one 
who has been awakened to truth for liberation from suffering.  
155 This dissertation owes English translation of Surangama Sutra to Charles Luk.  
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In Buddhist philosophy, mind has been consistently one of the cardinal topics (Jan, 
1981) that must be addressed. From Buddhist perspectives, nothing exits apart from 
mind and accordingly all phenomena can be understood as manifestations of mind 
(Chung, 1993). This does not mean that there are no objects outside our mind: rather, 
as Lai argues, that “the qualities of the things come into existence after the mind, are 
dependent upon mind and are made up of mind” (1977: 66). In other words, the world 
or reality of our experience is framed as the realm of the derived subjective 
construction: the only world we can explore is our inner world (Olendzki, 2003). 
Therefore, from Buddhist viewpoints, the world around us, or the world, which we 
believe exists exterior to us, is a reflection of the condition of our mind (Ramanan, 
1978).  
 
Therefore, analyzing mind-state in relation to one’s understanding of reality is of great 
significance. Practicing Buddhists cannot seek truth or right knowledge to attain their 
own liberation outside of minds or mind-states. The Platform Sutra states, “Because 
all sentient beings have of themselves deluded minds, they seek the Buddha by 
external practice and are unable to awaken to their own nature. But even these people 
of shallow capacity, if they have the sudden doctrine,[sic], and do not place their trust 
in external practices, but only in their own minds always raise correct views in regard 
to their own original natures: even these sentient beings, filled with passions and 
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troubles, will at once gain awakening” (Yampolsky, 1967: 150). The Sutra of 
Complete Enlightenment also states, “All Buddhas relied on the true mind of the 
dormant enlightenment to develop the wisdom of aroused or initiated enlightenment to 
eradicate delusion” (Luk, 1962: 170-171). Furthermore, “Hymn to the jewel of the 
mind” by Nagarjuna156 says, “Attainment of the mind is illumination: only mind are 
five destinies, and the essence of happiness and suffering does not exist at all outside 
the mind” (Tola and Dragonetti, 1995: 136).  
 
Kalpahana argues that the Buddha (and the other Buddhist masters) have realized the 
potential power of human mind both in the perception of evil and the promotion of 
good (1987), which means that mind is both a source of enlightenment to attain 
liberation and a cause of non-enlightenment or delusion (Lai, 1977) that brings about 
suffering and trouble. Accordingly, human suffering is understood as actually 
human-caused, that is, mind-made. However, suffering or trouble should be 
understood positively or be recognized as an upshot of Buddhist religion and 
philosophy that aims to achieve soteriological liberation. The reason for that is while 
human mind causes suffering, as the above statements of sutras and hymns show, 
                                                  
156 Nagarjuna is one of the most important Buddhist philosophers, who lived between 
the second and third century. Chang (1971) states that Nagarjuna is a founder and 
exponent of Madhyamaka (Middle-Way) philosophy that centers on sunyata 
(emptiness) doctrine to achieve liberation from suffering. According to Williams (1989), 
he is called “the second Buddha” since, Chang states, he made a huge contribution to 
the development of Mahayana Buddhism. Regarding the details of Nagarjuna’s works 
and Madhyamaka philosophy, see Williams (1989; 55-76). 
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human mind its fundamental nature possesses the potential of enlightenment and 
prajna or wisdom to overcome suffering. That human mind brings about suffering and 
trouble and that the essential nature of the same mind is the innate possession of 
power to know wisdom and attain enlightenment, mean that suffering is within human 
beings. Thus, what we should work on is, as Ng insists, “nothing but the ordinary 
mind in our daily lives” (1993: 176).  
 
4-2-4 How can Buddhist epistemology be characterized? 
As argued, human mind has been the central element in Buddhism as a key to 
liberation from suffering. However, what is the implication of this Buddhist 
understanding of mind’s fundamental role in this religious and philosophical 
enterprise; and how can Buddhist epistemology be characterized?  
 
Since human mind has been a principal locus in Buddhism, it can be pointed out that 
Buddhist philosophy has laid major emphasis on subjectivity and it has been 
consistently linked with such understandings of reality (Sharma, 1993). In Buddhism, 
therefore, it is difficult to establish the world that exists independently of our own 
perception and interpretation of it since our apprehension of the world is inevitably of 
the world as understood (Burton, 2001). Our understanding of reality or phenomena in 
terms of their content is invariably mediated by the knowing mind and its perceptual 
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apparatus (Burton, 2001). We cannot step outside our own mind-state to comprehend 
reality. As Scutton insists, from a Buddhist approach to knowledge, “all knowledge is 
more about our own mind than about the (objectively existing) world” (1991: 204). 
Consequently, in Buddhism, without human mind, metaphysics cannot be established 
and in the same vein, nor can ontology be established: the contents of metaphysics and 
those of ontology are to be understood as states of mind.157  
 
Therefore, from a Buddhist standpoint, the object of philosophical investigation is 
consistently human beings, the aim of which is the realization of the mind-base for 
knowledge and construction of knowledge (Matsuo, 1981). So the meaning or 
significance of philosophy is an examination or exploration of the nature of human 
mind since any knowledge of reality or phenomena including human beings is derived 
from human mind itself.  
 
                                                  
157 Scutton argues that it is sometimes with difficulty and never with categorical 
certainty that the distinction between ontological, epistemological and soteriological 
concepts can be made (1991). Matsuo insists that Western philosophy, which fused the 
essentials with Greek and Christian thought, has set aside the original doctrine and 
admonition of “knowing thyself” and come to regard the philosophical enterprise to be 
in the domain of different and respective areas of concentration such as epistemology, 
metaphysics, theism, atheism, materialism, idealism to name a few, while the pursuit 
of unifying all the different disciplines has remained to be explored (1981). What 
should be emphasized is not that Buddhism downplays or denies those respective 
areas of philosophical or religious enterprise: rather, what Buddhism wishes to show 
is that those seemingly different domains have one thing in common: they are 
originally derived from human mind and as a corollary of that, each domain is to be 
seen as a reflection of mind-state. Different domains of philosophical and religious 
enterprise are different stages or conditions of human mind.  
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However, what should be noted is that, as discussed, while human mind inherently 
possesses the potential or power to attain enlightenment or to obtain wisdom to 
achieve the soteriological objective, the same mind causes suffering: human mind is to 
be understood both as the seed of enlightenment or soteriological aspiration and as a 
cause of suffering. For instance, The Platform Sutra states, “It is because the mind is 
deluded that human beings cannot attain awakening to themselves” (Yampolsky, 1967: 
135). The Sutra also warns, “If you are deluded in your own mind and harbor 
erroneous thoughts and contrary concepts, even though you go to an outside teacher 
you will not be able to obtain salvation” (Yampolsky, 1967: 153).  
 
Komito argues that erroneous and distorted cognitions cause all our troubles and 
produce suffering rather than serenity and peace (1987). However, as there are 
erroneous cognitive and perceptual modes, so there are non-erroneous and valid 
cognitive and perceptual modes (Komito, 1987). Accordingly, whatever occurs to 
mind or any mind-state and knowledge derived from it cannot be recognized as a right 
source for liberation: a distinction must be made between right mind-state and right 
knowledge arising from it, which leads to the attainment of the soteriological goal, 
that is, liberation from suffering; and mind-state and knowledge that impedes the 
soteriological objective and causes suffering. 
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Based on the above understanding of mind both as a source of liberation and as a 
cause of suffering, a Buddhist epistemology can be characterized as a critical and 
qualitative analysis and exploration of the structure or nature of human mind; and a 
right knowledge or an insight into the nature of reality including human beings, the 
ultimate aim of which is to attain liberation from suffering. While a critical and 
qualitative analysis of human mind has come to be recognized as the core theme of a 
Buddhist epistemology, what is a right state-of-mind and what is a right knowledge or 
an insight into the nature of reality? The exploration of this question is the central 
theme of the next chapter.  
 
However, before analyzing a Buddhist epistemology in detail, there is one thing that 
must be noted. It is that in-depth analysis and understanding of a Buddhist 
epistemology can be applied to every dimension of our human life including conflict.  
As argued, from Buddhist viewpoints, this empirical world is full of suffering. 
However, it is possible to transform the world filled with suffering into that which has 
overcome suffering and attained peace or tranquility. Further, what should be 
emphasized regarding soteriological aspiration is that since the focal realm of 
Buddhist religious and philosophical enterprise is our daily lives, the approach to 
soteriological enterprise can be applied to any dimension of our lives. This has 
important implications for the contribution of studies of Buddhist epistemology to 
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understanding conflict and conflict resolution.  
 
Since any dimension of our daily lives is within the Buddhist religious and 
philosophical enterprise, conflict is inevitably to be included. Besides that, from 
Buddhist views, conflict like other sufferings is not beyond our reach or beyond 
resolution since it is essentially understood as human-made or mind-made. However, 
while Buddhism stresses mind as the key to salvation from suffering, it also 
recognizes the danger of mind as the source of suffering. Put another way, a clear 
distinction must be made between mind-state that enables resolution of conflict and 
state of mind that causes conflict and hampers its resolution. While Buddhism believes 
that conflict can be resolved, a critical analysis of human mind must be made since 
mind is understood both as a key to conflict resolution and lasting peace and as a 
source of violence.  
 
Consequently, in-depth studies in Buddhist epistemology, that is, an exploration of 
right state of mind and right knowledge would enable us to comprehend a Buddhist 
view of conflict that could contribute to expanding the framework of contemporary 
conflict resolution based on Western epistemologies, which has focused mainly on the 
social dimension of human mind. However, the aim of the in-depth examination of 
Buddhist epistemology is not to deny or impair the social dimension of human 
 264
subjectivity that has been the main theme of contemporary conflict resolution. Rather, 
what the examination of a Buddhist epistemology can emphasize is that social mind is 
only part of our mind: studies in a Buddhist epistemology – more profound and 
qualitative exploration of human mind in relation to how suffering arises and how it 
can be overcome – aims to reveal the richer and broader nature of human mind. This 
deeper qualitative exploration of human mind will provide us with a novel angle to 
understand conflict in a different manner, which could open the door for an 
exploration for a new framework of contemporary conflict resolution. Especially, 
studies in a Buddhist epistemology can enable us to make a critical and constructive 
analysis of subjective and critical epistemological approaches to contemporary 
conflict resolution that have limited human mind to social dimensions, which could 
lead to an exploration for a new phase of contemporary conflict resolution. Therefore, 
in-depth analysis of Buddhist epistemology is of great significance as a first step 
towards exploring or expanding the framework of contemporary conflict resolution.   
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Chapter Five: Examination of Buddhist Epistemology and Meaning 
of Peace 
 
5-1 Examining ignorance as a cause of suffering 
As discussed, in the Buddhist religious and philosophical enterprise, the mind is the 
focal point for soteriological attainment. However, the same mind is seen as the cause 
of suffering, the recognition of which makes it essential to engage in a critical analysis 
of the quality of mind, so that state of mind and “right knowledge” that can enable us 
to attain salvation from suffering will be revealed. However, before examining 
Buddhist right knowledge and right state-of-mind, it is of great importance to 
understand the cause of suffering. From a Buddhist perspective, since the aim of 
Buddhist epistemology is to acquire right knowledge to achieve liberation, it is also 
essential to have a proper understanding of the nature of that which causes suffering as 
a first step.  
  
As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, the fundamental cause of suffering in 
Buddhism is ignorance, or avidya in Sanskrit. Clear understanding of the meaning or 
characteristics of ignorance will enable us to have a clear picture of a Buddhist 
epistemology.  
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According to McFarlane, ignorance in Buddhism is “to ignore the true nature of things” 
(1995: 5). He also states that it is “the original mistake of taking things to be other 
than what they are and then acting on this false presumption” (1995: 5). Huntington 
explains that ignorance is defined as “the misapprehension of the meaning of words 
and concepts as if they referred to entities which are ultimately true” (1983: 328). 
Further, Shinohara asserts that ignorance is the fundamental cause of errors and 
misfortunes since it distorts one’s images or views of the world and of the self (1998).  
 
From these views, ignorance is to be understood as a subjective phenomenon in which 
we fail to gain an insight into the nature of reality or phenomena including ourselves, 
while we project the some attributes or features upon them, as a result of which, we 
fall into mainly psychological suffering. Put differently, the core nature of ignorance is 
an erroneous thought construction of reality due to the misunderstanding of the nature 
of it. But, how can a false understanding of reality be characterized? 
 
The Lankavatara Sutra158 states, “Since the ignorant and simple-minded, not knowing 
                                                  
158 Suzuki (2003) explains that Lankavatara Sutra is one of the main texts of 
Mahayana Buddhism and central to Zen school that is one of the important wings of 
Mahayana Buddhism. He also argues that the teachings presented in this sutra 
examine the nature or quality of mind, self-realization and the process for its 
attainment. Put differently, it can be understood that Lankavatara Sutra engages in 
critical and constructive analysis of human mind that seeks to break through an 
erroneous understanding of mind and unveil its true nature so that we can achieve 
liberation from suffering that essentially arises from our own mind.   
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that the world is only something seen of the mind itself, cling to the multitidunousness 
of external objects, cling to the notions of being and non-being, oneness and otherness, 
bothness and not-bothness, existence and non-existence, eternity and non-eternity and 
think that they have a self-nature of their own, all of which rises from the 
discriminations of the mind and is perpetuated by the habit-energy, and from which 
they are given over to false imagination” (Suzuki, 2003: 4-5).159 The Sutra also states, 
“The ignorant and simple-minded, their minds burning with the fires of greed, anger 
and folly, finding delight in a world of multitudinous forms, their thoughts obsessed 
with ideas of birth, growth and destruction, not well understanding what is meant by 
existent and non-existent, and being impressed by the erroneous discrimination and 
speculations since beginningless time, fall into the habit of grasping this and that and 
thereby becoming attached to them” (Suzuki, 2003: 5). Moreover, it is stated, “ It is 
because the ignorant cling to names, signs and ideas: as their minds move along these 
channels they feed on multiplicities of objects and fall into the notion of an ego-soul 
and what belong to it: they make discriminations of good and bad among appearances 
and cling to the agreeable. As they cling to the agreeable there is a reversion to 
ignorance and karma born of greed, anger and folly, is accumulated. As the 
accumulation of karma goes on they become imprisoned in a cocoon of false 
discrimination and are thenceforth unable to free themselves from the round of birth 
                                                  
159 This dissertation owes English translation of the Lankavatara Sutra to Suzuki.  
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and death” (Suzuki, 2003: 8).  
 
These statements describe the crucial features of ignorance as a strong belief in the 
existence of a separate and independent self and separate and independent others 
(Rothberg, 1992), or as Murti asserts, ignorance is “the wrong belief in the atman”160 
(1955: 11). With the rise of ego-consciousness, we put some fixed attributes to self 
and believe that they are absolute, as a result of which, we stick to those projected 
natures and have negative feelings such as anger, hatred or pain when we encounter 
those that are opposed to them or are believed to threaten those attributes.  
 
However, the problem is not only about an erroneous view of self, that is, the 
assumption or belief in the permanent and fixed self: the tendency to conceptualize 
reality or any phenomena or entities with fixed attributes is in general a fundamental 
cause of suffering and obstacle to liberation from it. Of course, to conceptualize reality, 
that is, to project some marks, signs, attributes or characteristics upon phenomena or 
any objects is essential for us to live a meaningful life. However, what Buddhist 
analysis of ignorance emphasizes is the potential danger of those conceptualizations. 
The danger emerges when each conceptual thought or view of reality comes to be 
believed to have an absolute and independent status as the right view. Under the 
                                                  
160 According to Chang (1971), atman refers to unchanging or fixed self, ego or 
individual personality.  
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strong belief in the absoluteness of some view, one tends to cling to it and have 
negative reactions against other views or conceptual thoughts that are opposed to 
one’s own, as a result of which, anger, fear or hatred will emerge in one’s mind. In 
other words, the root of suffering is in our mind’s propensity to ardently stick to its 
own fancies, that is, its conceptualizations of the real (Gomez, 1976) and the illusory 
belief in their absolute and unchanging status.161 
 
However, there is one more thing that should be emphasized as a conspicuous 
character of this erroneous understanding of reality: that is, belief in the separation 
between subject and object. As the Lankavatara Sutra claims, in the ignorant condition, 
one tends to be unaware that the attributes or characters of reality or phenomena, 
including human beings, are manifestations of mind. Accordingly, there emerges a 
situation in which the subject and object upon which some conceptually constructed 
view or attribute has been projected are separated and the object with the attribute 
come to be believed to exist objectively or independently of subject. As a consequence 
of one’s unawareness of the contents of reality (including oneself) as manifestations of 
mind, a contradictory condition arises, in which conceptually constructed thought or 
views projected upon reality or phenomena come to be objectified: it comes to be 
                                                  
161 Muller argues that the main obstacle to the achievement of enlightenment or 
liberation from suffering is the tendency of the mind to become conditioned and 
attached to concepts (1998).  
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believed that these attributes or characteristics, although they have been actually 
projected by the mind, are inherently possessed by the phenomena or objects 
themselves. Under this illusory circumstance, one tends to cling to some specific or 
agreeable view or attribute as absolute or categorically right and manifests anger, 
hatred or fear towards different views, even though the clinging and the origin of 
negative feelings are fundamentally born out of one’s own mind.  
 
5-2 Analysis of tendency of mind 
Why are human beings inclined to absolutize their conceptually constructed thought 
or view on reality including themselves and cling to it as if it were absolutely right? 
From Buddhist perspectives, the tendency is intimately connected to svabhava 
thinking. According to Chang, svabhava, which is Sanskrit, denotes “self-being, 
self-existence, or selfhood, that which does not depend on others for its existence: the 
definitive, irreducible and self-subsisting entity that is being self” (1971: 261).162 
What exists by means of its own-nature accompanies the assumption that it has 
permanent, fixed and unchanging nature (Jones, 1978).  
 
However, what must be clarified regarding the svabhava idea is that svabhava should 
be analyzed or discussed not as an ontological matter, but as an epistemological one. 
                                                  
162 Siderits (2003) argues that to say that something has svabhava is to say that its 
nature is wholly its own.  
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For instance, Sharma asserts that svabhava entails “the idea of essential condition 
which remains invariable with a thing” (1993: 109).163 Put another way, svabhava is 
our assumption that entities including ourselves inherently possess some fixed, 
unchanging and immutable atman or self-nature. Therefore, what should be added to 
the above explanation of svabhava is that svabhava signifies an epistemological 
feature of the tendency of the human mind to project fixed, permanent and unchanging 
characteristics upon reality and to believe that it is inherent within reality itself.  
 
Why do human beings have svabhava thought to understand reality including 
themselves? Mipham asserts that in their anxiety or quest for reassurance and security, 
people reify situations and things and cling to and manipulate these reified conditions 
(2002). Essentially, human beings cannot live without ideas, or more specifically, as 
Chinn claims, “without something to strive for that gives their existence authenticity” 
(2001: 69). Consequently, in seeking the ultimate meaning of their existence, human 
beings are disposed to project some fixed and permanent nature or attribute upon 
reality of phenomena and feel that their existence is assured and secured, after which, 
we cling to them.  
 
                                                  
163 Betty (1983) argues that svabhava is the characteristic which people 
unconsciously and erroneously suppose all individual entities to possess. His view 
shows that svabhava is, rather than what entities have inherently, what is projected 
upon by human mind.  
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However, from a Buddhist epistemological perspective, the svabhava way of thinking 
should be exposed to critique. As Murti states, “we desire consciously or otherwise, to 
acquire and enjoy things” (1955: 256) by projecting some fixed and permanent 
attributes on to them. We ascribe some fixed and unchanging features to reality in 
order to satisfy our own desires, cravings or pleasures. However, actual conditions in 
the real world are not always in consonance with our projected attributes and with our 
desires, which results in suffering (Murti, 1955) represented by anger, hatred or 
bewilderment. What must be underlined is that the discrepancy between the attributes 
or natures projected upon reality and the real and consequent negative feelings are a 
responsibility of our mind, especially, our svabhava thinking of reality.  
 
The mind in svabhava thought, as Inada argues, “freezes or staticizes the object of 
perception” (1970: 24) with fixed and permanent qualities and accordingly objects and 
reality in general come to be tied up with definitive and fixed views and treated as a 
fixed entity or substance (Chang, 1971). Thus through the projection of some fixed 
views on objects, one substantializes reality with fixed attributes and this subjectivized 
reality becomes objectified. By fixating reality with a permanent and unchanging 
nature or attributes, as Suzuki argues, “one wraps him/herself like a silkworm in a 
cocoon, binding tight not only him/herself but others” (1999: 113).  
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The minds in svabhava thought that have constructed their own world with fixed and 
certain attributes keep strong hold of those qualities as absolute, over which they learn 
to have greed, anger, infatuation or obsession (Suzuki, 1999). Those clingings can 
strengthen our disposition and transform our interests and emotions into self-view, 
self-confusion, self-esteem and self-love and accordingly the notion of a permanent 
and eternal self is fortified (Kalpahana, 1987). Further, the ego-clinging, in terms of 
one’s self and views of reality is by nature exclusive and tends to reject others and 
different views (Chang, 1971).164 These clingings to svabhava thought, an extreme 
attachment to ego and their negative impacts are described in the Lankavatara Sutra: 
“By becoming attached to what is seen of the mind itself, there is an activity 
awakened which is perpetuated by habit-energy that becomes manifest in the 
mind-system. From the activities of the mind-system there rises the notion of an 
ego-soul and its belongings; the discriminations, attachments and notion of an 
ego-soul, rising simultaneously like the sun and its rays of light” (Suzuki, 2003: 37). 
 
On this view, the projection of fixed and permanent attributes upon reality causes 
suffering since they do not accurately reflect how the world really is (Loy, 2006). By 
indulging in conceptual thought-constructions with some fixed qualities on reality, one 
                                                  
164 Siderits asserts that clinging to ego reinforces the belief in “I” and “mine” (2003) 
and consequently one feels anger, hatred or confusion when he/she encounters 
different views.  
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is imprisoned in his/her own fixed world and is unable to liberate him/her from the 
encumbering thread of wrong judgements (Suzuki, 1999). The intuitive perception of 
being or actuality as being of permanent and unchanging nature manifests human 
being’s deep clinging and attachment, which is the very root cause of suffering (Chang, 
1971). We tend to believe that, by fixating or putting some permanent nature to 
objects or phenomena as their own essential or inherent nature, we can gain sense of 
security or happiness and consequently we cling to the projected quality. However, 
this is the result of an epistemological orientation, one that Buddhism regards as 
illusory and does not bring about any security or tranquility of mind: the fixation will 
result in the opposite, that is, infatuation, insecurity, anger or hatred.  
  
5-3 Gaining an insight into the real as the key to liberation from suffering 
What must be remembered is the Buddhist recognition of the potential of human mind 
either in the direction of suffering or the liberation from it: it is the acts of our mind 
that determine whether we are in svabhava-thought, or in enlightenment, that is, 
salvation from the suffering (Ng, 1993). Therefore, the Buddhist stance is that the 
strong belief in phenomena including ourselves as solid and real entities with fixed 
and permanent natures or qualities is neither a sin (Mipham, 2002) nor something 
what we cannot overcome.  
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Since suffering arises from ignorance, liberation from it can be attained by dispelling 
it. In order to overcome ignorance, one must be able to acquire insight into the nature 
of phenomena or reality that has been erroneously grasped at by the mind in ignorance 
(Komito, 1987). The vantage point of Buddhist critique of svabhava-thought is not 
that thought should be rejected, but that we should obtain insight into the nature of 
real (Loy, 1983). What Buddhism wants to achieve is the transformation of our 
mind-system by acquiring a right insight into the real. Transformation of 
svabhava-thought into right thought that gains an insight into the nature of the real 
centers on the acquisition and cultivation of a certain general subjective attitude 
towards the world and daily lives, which derives from the experience of change in the 
activity of our own mind (Suzuki, 1999). This shows that the core of Buddhist 
epistemology is the critique of human subjectivity. Although Buddhist epistemology 
acknowledges that human subjectivity is essential to make a meaningful reality, it 
asserts that it can also cause a trouble or suffering when it is trapped into 
svabhava-thought mode. Rather than rejecting human subjectivity itself, what 
Buddhist epistemology seeks to achieve is a mind-state that has overcome 
svabhava-thought pattern by gaining an insight into human subjectivity. This character 
of Buddhist epistemology has an important implication for a Buddhist epistemological 
contribution to contemporary conflict resolution based upon Western epistemologies. 
Rather than denying social or cultural subjective dimensions of human mind, which 
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have been examined in the third chapter, Buddhist epistemology makes a critical 
analysis of how those social and cultural characters of human mind can cause conflict 
or make conflict intractable, which will be conducted in the sixth chapter.  
 
5-4 Examining Buddhist dependent-arising 
As outlined above, from Buddhist perspectives, the fundamental cause of suffering is 
ignorance, that is, lack of insight into the nature of the real, which is a subjective 
phenomenon. Moreover, the most salient feature of ignorance is svabhava-thought: the 
belief in permanent, fixed and unchanging self-nature of objects and entities including 
ourselves. Accordingly, as a first step to liberation, svabhava-thinking must be 
exposed to critical examination. 
 
Accordingly to Komito, the term svabhava – denoting own-being or self-existence – is 
“an existence which inheres in something itself, a being which inheres in something 
on its own.” (1987: 69). It signifies an actual independent existential status of each 
phenomenon or entity including ourselves (Komito, 1987). As Betty explains, 
svabhava is “the characteristic which, according to Nagarjuna and his followers, 
ordinary people unconsciously and erroneously suppose all individual entities to 
possess” (1983: 127). In this svabhava-thought, one sees and experiences reality as a 
collection of discrete and self-existing objects and entities with fixed and permanent 
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natures or qualities (Loy, 1996).  
 
At the heart of the problem or misunderstanding of the real lies the perception of a 
duality between ourselves and the real. For instance, Loy argues that we normally 
separate ourselves from our own actions and thinking and from the events that happen 
to us (2006). In order to overcome the false division between the substantialized 
reality and the subjects, a nondual relationship must be established. However, how can 
a nondual relation be achieved and what is meant by non-dual relationship? One of the 
core elements to answer those essential questions in relation to attaining liberation 
from suffering is ‘dependent-arising’ or pratityasamutpada in Sanskrit. Inada – one of 
the most important figures in Buddhist studies – asserts that one of the essential 
concepts in understanding Buddhism is pratityasamutpada known as dependent or 
relational origination (1968). Matsumoto also claims that Buddhism is “the teaching 
of dependent-arising and therefore the enlightenment that Buddhism proffers is 
nothing other than thinking correctly about the teaching of dependent-arising.” (1997: 
249).  
 
Pratityasamutpada is a principle that demonstrates how entities or phenomena arise. 
According to Lai, pratityasamutpada means “conditioned co-arising.” (1977: 244), 
according to which, there is no independent entity or phenomena with fixed or 
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unchanging nature. From the Buddhist viewpoint of dependent-arising, phenomena or 
entities, which prima facie seem to exist independently with permanent characters, are 
defined by and depend upon their interconnections (Mansfield, 1900). In short, 
pratityasamutpada denotes a fundamental mutual interdependency of entities and 
phenomena 
 
However, in order to grasp the profound meaning of Buddhist pratityasamutpada, a 
deeper analysis of its meaning must be made. The most important premise of Buddhist 
dependent-arising is that it is essentially different from conventional understandings of 
causality. Loy argues that the conventional view of causality is rooted in “purposive 
activity to attain something desired or to present something disliked” (1983: 362), 
which is essentially of a temporal and linear nature. An orthodox idea of causality 
assumes that some specific cause A will inevitably give rise to effect B (Loy, 1983). 
Since the fundamental presupposition of the conventional view of causality is that we 
experience the world as a collection of separate objects or entities with fixed and 
unchanging qualities or natures (Loy, 1983), causality comes to be considered as a 
phenomenon in which mutually independent objects or entities that possess inherently 
fixed and permanent attributes or natures interact and determine a subsequent 
phenomena.   
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However, the Buddhist notion of pratityasamutpada or dependent-arising opposes this 
naïve cause-and-effect relationship. From the Buddhist perspective, the conventional 
understanding of causality and its basic premise, that is, the world as a conglomeration 
of mutually independent objects or entities with fixed attributes can make us believe 
that objects and subject exist inherently, intrinsically, and independently of human 
subjective work, that is, conception or designation (Mansfield, 1990). The 
conventional causality can place the effects or participation of the human subjectivity 
secondary role. Buddhist claims that this conventional view of causality does not 
enable us to obtain an insight into the real and accordingly prevents us from achieving 
liberation from suffering. The reason is clear: since the main cause of human suffering 
is our svabhava-thought, that is, strong belief in the inherent or intrinsic existence of 
phenomena with fixed attributes or characteristics and the orthodox idea of causality is 
based on svabhava-thought, it is impossible for us to break through the 
svabhava-thought itself as long as we try to understand or explore the nature of the 
real from the perspective of conventional causality. On a Buddhist view, although 
conventional causality plays an important role in our lives, it also tends to make us 
believe in the independency of objects or phenomena with unchanging nature, which 
can result in causing us to fixate our view and bringing about suffering.  
 
While the conventional view of causality – an interaction between/among mutually 
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independent objects or entities with fixed attributes – has been criticized, how can a 
Buddhist pratityasamutpada be characterized? One of the core features of it is the 
revelation of the unreality of independently existing objects and entities with their 
own fixed nature. However, what Buddhist pratityasamutpada wants to emphasize is 
not the categorical denial of phenomena or reality: the aim of Buddhist causality is “to 
refute the concept of independent and fixed self-nature and accordingly to overcome 
the ontologization of any entity or object” (Cheng, 1982: 7). Put another way, 
Buddhist causality tries to enable us to understand phenomena including ourselves 
without falling into a substantialist view of reality which is the cause of suffering.  
 
According to Siderits, to assert that something has svabhava is to state that “its nature 
is wholly its own; that is, it is not borrowed from or dependent upon those other things 
on whose existence it depends” (2003: 1). Svabhava or inherent own-being is 
characterized as “non-dependent” (Robinson, 1972: 326) and accordingly, any 
conventional understanding of cause-and-effect that tries to establish a connection 
between/among mutually independent objects or entities that possess inherently fixed 
and permanent natures can fall into the contradiction (Loy, 1999) since if they are 
inherently in svabhava condition, cause-and-effect relationship itself cannot be 
established. 
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Komito states that true existence refers to “that which exists inherently from its own 
side without depending on any other thing” (1987: 98). However, no phenomenon, 
object or entity is dependent on itself for existence, but each depends upon other 
causes and conditions for its existence, as a result of which, it is devoid of inherent 
existence or self-existence with a fixed and permanent nature or attributes (Komito, 
1987). In short, Buddhist pratityasamutpada seeks to reveal the non-inherent 
self-nature of objects and phenomena, that is, unreality of their independency and 
fixed nature of attributes.  
 
The Buddhist critique of the inherently fixed nature of phenomena or the real is 
asserted in Buddhist texts. Nagarjuna’s “Yuktisastikakarika” or “Seventy Stanzas on 
Emptiness” is a good instance. It states, “Without depending on the defined, one 
cannot establish a definition and without considering the definition, one cannot 
establish the defined. As they depend on each other, they have not arisen by 
themselves, so therefore the defined and the definition are devoid of inherent 
existence and also they do not exist inherently in a mutually dependent way, so none 
of them can be used to establish the inherent existence of another one” (Komito, 1987: 
85). 165  Following this statement, it is asserted, “Following the logic of this 
explanation of mutually dependent origination, one cannot use the cause of a result to 
                                                  
165 This dissertation owes English translation version to Komito.  
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prove that the result has inherent existence because the cause of the result originates in 
dependence on the result and so is devoid of inherent existence. The same applies to 
all the pairs such as feeling and the one who feels or seeing and the seer and so forth. 
Taking these as examples one should understand how all the pairs are explained as 
being devoid of inherent existence because they originate in mutual dependence” 
(Komito, 1987: 85-86).  
 
What these statements exhibit is that the true dependent-arising or causality must be 
based on the premise of the unreality of inherent existence of phenomena or objects 
with some fixed and permanent natures or qualities. We tend to believe that inherent 
existence of phenomena, or objects possessing fixed and stable qualities or natures is 
essential for understanding reality, but from Buddhist pratityasamutpada perspectives, 
“an object’s lack of inherent existence and its dependency makes phenomena possible 
and functional” (Mansfield, 1990: 62). Since phenomena arise in dependence on each 
other, they lack inherent existence and consequently do not possess inherently existing 
characteristics or attributes of their own (Komito, 1987).  
 
While the non-inherent and non-fixed nature of phenomena is asserted from Buddhist 
dependent-arising perspectives, how can the nature of the real that is conventionally 
believed to consist of the interaction between/among the mutually independent objects 
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possessed of some fixed attributes be characterized? Since from a Buddhist 
perspective phenomena arise in mutual dependence, the inherent existence of 
phenomena and their characteristics or natures are to be understood as being 
superimposed or attributed to them from the agency of human mind (Komito, 1987). 
Our very conventional notion of independently existing phenomena including 
ourselves, some fixed qualities and their causal relations are, in their fundamental 
nature, a mental fabrication or a conceptual thought-construction.  
 
The real as a mental fabrication is asserted by Buddhist texts. For instance, 
Asvaghosha’s Discourse on the Awakening of Faith166 states, “Since all things, owing 
the principle of their existence to the mind, are produced by subjectivity, all the modes 
of particularization are the self-particularization of the mind” (Suzuki, 2001: 77).167 
In addition, the Awakening of Faith, the Lankavatara-sutra states, “All such notions as 
causation, succession, atoms, primary elements, that make up personality, personal 
soul, supreme spirit, sovereign God, Creator, are all figments of the imagination and 
manifestations of mind” (Suzuki, 2003: 58-59). As Chinn argues, our inherent desire 
to have an absolute understanding of the basic framework of experience of reality 
causes the obsessive delusion of thinking-mode by which we treat phenomena with 
                                                  
166 Suzuki (2001) explains that Asvagosha (first or second century CE) is one the 
important expounders of early Mahayana Buddhism.  
167 This dissertation owes English version of the discourse to Suzuki.  
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inherently fixed and unchanging natures (2001), which leads to the belief in the causal 
relationship between/among inherently or independently existing phenomena or 
objects. However, it is in reality merely a construction of the mind. Phenomena or 
objects – more precisely, phenomena or objects that innately possess some fixed 
attributes or characteristics – have only a conceptual existence. Put differently, as 
Burton claims, such an entity is “simply a name or concept attributed to the 
conglomeration of conditions” (2001: 4).  
 
People tend to ontologize reality to make sense of it: they understand reality as a 
collection of mutually independent objects that innately possess fixed or unchanging 
natures or attributes and believe those discrete objects interact to make the reality 
although they are essentially mental fabrications, as a corollary of which, they are not 
objective phenomena. The aim of Buddhist pratityasamutpada is to reveal the 
falsehood of this understanding of the real. From the Buddhist view of dependent 
arising, there is no inherently fixed self-nature of phenomena including ourselves: the 
discrete or independent objects with fixed qualities or attributes are a subject’s 
conceptual thought-construction as a true nature. In short, what Buddhism seeks to 
demonstrate through pratityasamutpada is the realization that the real is a product of 
our conceptual thought-construction.  
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However, the realization that reality is not exterior to us, but a mental fabrication or 
conceptual thought-construction is not the ultimate aim of Buddhist epistemology: in 
the view of Buddhist epistemology, we must make a deeper and more profound 
analysis of reality than the discussion of conventional understanding of reality. The 
reason for that is if the realization of the real as a conceptual construction is the final 
stage of Buddhist epistemology, it can result in “Anything goes” view: any conceptual 
thought or mental fabrication can be assumed to be the right or true apprehension of 
the real. Put differently, any subjective state can be mistakenly seen as a true nature or 
reflection of reality.  
 
While Buddhism emphasizes the mind as the key source for liberation from suffering, 
it also warns of the potential danger of the mind: every subjective state is not 
necessarily recognized as the source for liberation. Therefore, a critical analysis of a 
true nature of conceptual thought-construction must be made in order to acquire an 
insight into the real, which eventually brings about the liberation from suffering. For 
this purpose, the idea of sunyata comes to the fore to unveil the true nature of 
conceptual thought-construction.  
 
5-5 Analyzing sunyata 
From time immemorial, we human beings have developed the use of language as the 
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primary tool to understand or make sense of the world of experiences in abstraction 
and to communicate them with fellow human beings (Ichimura, 1997). However, 
Buddhism warns of the tendency of the human mind to become enmeshed in specific 
conceptual positions (Muller, 1998) and cling to them as absolute, which causes 
suffering. Therefore, the main obstacle to salvation from suffering is the tendency of 
the mind to become conditioned and attached to concepts (Muller, 1998). In order to 
overcome this, it is of importance to have an insight into the conceptualization of the 
real, which is to be achieved by knowing sunyata, or emptiness of conceptual 
thought-constructions. The importance of knowing sunyata is stated by Nagarjuna’s 
Mulamadhyamakakarika or The Middle-Way Stanzas: “There is moksa (release or 
liberation) from the destruction of karmic168 defilements which are but sunyata 
conceptualization. These arise from conceptual play (prapanca) which are in turn 
banished in sunyata” (Inada, 1970: 114). 
 
According to Ichimura, the term sunyata consists of sunya (empty, void, hollow) and 
an abstract suffix ta (equivalent to “ness”) and has been translated into Chinese as 
kung-hsing (emptiness or voidness) (1997). However, Ichimura also argues that the 
difficulty in understanding sunyata is “due to its transcendental meaning in relation to 
                                                  
168 Chang defines karma as “action, causation, the binding force of the universe which 
enforces the law of “like cause produces like effect.” (1971: 255). He also states that 
karma is a metaphysical principle that governs the overall phenomenon of human 
world.  
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the logico-linguistic meaning, especially because the etymological tracing of its 
meaning – sunya meaning vacuous or hollow within a shape of things – provides no 
theoretical or practical addition to one’s understanding of the concept” (1997: 87). The 
difficulty in grasping the meaning of sunyata which Ichimura points out is reasonable. 
The idea of emptiness or voidness within a shape of things or objects can give us an 
impression that sunyata denotes nothingness or annihilation and consequently it can 
come to be considered that sunyata is some transcendental condition beyond the 
empirical world.  
 
However, a nihilistic view of sunyata and understanding of sunyata as an ontologically 
transcendental entity or realm is not the accurate comprehension of sunyata. Rather, in 
order to grasp the correct picture of sunyata, its aim needs to be clarified. Ng states 
that the aim of sunyata is to enable people to acquire a right understanding of objects 
and phenomena, especially, our conceptual thought or mental fabrication that puts 
certain attribute or nature upon them (1993).  
 
Buddhist sunyata aims to overcome our strong attachment or clinging to conceptual 
thought-construction. For practical purposes, conceptual thought-construction is 
essential for us. However, suffering arises when some conceptual view is absolutized 
and clung to as such (Fredericks, 1995). We tend to choose some particular views and 
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“claim completeness for the aspects that we have selected” (Ramanan, 1978: 107). 
Consequently, the chosen view comes to be seized on as absolute and clung to as the 
complete truth (Ramanan, 1978), which makes us dogmatic, excluding or denying 
other views. From the sunyata viewpoint, absolutization and strong attachment to a 
particular view arise from the lack of insight into the nature of conceptually 
constructed reality. In short, the aim of sunyata is to provide an insight into 
conceptually constructed reality, which enables us to attain the eradication of 
attachment or clinging to a particular view as absolute and consequently achieve 
liberation from suffering.  
 
Thus, sunyata doctrine demonstrates itself as of epistemological significance: by 
providing an insight into the conceptualization of the real, one will be able to know 
the ultimate unreality of attachment to one’s own view as absolute and of aversion for 
others’ views. The revelation of nature of reality, through sunyata doctrine, as Murti 
asserts, “frees the human mind of the cobweb of false views and wrong perspectives” 
(1955: 233-234). The objective of Buddhist sunyata is not to advance a certain view in 
order to describe the world but to reveal the potential danger of conceptual thought or 
mental fabrication and unreality to absolutize and cling to a particular view. In other 
words, as Garma Chang claims, sunyata is “a therapeutic device for the cleansing of 
men’s innate clinging” (1971: 98) due to misunderstanding of nature of the real. 
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However, how the nature of the real or more specifically, conceptually constructed 
reality can be revealed must be analyzed.  
 
5-6 Buddhist dialectic and an insight into the real 
The main aim of Buddhist dialectic is to purify the mind, that is, freeing us from an 
extreme attachment to certain conceptual thought (Cheng, 1981). As a matter of fact, 
we select a particular pattern of thinking from various exemplified in phenomena, 
which is essential in leading daily lives or engaging in intellectual enterprise. Without 
building a particular conceptual thought or view, it is impossible for us to make sense 
of reality including ourselves. While Buddhist dialectic acknowledges that, it also 
purports to warn us of the potential danger of constructing certain conceptual thought. 
From the Buddhist dialectic viewpoint, when we choose a particular thought, in some 
cases we are prone to absolutize it and take an exclusive view towards others (Murti, 
1955). What should be asserted here is that, from the Buddhist viewpoint, building 
certain conceptual thought or view has two dimensions: as its positive side, it enables 
us to make sense of reality: and as its negative side, it can cause us to have a dogmatic 
view and make us unable to broaden our view when consciously or unconsciously 
absolutized. And Buddhist dialectic seeks to break through the latter dimension by 
revealing an insight into conceptual thought-construction or view.  
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Buddhist dialectic aims to demonstrate that all intellectual enterprises that try to 
absolutize or universalize some concepts or categories to construct experiences are 
ultimately unintelligible. Buddhism, especially Madhyamika believes that the 
concepts we use to construct reality will reduce to contradiction or absurdity when 
exposed to logical analysis (Kakol, 2002). Any attempt to use concepts or conceptual 
systems to describe the true or absolute status of the real accompanies contradiction 
and inconsistency and must be negated (Cheng, 1981) since as McEvilly asserts, the 
mind’s attempt to project conceptual categories ontologically, or to make experience 
conform to a concept-system, ends up in suffering and delusion (1982).  
 
The Buddhist dialectic, especially Madhyamika dialectic, purports to move the 
clinging mind beyond any conceptual structures, beyond any form of discourse, or 
philosophical view and beyond any ontology (McEvilley, 1982) by gaining an insight 
into conceptualization of any kind that is seen as absolute. Waldo asserts that, from 
Buddhist perspectives, “no concepts are immune from the dynamic process of 
interdependence in the sense that they refer to an absolute stratum of reality 
presupposed by all other concepts” (1975: 288). Our views are essentially defined by 
their opposites (Hanh, 1992). 
 
However, the Buddhist examination of conceptualization provides a deeper analysis 
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than merely exhibiting the relative nature of concepts of any kind, to show the 
ultimate unreality of each conceptualization. As Kakol claims, “all views, when 
analyzed, imply their own negation, which means that they are logically dependent on 
opposing views that contradict them” (2002: 212). Put another way, any concept or 
view, while claiming its own absolute validity, inherently possesses a contradictory 
nature and cannot describe the absolute or ultimate nature of the real, which is 
demonstrated by Nagarjuna. For instance, in Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness, he states, 
“Without one there cannot be many and without many it is not possible to refer to one. 
Therefore, one and many arise dependently and such phenomena do not have sign of 
inherent existence” (Komito, 1987: 80). This statement demonstrates that mutually 
opposing or contradictory concepts actually need to be interdependent to make sense.   
His other works also assert the fundamental interdependency of conceptual thoughts 
and the ultimate unreality of their inherent existence or independency. The Catustava, 
or Four Hymns to Absolute Reality is one of them. It states, “If there is existence, 
there is non-existence; if there is something long, similarly (there is) something short; 
and if there is non-existence, (there is) existence; therefore, both (existence and 
non-existence) are not existent” (Tola and Dragonetti, 1995: 128). It also states, 
“Unity and multiplicity, and past and future, etc., defilement and purification, correct 
and false – how can they exist per se?” (ibid). Further, it claims, “Since a thing that is 
per se does not exist, that which (thing) – whatever it be – exist? That (thing) which is 
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called ‘other’ does not exist without an own being of itself” (ibid). Finally, as a 
corollary of these statements, “Since for things, there is not an own being neither there 
is the being ‘other,’ then which devotedness to the holding to the belief in things, 
being dependent (on non-existential things) could exist (with ground)?” (ibid).  
 
Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamikakarika also critically examined the ultimate unreality of 
conceptualizations of any kind to describe the real. In the karika, the following verses 
are read to reveal the contradictory nature of the concept of time. “If, indeed, the 
present and future are contingently related to the past, they should exist in the past 
moment”; “If, again, the present and future do not exist there (in the past), how could 
they be contingently related?”: “Again, it is not possible for both (present and future) 
to establish themselves without being contingent on a past. Therefore, there is no 
justification for the existence of a present and a future time: It follows from the above 
analysis that the remainder of the two periods likewise can be taken up and that 
concepts such as above, below, middle, etc., or identity, etc., can be similarly 
described or treated” (Inada, 1970: 117-118). Conventionally, the concept of time – 
past, present and future – are seen as that which signifies different moments of time 
and are believed to be describing the objective reality of time. However, as the above 
verses assert, a careful analysis exhibits the contradictory nature of our assumptions 
about the concept of time and the ultimate unreality or impossibility of it. 
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This critical analysis can be applied to all concepts, which is demonstrated in other 
verses: “We provisionally assert that impurity cannot exist without being mutually 
dependent on purity and that, in turn, purity exists only as related to impurity. 
Therefore, purity per se is not possible: We provisionally assert purity cannot exist 
without being mutually dependent on impurity and that, in turn, impurity exists only 
as related purity. Therefore, impurity per se does not exist.” (Inada, 1970: 139). These 
verses reveal the fundamental contradiction or inconsistency of conceptualization of 
forms; while one concept needs the other that opposes it, the latter needs the former to 
make sense. However, the former itself requires the latter and eventually infinite 
regress continues without end, which leads to the realization of the ultimate unreality 
of conceptualizations of any kind to exist.  
 
As Kakol claims, the central approach to the revelation of the unreality of 
conceptualization of the real is to expose all views to “bi-negation.” (2002: 212). 
Views are negated by the function of “reduction ad absurdum” and then the opposing 
views that have arisen by the negation are also nullified in the same manner (Kakol, 
2002). Through this process, the untenability or unreality of concepts of any kind is 
revealed. What must be emphasized in this process is that Buddhist dialectic does not 
aim at the achievement of nihilism. The reason is clear: in order for nihilism to exist as 
a concept to describe reality, it requires the opposing view. Our mind, as is its nature, 
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tries to project some conceptually constructed view upon phenomena, objects or 
entities to make sense. However, as exhibited in Buddhist dialectic, all forms of 
concept, although they tend to be absolutized, innately possess a contradictory nature, 
and accordingly, the fundamental untenability of concepts to describe the real is 
realized, which is stated in Lanakavata-sutra: “False-imagination teaches that such 
things as light and shade, long and short, black and white are different and are to be 
discriminated; but they are not independent of each other; they are only different 
aspects of the same thing, they are terms of relation, not of reality. Conditions of 
existence are not of a mutually exclusive character; in essence things are not two but 
one. Even nirvana and samsara world of life and death are aspects of the same thing, 
for there is no nirvana except where is samsara and no samsara except where is 
nirvana. All duality is falsely imagined” (Suzuki, 2003: 25).  
 
From the Buddhist sunyata, or emptiness perspective that reveals the inherently 
contradictory nature of conceptualization of the real, what can be known as the true 
nature of the real? Asvaghosha states, “All things in their fundamental nature are not 
namable or expressible. They cannot be adequately expressed in any form of language. 
They are without the range of apperception. They, in their fundamental nature, have 
no signs or distinction.” (Suzuki, 2001: 56). Lankavatara-sutra claims, “By emptiness 
of individual mark is meant that all things have no distinguishing marks of 
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individuality and generality.” (Suzuki, 2003: 29). These demonstrate what Buddhism 
regards as the true nature of the real: beyond any kind of conceptualization. We try to 
project some conceptual thought upon things or objects to make sense and believe it as 
reality, but, since any concept or view lacks inherent existence, it is absurd or 
contradictory to absolutize conceptualizations of any sort. From a Buddhist sunyata 
viewpoint, conceptualization and clinging to it are merely a speculation indulged in by 
the ignorant mind (Murti, 1955) and once an insight into the nature of concepts or 
views is known, one will realize that a true nature of the real is beyond any 
conceptualization and fundamentally remains unaffected by our imaginative or 
conceptual construction (Ramanan, 1978) and that imagination or belief that some 
inherent attributes or qualities are possessed by objects or entities is our own 
responsibility - consequently, negative feelings such as anger, hatred, aversion 
accompanied by clinging to certain attributes of phenomena are to be known as our 
mental projections.  
 
The examination of pratityasamutpada and sunyata has unearthed some of the 
important elements of Buddhist epistemology: the mental or conceptual construction 
of attributes or nature of the real; the fundamental contradiction and untenability of 
any forms of conceptualization of the real and realizing an emptiness or voidness of 
conceptualization of the real as a true nature of the real, that is, the real beyond 
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conceptualization. These fundamentals of Buddhist epistemology can reasonably 
break through svabhava-thought, which is the central element of avidya or ignorance 
that causes suffering. However, more analysis must be made in order to enhance the 
practicality of these Buddhist epistemological features to address practical issues 
including conflict. As briefly mentioned, nihilism, when subjected to Buddhist 
dialectic, demonstrates its inherently contradictory and untenable nature and 
accordingly, a Buddhist epistemology is to be understood as far from nihilism. 
However, mere disclosure of a “true” nature of the real, that is, the real beyond 
conceptualization, cannot wipe out a nihilistic view of sunyata categorically: more 
constructive elaboration must be made to explore the potential for practical 
engagement within a Buddhist epistemology in the phenomenal world. The Two 
Truths system plays the central role in examining this potential.  
 
5-7 Analyzing Buddhist Two Truths 
Buddhist pratityasamutpada and sunyata fill an important role in breaking 
svabhava-thought, which constitutes the underlying element of avidya or ignorance 
that is the fundamental cause of suffering. Nevertheless, the nature of the real as 
depicted by pratityasamutpada and sunyata, that is, the real beyond or free from 
conceptualization, attributes or qualities, gives us an impression that Buddhist 
liberation from suffering is achieved in the realization of the world as nothingness, or 
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in the transcendental realm beyond our daily world. However, Buddhist soteriological 
achievement is not to be actualized in such a nihilistic and ontologically 
transcendental manner. In order to overcome such a misunderstanding, the Two Truths 
doctrine must be examined.  
 
What must be stressed above all is that the denial of nihilistic and ontologically 
transcendental view of sunyata is clearly claimed by Buddhism itself. Nagarjuna 
acknowledges the critique of Buddhist sunyata by the opponents of Buddhism in his 
work. The opponent of Nagarjuna claims, “Delving in sunyata, you will destroy the 
reality of the fruit or attainment, the proper and improper acts, and all the everyday 
practices relative to the empirical world” (Inada, 1970: 145). This opponent’s critique 
contends that sunyata annihilates daily phenomena in our lives, as a consequence of 
which, sunyata comes to be seen as if it were advocating nothingness: Nothing exists 
in this world and accordingly phenomena we experience in daily lives do not make 
sense. The opponent’s argument on sunyata demonstrates his/her understanding of 
sunyata as nihilistic and transcendental entity since he/she believes that the aim of 
Buddhist sunyata is to invalidate everything in this empirical world and achieve 
salvation by reaching a transcendental realm beyond our daily lives.  
 
In order to elaborate the counter-argument to the nihilistic view of sunyata, the 
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doctrine of Two Truths plays a crucial role, which is explicitly elucidated by 
Nagarjuna: “The teaching of the Dharma169 by the various Buddhas is based on the 
two truths: namely, the relative (worldly) truth and the absolute (supreme) truth” 
(Inada, 1970: 146). He also asserts, “Those who do not know the distinction between 
the two truths cannot understand the profound nature of the Buddha’s teaching” (Inada, 
1970: 146). Put differently, without knowing the Buddhist two truths, one will easily 
fall into the wrong views of sunyata such as nihilism and ontological 
transcendentalism. Therefore, it is essential to acquire the characteristics of 
conventional truth and the ultimate truth and examine how these two are related.  
 
According to Nayak, ‘samvrti’ means “that which is conventionally true or is of 
practical use” (1979: 482). Therefore, as Garfield argues, samvrti-satya or 
conventional truth is an ordinary or everyday truth or truth by collective agreement 
(2003). Conventional truth is formed by the collection of ideas, values and customs 
that have come to be regarded as truth by the common sense of community (Wright, 
1986). Conventional truth can be understood as the conception and form of truth that 
is habitually or customarily recognized as valid and efficacious in the practical matters 
of daily life (Wright, 1986). As social beings, we live in a society: conventional truth 
                                                  
169 According to Garma Chang, Dharma signifies “Buddhist doctrine or teachings: 
that which is true and good” (1971: 253). He also states that Dharma can be used to 
indicate “Buddhism as an organized religion” (1971: 253).  
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is a set of truths that are necessary for us to make social intercourse unproblematic, at 
least in its fundamentals. 
 
However, while conventional truth is essential for empirical daily life, there is another 
feature that must be mentioned regarding conventional truth. According to Murti, 
samvrti also means “the covered or the covering activity: superficial reality or 
appearance” (1955: 349). Garfield also states that samvrti denotes “concealing, hiding, 
obscuring or occluding” (2003: 5). Based on these meanings, Garfield asserts that 
samvrti-satya signifies “something that conceals the truth, or its real nature, or as it is 
sometimes glossed in the tradition, something that is regarded as a truth by an 
obscured or a deluded mind” (2003: 5).  
 
What is most conspicuous about the second aspect of samvrti-satya is the assumption, 
in one’s thought or conceptualization, that objects of thought or concepts possess their 
own being or self-nature, that is, a svabhava-nature (Wright, 1986). In conventional 
truth, objects or entities of experience are seen as real and substantial in themselves 
independent of all other objects or entities and of one’s thought or conceptualization 
of them (Wright, 1986). Accordingly, it comes to be believed that each object or entity 
innately has its own unique and fixed quality or nature. Furthermore, in conventional 
truth, one tends to have emotional and intellectual attachment to what one conceives 
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as true (Cheng, 1981): as one selects some specific viewpoint or idea on phenomenon, 
he/she clings to it as the true nature of the phenomenon. Thus, samvrti-satya or 
conventional truth, while necessary and helpful to lead a daily life based on social 
intercourse, possesses the potential to be the cause of suffering.  
 
According to Murti, ‘paramartha’ means “the ultimate or noumenal reality or the 
Absolute” (1955: 347). Therefore, paramartha-satya or the ultimate truth denotes “the 
absolute or transcendental truth or the truth of the ultimate or the beyond” (Chang, 
1971: 258). The fundamental nature of the ultimate truth is that it transcends and 
negates the norms of conventional truth (Wright, 1986) and asserts that the real is 
beyond conceptualization, which clearly exhibits that the core element of 
paramartha-satya is sunyata. While in the conventional truth, concepts, views or 
attributes of objects and phenomena are recognized as true and necessary for us to 
lead daily lives, in the ultimate truth, every concept or view is empty in terms of being 
without essence (Nayak, 1979) or lacking independent existence. 
 
5-8 Nonduality between samvrti-satya and paramartha-satya 
When the Two Truths are comparatively analyzed, it seems prima facie that they are 
respectively describing two different realities: the samvrti-satya delineates the samsara, 
that is, our daily life world or what Inada calls “the empirical life-death cycle” (1970: 
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158) while the paramartha-satya refers to nirvana or the realm of enlightenment that 
has achieved liberation from suffering. Put differently, the Two Truths ostensibly give 
us an impression that they are reflecting two ontologically opposed or incompatible 
realities. Further, as the paramartha-satya tries to reveal the ultimate unreality of 
samvrti-satya or truth/knowledge conventionally recognized as valid and 
pragmatically useful, it seems that it denies or eliminates the latter to attain 
enlightenment. In short, at first glance, it could be considered that the samvrti-satya 
and the paramartha-satya are mutually antithetical truths and accordingly refer to the 
truth in ontologically distinct relams. 
 
However, Buddhism denies these views and tries to demonstrate different features of 
the relationship between the samvrti-satya and the paramartha-satya. In order to 
realize the true relationship between these two truths, the correct relationship between 
samsara and nirvana must be grasped. How are these two seemingly different realms 
or realities related? Buddhism emphasizes the fundamental nonduality between 
samsara and nirvana. The nondualistic relationship between seemingly antithetical or 
incompatible realms is asserted, for instance, by Nagarjuna. He claims, “Samsara (that 
is, the empirical life-death cycle) is nothing essentially different from nirvana. Nirvana 
is nothing essentially different from samsara” (Inada, 1970: 158). Further, he states, 
“The limits (that is, realm) of nirvana are the limits of samsara. Between the two, there 
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is not the slightest difference whatsoever” (Inada, 1970: 158). What these statements 
assert is that the ideas of samsara or our empirical world and nirvana, or the world of 
enlightenment that overcomes our suffering are ultimately referring to one world. In 
short, our empirical daily world filled with suffering can be transformed into the 
enlightened world in which suffering has been addressed. Ultimately, there is no 
ontological difference between samsara and nirvana.  
 
The ontological nonduality between samsara and nirvana and the attainment of 
nirvana within samsara as the corollary have important implications for the 
samvrti-satya and the paramartha-satya. If samsara and nirvana are ontologically 
nondual, it is a matter of our mind’s perception, conception, feeling and acting that 
makes a difference between them (Cheng, 1981). In other words, the major difference 
between samsara and nirvana is epistemological and the samvrti-satya and the 
paramartha-satya play the major role in this epistemological dimension in approaching 
samsara and nirvana.  
 
What must be highlighted above all is that since there is ontological nonduality 
between samsara and nirvana, the samvrti-satya and paramartha-satya are not 
reflecting two ontologically different realities; rather, the two truths are essentially the 
two modes of understanding one reality. How can these two truths that reflect the 
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same reality be characterized? According to Chinn, the difference between them is a 
“distinction between ordinary consciousness, which is fraught with the dangers of 
misconceptions influenced by all kinds of desires (the desire for certainty, for eternal 
existence and so on) and an enlightened consciousness purged of all the needs and 
fears that bring about suffering” (2001: 70). As Loy argues, our everyday world is 
conceptually and socially constructed by our delusive attribution of inherent 
self-existence to phenomena (1996). In other words, normal daily life and discourse is 
in the realm of conventional truth, but we “unfortunately contaminate conventional 
truth by imputing inherent existence to it” (Mansfield, 1990: 68): we project 
conceptually constructed views or attributes upon phenomena and believe that they 
innately inhere in those phenomena and cling to them, which causes suffering. 
 
As Chang claims, “each and every concept man holds is inherently svabhava-bound” 
(1971: 86): one tends to have a strong belief in some conceptually constructed view of 
reality and clings to it as independently existing and absolute, which can be overcome 
by the paramartha-satya. The paramartha-satya or the ultimate truth refers to the 
awareness that samsara, that is, the empirical world of forms is a phenomenal 
appearance that is ultimately empty of svabhava or inherent fixed nature or quality 
(Mithcell, 1976). The ultimate truth is the truth of an enlightened mind that has 
realized an ultimate unreality or contradiction of absolutizing a particular view or 
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reality by gaining an insight into conceptual thought-construction (Vladimir, 2004), as 
a result of which, one can attain “tattva.” According to Nayak, tattva means a true or 
real nature of our ordinary discourse (1979) or conceptualization. The 
paramartha-satya enables one to realize the svabhava-sunya (essencelessness) of all 
concepts (Nayak, 1979) and once essencelessness or an ultimate emptiness of all 
concepts or conceptualization of any kinds has been known, one will be able to realize 
an ultimate unreality or contradiction of asbolutizing and clinging to certain 
conceptual thought.  
 
However, what must be remarked is that while it is indispensable to know the 
paramartha-satya in order to achieve liberation from suffering, it does not mean that 
the samvrti-satya should be eliminated. Rather, as an essential feature, there is an 
interdependent relation between the samvrti-satya and the paramartha-satya. This is 
explicitly asserted by Nagarjuna: “Without relying on everyday common practice (that 
is, relative truth), the absolute truth cannot be expressed.” (Inada, 1970: 146). As this 
verse states, the ultimate truth is key to achieving nirvana. However, what must be 
clarified more explicitly is that only through the conventional truth, can the ultimate 
truth be known or revealed. Whereas liberation from suffering cannot be achieved 
without the realization of the paramartha-satya, that is, an ultimate emptiness of 
conceptualization of any kinds as absolute, there is no approach to the ultimate truth 
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without relying on the conventional truth (Mipham, 2002). Here, we can seen an 
important and interesting relationship between the conventional truth and the ultimate 
truth. While the aim of the ultimate truth is to demonstrate the ultimate unreality of the 
conventional truth, the former does not negate the latter per se. both truths actually 
refer to one world, that is, our daily empirical world and if the ultimate truth denies 
the conventional truth that assumes a crucial role in our empirical world as worthless, 
it results in annihilating our world within which we seek to be enlightened to 
overcome suffering and acquire serenity in mind. In other words, if the conventional 
truth is nullified by the ultimate truth, it becomes impossible to obtain the ultimate 
truth itself.   
 
As the paramartha-satya must be realized within samsara, it is not separate from 
phenomena: rather, it is the very nature of phenomena (Mipham, 2002). The ultimate 
truth is what the conventional truth is and the conventional truth is the way the 
ultimate truth appears; “they merge and coincide in phenomena” (Mipham, 2002: 19), 
which means that eventually nondualistic relationship must be realized. This ultimate 
nonduality makes us realize that the conventional truth cannot be dismissed as 
worthless since the conventional truth must be presupposed to know an ultimate truth 
of the real. 
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Truly, the realization of sunyata or the paramartha-satya, that is, an ultimate unreality 
of conceptualizations of any sort to describe the real is indispensable to breakthrough 
the svabhava-thought that is fundamental element of ignorance. Nevertheless, the 
doctrine of sunyata is a double-edged sword: if understood rightly, it brings about 
liberation, but if understood wrongly, it can cause a spiritual and moral corruption 
(Mipham, 2002), which results in suffering. If one eliminates the reification of 
phenomena with some view but reifies and clings to emptiness, that arouses a new 
grasping and craving, that is, grasping and craving for emptiness as absolute and a 
new round of suffering (Garfield, 1994). While overcoming svabhava-thought through 
the realization of sunyata is essential for liberation from suffering, if one clings to or 
absolutizes sunyata or the notion of the real beyond conceptualization, that creates 
another svabhava-thought of emptiness, which nullifies or abandons engagement in 
samsara and one falls into nihilism that is essentially critiqued by Buddhism as a cause 
of suffering. In short, the doctrine of emptiness must be a remedy for all views 
including emptiness itself (Olson, 1975): attachment to any views including sunyata or 
the paramartha-satya must be overcome to attain liberation from suffering. 
 
According to Buddhist doctrine, there can be several steps towards understanding the 
true relationship between the samvrti-satya and the paramartha-satya. Firstly, all the 
principles and categories of conventional reality are recognized as necessary for life in 
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this world: their pragmatic validity must be maintained (Tola and Dragonetti, 1995). 
However, as a second step, those principles and categories – the samvrti-satya – must 
be problematized; one tends to use them without knowing their true nature and 
consequently falls into svabhava-thought and is afflicted with suffering or conflict. 
Following the second step, the true nature of the samvrti-satya, that is, the 
paramartha-satya or emptiness of conceptualization of any kind is to be revealed. As 
shown, any concept, when subject to Buddhist dialectic, reveals itself as 
interdependent and ultimately unreal, as a consequence of which, the real beyond 
conceptualization can be exhibited. However, the true relationship between the 
samvrti-satya and the paramartha-satya must be known in their interdependent and 
nondual condition: in order to overcome svabhava-thought in the samvrti-satya, 
Buddhist dialectic plays an important role, but Buddhist dialectic must eventually 
apply to the paramartha-satya as well in order to overcome the last clinging, that is, 
the clinging to the paramartha-satya or emptiness.  
 
As a result of the realization of the emptiness of emptiness, one becomes free from all 
conceptualization or attachment to any specific concepts (Gimello, 1976). What must 
be stressed is that it is not the concept itself but the attachment to some specific 
concept that must be rid of (Gimello, 1976). What needs to be eliminated through two 
truths is one’s perversions and false clinging to concepts, which applies to words, 
 308
concepts, understanding or systems of understanding (Ramanan, 1978) – the 
subjective dimensions that frame our actual life. What two truths assert is that to state 
that all existing things are empty does not mean that conventional thoughts, 
conceptualizations or discourses should be abandoned; rather, by knowing their true 
nature, we will be able to engage in the conventional phenomenal world without 
falling into attachment to things or dynamics as absolute. One who has known the true 
relationship between the conventional truth and the ultimate truth transcends both by 
synthesing them, which can entail a positive and constructive attitude toward the 
empirical world by means of a nondual mind (Ramanan, 1978): by knowing the true 
nature of the conventional truth, that is, the ultimate truth – an ultimate emptiness or 
unreality of conceptualization and of clinging to specific concept as absolute, one can 
free him/her from any kinds of fixed views and be more creative and inclusive or 
holistic in approaching the phenomenal world.  
 
5-9 Characterizing a Buddhist epistemology 
As generally understood, one of the essential features of epistemology is study of 
knowledge. Human beings by nature need a solid epistemological foundation or 
framework to make sense of reality. However, while this conventional view of 
epistemology is not to be denied, a Buddhist epistemology adds another element to it: 
a soteriological element as the aim of epistemology. Kalansuriya argues that since the 
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Buddhist use of the word ‘knowledge’ is made within a soteriologically-oriented 
framework, it is not exclusively understood on an epistemological basis (1993). Put 
differently, from a Buddhist epistemological perspective, knowledge is never merely 
an accurate representation of some external reality or world (Frisina, 2001). Rather, 
the core of knowledge in Buddhist epistemology is purposeful: an emancipation or 
liberation from suffering (Kalansuriya, 1993) that is caused by a lack of right 
understanding of reality. Therefore, gaining a correct understanding the nature of 
phenomena – the objects and situations surrounding us in daily lives – which have 
been covered with erroneous views on them, is the most fundamental aim of Buddhist 
epistemology (Mipham, 2002) since that can enable us to address problems we 
encounter in daily lives on a deeper level.  
 
Further, as Ramanan claims, a Buddhist epistemology asserts that the world around us 
is a reflection of the condition of our mind: “we do deeds that build the world for us 
exactly in the way we interpret to ourselves the reality of things” (1978: 71). Since the 
condition of reality is a reflection of mind, knowledge of any kind arises from our own 
mind: a Buddhist epistemology focuses on the fundamental nature of the mind 
(Matsuo, 1981) in order to attain liberation since as Lai claims, epistemologically, the 
mind is “the seat of enlightenment as well as of non-enlightenment” (1977: 250). Put 
another way, a Buddhist epistemology centers on the attainment and cultivation of a 
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correct subjective attitude towards the world and life, which arises from the 
experience of some transformation in the activity of mind (Suzuki, 1999). By 
acquiring a right knowledge, one can attain transformation of the whole system of 
mind (Suzuki, 1999), which can break suffering.   
 
While a Buddhist epistemology can be understood as a study of knowledge that 
purports to achieve a soteriological aspiration, that is, liberation from suffering, what 
is the soteriological study of knowledge? The important character of a Buddhist 
epistemology is the critical attitude towards knowledge of any kind. While 
conventional epistemology, which tries to found the system or framework of certain 
knowledge, plays an important role in establishing a firm foundation for one’s 
understanding of reality or phenomena including oneself in terms of making sense of 
them, a Buddhist epistemology asserts that this conventional disposition of 
epistemology can cause trouble or suffering as one is prone to cling to some specific 
epistemological framework and ignore others. Once one has absorbed or chosen a 
certain epistemological framework to make sense of reality, one is inclined to stick to 
it and fixate one’s mode or pattern of thought, and consequently one can become 
narrow-minded toward other views and even have negative feelings such as anger, 
hatred, embarrassment and so on. A Buddhist epistemology seeks to reveal this 
possible danger lurking within the conventional disposition of epistemology by 
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demonstrating an insight into the nature of knowledge in any form. 
 
However, a Buddhist epistemology characterized as critique of knowledge of any sort 
does not aim at denying or annihilating knowledge itself. Rather, the fundamental 
objective of a Buddhist epistemology is to reveal an insight into the nature of 
knowledge in order to break through one’s rigid attachment to certain knowledge as 
absolute. Buddhism asserts that the clinging to certain knowledge and expressing 
some negative feelings towards other knowledge or conceptualization, which brings 
about trouble or suffering, is due to a lack of right understanding of the nature of 
knowledge of any kind. By attaining an insight into the nature of the knowledge, one 
can eliminate one’s strong attachment to certain knowledge. As Loy claims, the goal 
of a Buddhist epistemology is “not to eliminate concepts but to liberate them” (1999: 
10): a Buddhist epistemology aims to liberate knowledge of any sort from one’s 
erroneous attachment by revealing an insight into the nature of knowledge. 
Attachment to any definitive concepts or knowledge, whether it be affirmative, 
negative or synthesis, rather than bringing about liberation from suffering, impedes the 
attainment of it as the dogmatic assertion of any view inevitably excludes other views 
and the former is distinguished from others as false and conflict results (McFarlane, 
1995).  
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Rather than an elimination of knowledge as its aim, a Buddhist epistemology can be 
understood as an exhaustive critique of dogmatism of knowledge of any form (Scutton, 
1991), which arises from svabhava-thought. By the doctrine of sunyata, the 
viewpoints or various types or levels of knowledge that are developed into elaborate 
construction about the absolute or ultimate nature of reality are understood as 
interdependent variables which arise through mutual interaction and at different 
extents of opposition toward each other and consequently reaches the point of mutual 
annulment (Scutton, 1991). Accordingly, the ultimate impossibility of independent 
existence of knowledge of any kind and unreality or contradiction of clinging to a 
particular view as absolute comes to be demonstrated.  
 
A Buddhist epistemology, as Murti claims, attains its fruition through the working of 
its inner dynamism (within our mind), through the three moments of the dialectic: 
dogmatism, criticism and intuition (1955). Initially, one chooses a view, concept or 
philosophy to make sense of reality and clings to it as absolute or ever-lasting and 
denies or excludes others, which causes suffering as a rigid attachment to one’s view 
and denial of others arouses anger, hatred or embarrassment. In the second stage, an 
insight into the nature of concepts or views is analyzed, which reveals the essential 
relativity of them and the contradictory nature of absolutization of them. Finally, the 
ultimate unreality of clinging to any forms of concept or view is intuitively understood, 
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which results in liberation from suffering. Thus, rather than proposing a new 
knowledge of reality, a Buddhist epistemology seeks to propose an insight into the 
nature of knowledge of any kind, that is, relativity and its ultimate emptiness in order 
to break through svabhava-thought. A Buddhist epistemology can be regarded as a 
reflective awareness of the false nature of every conceptual or philosophical view that 
pretends to give a complete and exclusive picture of phenomena, and which curbs the 
dogmatic disposition of knowledge (Murti, 1955).  
 
By acquiring an essential insight into the real, that is, relativity and ultimate unreality 
to absolutize a certain viewpoint through a dialectical critique of all views or thoughts, 
the intension of a Buddhist epistemology is to attain mind-state free from conceptual 
thought-constructions while appreciating their practical values in certain 
circumstances within our daily lives and intellectual undertaking. The pinnacle of 
knowledge in Buddhist epistemology, by acquiring an insight into the nature of 
knowledge of any sorts, is the complete detachment from all views (Scutton, 1991).    
 
5-10 Exploring an ultimate state of mind in Buddhist epistemology 
The main thrust of Buddhist epistemology is its critical attitude towards any kind of 
knowledge, which seeks to show an insight into construction and nature of knowledge 
and demonstrate the ultimate illusion and contradiction to cling to certain view as 
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absolute. How can an ultimate or right state of mind be characterized in this Buddhist 
epistemological condition? 
 
Since on a Buddhist view, the human mind tends to be enslaved to concepts due to a 
lack of right understanding of their nature, Buddhist enlightenment means liberation 
of mind from conceptual thinking (Cheng, 1981). As Scutton describes, the purpose of 
Buddhist epistemology is to liberate the mind from “the fetters of language, logic and 
even conceptual thinking itself” (1991: 162). This is stated in Asvaghosha’s 
Awakening of Faith: “Enlightenment is the highest quality of the mind: it is free from 
all the limiting attributes of subjectivity, it is like unto space, penetrating everywhere, 
as the unity of all” (Suzuki, 2001: 61-62). As Laycock asserts, the very essence of 
mind in Buddhist thought is “a state of absolute void,” which is claimed in the Sutra 
of Complete Enlightenment: “The substance of the perfect wondrous mind is by its 
nature spiritually clear, all-pervading, extensive, void and still; it is called absolute 
voidness” (Luk, 1962: 190). By knowing an insight into the nature of knowledge, one 
can realize an original unconditioned nature of mind that is undisturbed by or 
non-attached to concepts. 
 
However, ‘detachment from conceptualization’ or ‘absolute voidness’ as an ultimate 
condition of mind can give us the impression that Buddhism aims at the abandonment 
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of thinking or cessation of thinking. Buddhism explicitly denies this view, which is 
stated, for instance, by Asvaghosha: “We understand by the annihilation [of mind], not 
that of the mind itself, but its modes (only)” (Suzuki, 2001: 83). The 
Lankavatara-sutra also asserts, “Disciples may sometimes think that they can expedite 
the attainment of their goal of tranquilization (of mind) by entirely suppressing the 
activities of the mind-system. This is a mistake, for even if the activities of the mind 
are suppressed, the mind will still go on functioning because the seeds of habit-energy 
will still remain in it. What they think is extinction of mind, is really the 
non-functioning of the mind’s external world to which they are no longer attached. 
That is, the goal of tranquilization is to be reached not by suppressing all mind activity 
but getting rid of discrimination and attachments” (Suzuki, 2003: 72-73).  
 
These statements show that it is a grave mistake to consider that the purpose of 
Buddhist epistemology is the denial or cessation of conceptual thought and 
construction of knowledge. Rather than signifying an elimination or absence of 
thought, the ultimate state of mind in Buddhist epistemology refers to the condition of 
not being trapped in thoughts and not adhering to a certain conceptual habit or 
disposition (Muller, 1998) as absolute. Buddhist no-thought or no-mind means the 
function of a mind free from any attachment to conceptual thought-construction even 
when we are engaged in it (Loy, 1986). This means non-abiding in any specific 
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conceptual constructions since ultimately it is a mere illusion or even a cause of 
trouble to cling to the certain habit of reified conceptual thought (Muller, 1998).  
 
The merit of this non-abiding condition of mind is that we can appreciate or even 
enjoy any form of knowledge that is of use in certain circumstance, but at the same 
time can be detached from it by knowing the nature of conceptual 
thought-construction. By being liberated from an attachment to any particular view 
while perceiving its practical value in certain situation, within Buddhist enlightened 
mind, the conceptualizing faculty, rather than being wiped out, functions well or even 
better than before as it no longer has to operate in a rigid, constricted and clinging 
mode in approaching our daily phenomena reality (Muller, 1998).  
 
5-11 Implications of Buddhist epistemology for conflict resolution 
Buddhist epistemology claims that once one has attained an insight into knowledge 
one is to be freed from “conceptual prisons” (Hanh, 1992: 61). However, gaining an 
insight into the nature of knowledge does not allow an attachment to the ultimate truth, 
that is, the ultimate emptiness of any forms of knowledge as their nature. Rather, the 
attainment of the ultimate truth of emptiness of knowledge or conceptualization, while 
recognizing its pragmatic values, reconnects us to praxis and convention in an 
enlightened mode: the ultimate truth of sunyata, rather than disabling or terminating 
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the conventional truths, reinforces them without making us their slaves (Barnhart, 
1994). The fundamental interdependence between the conventional truth and the 
ultimate truth stresses the kind of flexibility regarding our perspectives to approach 
phenomenal world: the functional ability to tailor the ultimate truth to the 
conventional truth and the conventional truth to the ultimate truth presupposes a 
flexibility within human mind, which “undermines any insistence on closure within a 
given scheme” (Barnhart, 1994: 653) and enables us to act upon and engage in 
worldly affairs in more creative, open-ended and inclusive manner.  
 
How can a Buddhist epistemological approach to our phenomenal daily world from a 
deeper and broader dimension of mind-state contribute to contemporary conflict 
resolution that has been founded upon Western epistemologies? Clearly, a contribution 
of Buddhist epistemology to contemporary conflict resolution would be an analysis of 
human mind in a deeper and more profound dimension. Although a Buddhist 
epistemology does not deny objective or material and structural dimensions of conflict 
dynamics, what it emphasizes is that those dimensions are essentially manifestations 
of mind, since the character or attributes of objective reality are projected by the 
human mind, individually and/or collectively. 
 
As examined (especially in the third chapter), the human subjective dimension and its 
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role in an analysis of conflict has been exhibited, which is represented by subjective 
epistemology and critical epistemology. While a Buddhist epistemology appreciates 
their contributions to contemporary conflict resolution and pragmatic values, it is able 
to penetrate into a more profound level of mind to explore a deeper psychological and 
subjective dimension of conflict. One of the important critiques of subjective 
epistemology and critical epistemology from a Buddhist epistemological perspective 
is that both have clung to certain dimensions of mind and ignored a deeper dimension 
of mind to transform conflictual situation. However, this critique from a Buddhist 
epistemological aspect must be taken constructively and positively. As repeatedly 
stressed, a Buddhist epistemology never denies any forms of epistemology and their 
pragmatic values, as a corollary of which, the epistemologies and their contributions 
to contemporary conflict resolution must be appreciated. 
 
What a Buddhist epistemology seeks to propose is a deeper and more profound 
analysis of mind than made in subjective epistemology and critical epistemology, so 
that a richer nature of mind can be explored, which will contribute to expanding the 
framework of contemporary conflict resolution that has been based on Western 
epistemologies. An ultimate goal of this dissertation that seeks to contribute to 
expanding the framework of contemporary conflict resolution is not the denial or 
replacement of Western epistemologies and their understanding of conflict and 
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conflict resolution with those of a Buddhist epistemology. Rather, by penetrating into 
a deeper level of epistemologies and their applications to contemporary conflict 
resolution, a Buddhist epistemology wants to analyze conflict from deeper and more 
profound perspectives, which will enable us to explore new theories on conflict 
dynamics and conflict resolution and even new types of praxis in the future.  
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Chapter Six: Constructing a Complementary Relationship between 
Western Epistemologies and Buddhist Epistemology for an 
Expansion of the Framework of Contemporary Conflict Resolution.  
 
Introduction 
So far two themes have been dealt with: a critical analysis of Western epistemological 
foundations of contemporary conflict resolution and an examination of Buddhist 
epistemology. Following these analyses, the aim of this concluding chapter is to 
explore what contributions Buddhist epistemology can make to contemporary conflict 
resolution. What must be noticed here is that the objective is not to establish a 
Buddhist conflict resolution to replace or stand in addition Western conflict resolution. 
Rather, the core goal, as it has been established, expanded and evolved, is to enrich the 
conflict resolution enterprise. 
 
Firstly, the theoretical and conceptual contribution will be examined. In this part, what 
has been underdeveloped in Western conflict resolution will be argued and then what 
kind(s) of contribution(s) Buddhist epistemology can make to contemporary conflict 
resolution will be examined. Following this, how a complementary relationship 
between Western epistemologies and Buddhist epistemology can contribute to 
unfolding practical implications for contemporary conflict resolution will be explored. 
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Here, how dynamics and key elements of contemporary conflict resolution founded 
upon Western epistemologies can be reconfigured by establishing a complementary 
relationship between Western epistemologies and Buddhist epistemology will be 
explored. Finally, how further research following the argument of this chapter can be 
unfolded will be explored.  
 
6-1 Considering Buddhist epistemological contributions to the theoretical and 
conceptual development of contemporary conflict resolution 
6-1-1 Individual deep psychology as a core element of conflict resolution 
The practice of conflict resolution has always been informed by a very large 
theoretical literature – and this is essential as any sustained analysis of the sources of 
human conflict entails either implicit assumptions or explicit discussion of quite 
fundamental philosophical topics, mostly turning on questions of human nature.  
 
Part of the rationale for introducing Buddhist epistemology into the context of 
Western conflict resolution is that contemporary conflict resolution has been largely 
socially-oriented. This is understandable, since as we saw, the origins of conflict 
resolution are rooted in the destructive tendencies of state and/or large scale violence 
at sub-state or collective levels. Intellectually, too, conflict resolution has been rooted 
in the social sciences – International Relations, politics, anthropology, social 
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psychology and the rest. In addition, the body of practice of conflict resolution has 
been built up around inter-group dynamics.  
 
The social orientation of contemporary conflict resolution has had a profound effect 
on its theoretical development, particularly with respect to the sources and dynamics 
of violent conflict. The social manifestations of violence (war, genocide, ethnic 
cleansings) are aggregations of individual acts – the purposeful acts of adult human 
beings who possess moral agency. Although the purpose of this dissertation is not to 
discount the importance of social, socio-cultural, socio-economic and other large scale 
drivers of violent conflict, it remains a striking deficiency of contemporary conflict 
resolution theorizing that so little attention has been given to individual psychology 
and the quality of individual potential within a conflict resolution context.  
 
This is not to say that there are not very considerable bodies of work dealing with 
human psychology and violence, ranging from biology, cognitive studies and 
psychopathology. However, these have had little impact on the theoretical 
development of conflict resolution in general or in relation to the sources of conflict or 
violent conflict.  
 
Of course, Buddhism as a religion and as an epistemology has its own standing, 
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separate from the theory and practice of contemporary conflict resolution: and its 
many schools and branches have their own traditions, literatures, doctrines and even 
ritual practices. As mentioned in the introduction, “Buddhist epistemology” as 
characterized in chapters 4 and 5, is an abstraction from this rich tradition. The 
purpose of this dissertation in presenting a broadly applicable Buddhist epistemology 
has not been to flatten differences between Buddhist variants, but to present a 
fundamental orientation – an epistemology – that is common to the largest part of 
practicing Buddhists.  
 
Furthermore, although Buddhist scripture has been cited for explanatory and 
illustrative purposes, the presentation of Buddhism in the context of this dissertation, 
which seeks to complement Western conflict resolution, is philosophical – specifically 
epistemological – not doctrinal. It should be also emphasized that the intention of this 
research in examining Buddhist epistemology within a contemporary conflict 
resolution framework is complementary, not an argument about either truth or 
superiority. As emphasized in the chapter 5, there is a broadly shared Buddhist 
appreciation of the practical importance of what is commonly referred to as 
‘mundane/conventional truth,’ which comprises socially or culturally constructed 
views, values, and discourses that are necessary for us to live a meaningful life in the 
collective world. The main argument of this dissertation does not rely on a 
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non-Buddhist subscribing to Buddhist doctrine: and in fact, the first and foremost 
contribution of this study is its contextualization into a contemporary conflict 
resolution framework an entire epistemological orientation which locates the sources 
of conflict in individual/human psychology. 
 
The implications of this for the theoretical development of contemporary conflict 
resolution are considerable and they are not contingent on an acceptance of 
dependent-arising or enlightenment (or any Western variants on them, in the language 
of cognition, or one or more specialist branches of psychology). Therefore, the sense 
in which Buddhist epistemology is complementary to Western conflict resolution is 
not merely that it can stand in parallel to conflict resolution as it has developed to date, 
but that it can expand its theoretical and explanatory framework by introducing and/or 
restoring fundamental psychological perspectives to our thinking about human 
conflict.  
 
Actually, as mentioned in chapters 1 and 2, in contemporary conflict resolution, in 
which social psychological approach assumes a major role, it is generally recognized 
that conflict is not simply a phenomenon of psychological and subjective dynamics. 
Rather, it is rooted in material, objective or structural elements although psychological 
and subjective factors play important roles. However, the incorporation of Buddhist 
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epistemology, which critically examines how the human psychological and subjective 
disposition itself can cause suffering or conflict, allows us to analyze how 
psychological and subjective elements can be a root cause of conflict. And this 
re-centering our attention on the source of conflict toward individual deep psychology 
enables us to reconfigure the way we view social psychology as a means of 
understanding conflict.  
 
6-1-2 Qualitative enhancement of the potential of individual agency in conflict 
resolution 
The incorporation of individual deep psychology onto the conflict resolution center 
stage will unavoidably have an impact one of the long-standing debates in 
contemporary conflict resolution, that is, the relationship between society and 
individual agency. Especially, the introduction of individual deep psychology into 
Western conflict resolution that has been socially or culturally-oriented allows us to 
engage in qualitative enhancement of the potential of individual agency in conflict 
resolution. In the conflict resolution literature, there have been few arguments on the 
role of individuals or on how individual agency can contribute to resolving conflict or 
transforming violent and antagonistic inter-group relationships.  
 
Truly, the introduction of basic human needs theory into conflict resolution has shed 
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light on human beings/individual human beings. According to this theory, as basic 
human needs are universally applicable, states or sub-state groups should address the 
failure to satisfy basic needs of every individual person, which has caused violent 
conflict. However, the basic assumption of individual human beings in the context of 
basic human needs theory and conflict resolution is biological orientation or biological 
conditionedness.  
 
There are some approaches of social psychology that focus on individual agency to 
resolve conflict or violence: the problem-solving approach and contract hypothesis as 
the theoretical foundation to analyze the problem-solving approach or any other 
inter-personal meeting to address mutual misunderstanding and misperception are 
good instances. However, the major problem of social psychological approaches is 
that only a limited number of individuals can participate in them. Only a handful of 
top-level elites or other influential figures are the targets of social psychological 
approaches.  
 
As examined in chapter 1, since the end of the Cold War, the critique of traditional 
conflict resolution represented by problem-solving that entails only a handful of 
high-profile individuals for resolution has been actively made. This vigorous critique 
has borne fruits in creating arguments on peacebuilding from the bottom or grass-roots 
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based peace approach, and in the concept of conflict transformation with its potential 
and significance for reconciliation and justice. What is outstanding about these 
approaches is that they demonstrate that conflict and conflict resolution are not 
exclusively the concern of a handful of individuals. Rather, each individual or 
everybody must be incorporated.  
 
Critical epistemology has been examined in the third chapter as the epistemological 
foundation of many conflict resolution approaches in the post-Cold War era. As 
discussed, critical epistemology insists that socially/culturally constructed views or 
discourses and even social structures do not represent objective reality, but are 
intersubjectively built by those who live in the social/cultural world. Further, it is also 
argued that those views or discourses themselves are a cause of asymmetric relations 
between/among groups in society and of conflict or violence. However, the 
intellectual pinnacle of critical epistemology is that the socially/culturally constructed 
view is in essence fluid and contingent and subsequently can be subject to critique, 
deconstruction and transformation by those who are in the social/cultural world. In 
short, the active engagement of individual agency is one of the central features of 
conflict resolution the post-Cold War era.  
 
However, while the importance of the active role of individual agency is recognized as 
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a key to conflict resolution, qualitative argument on the potential of individual agency 
per se has remain underdeveloped in Western conflict resolution. Even in critical 
epistemological approaches to conflict resolution, individual agency is confined to 
social/cultural influence and consequently the social/cultural deterministic nature of 
individual agency remains, which renders it highly difficult to create self-reflective 
and self-critical individual agency. In short, an asymmetric relationship remains 
between society and individual agency, in which the former is still prioritized over the 
latter even though the importance of the latter’s active role has been increasingly 
accepted. Therefore, by introducing individual deep psychology into Western conflict 
resolution, less socially-oriented, more qualitative analysis of the potential of 
individual agency can be made. This does not mean to dismiss the social/cultural 
influence on individual agency: rather, the introduction of individual deep psychology 
into Western conflict resolution and establishment of their complementary relationship 
can reconfigure the relationship between society and individual agencies in the 
context of Western conflict resolution itself, in which the former has been the main 
focus.  
 
6-2 Exploring the practical implications of a complementary relationship 
between Western epistemologies and Buddhist epistemology 
As discussed in the previous section, the introduction of Buddhist epistemology into 
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contemporary conflict resolution based on Western epistemologies brings psychology 
back to the center stage of conflict resolution, and it does so at a deep level. Of course, 
Western conflict resolution has examined psychological and subjective dynamics to 
understand and address inter-group conflict. Doubtless, its examination, which is 
made mainly by social psychologists, has made an invaluable contribution to the 
conflict resolution enterprise. However, the introduction of Buddhist epistemology 
that makes a critical and deeper analysis of psychology as a root cause of conflict 
allows us to engage in a deeper and more profound analysis of psychological and 
subjective dynamics of conflict and conflict resolution. This is not a dismissal of 
social/cultural psychological dynamics of conflict resolution. What must be stressed 
here is that by constructing a complementary relationship between Buddhist 
epistemology that studies individual deep psychology and Western epistemology that 
have mainly focused on socially-oriented conflict resolution, we can make a deeper 
analysis of social/cultural psychological dynamics and subsequently new views or 
values can be added to the social/cultural dimensions of human psychology itself.  
 
Based on this expansion of psychological perspectives, this section explores how a 
complementary relationship between Western epistemologies and Buddhist 
epistemology can develop practical implications for the conflict resolution enterprise. 
As examined in chapters 4 and 5, the core theme of Buddhist epistemology is a critical 
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analysis of social/cultural views or conceptual thoughts. It analyzes how 
social/cultural subjectivity itself can become a root cause of suffering or trouble and 
how it can be addressed. From a Buddhist epistemological perspective that 
incorporates individual deep psychology into conflict resolution, while it is essential 
for us to ascribe certain attributes to the phenomenal world in order to make sense of 
reality, such meaning-making itself can be a root cause of conflict.  
 
6-2-1 Critical analysis of socially/culturally-engaged mind 
6-2-1-1 Characterizing a general feature of Western understanding of mind 
The long history of Western intellectual enterprise has made a valuable contribution to 
the study of human subjectivity or nature of mind: Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Jung, 
Wittgenstein, Foucault, to name a few. Although it is highly difficult and perhaps 
impossible to fully characterize the nature of mind, Zeuschner asserts that in the West, 
there seems to be some general agreement that mind can be understood in terms of 
such things as “thoughts, feelings, hopes, fears, acts of deliberation, discrimination, 
concepts, judging and so on” (1978: 69). The various approaches to understanding 
human mind and the construction of a generally agreed nature of it have promoted and 
developed analysis of how human subjects affect the phenomenal world including the 
resolution of conflict.  
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As examined in the first, second and third chapters, Western conflict resolution has 
developed psychological and subjective dynamics in conflict resolution, especially in 
order to investigate how groups in conflict interact. A main theme of Western 
approaches to psychological and subjective dynamics of conflict resolution has been 
an examination of how conflictual intergroup relationship can occur, how the 
conflictual circumstance negatively affects intergroup communication and how it can 
be improved to build a non-violent and more cooperative relationship. Put differently, 
it seems that intersubjectivity or collectivity has been presumed as a core in 
understanding human mind in Western conflict resolution.  
 
Further, as shown in the third chapter, amongst Western epistemologies, subjective 
and critical epistemologies have been a foundation for understanding mind in Western 
conflict resolution. Although they have respectively distinct approaches to 
psychological and subjective dynamics in conflict resolution, there is one thing that 
can be commonly recognized between them, that is, the socially or culturally-oriented 
nature of mind as their foundation to characterize nature of human mind. This can be 
also interpreted that in subjective and critical epistemological approaches to human 
mind, social or cultural conditionedness is an essential feature of human mind. The 
conditioned mind has been presupposed as a central pillar of Western conflict 
resolution.  
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The conditioned mind can be characterized as mind framed by “the entire corpus of 
ideas, values and customs that come to be presupposed or regarded as truth by the 
common sense of a community” (Wright, 1986: 21). It is also to be understood as the 
belief and forms of truth that are conventionally accepted as valid and effective in the 
practical matters of daily life-world (Wright, 1986). As argued in the second chapter, 
since we are essentially social entities, we are prone to get our minds conditioned by 
socially or culturally constructed views or conceptual thoughts. Based on the 
conditioned mind that is formed by socially or culturally-oriented conceptual thoughts, 
we cultivate a capacity to engage in the collectively and habitually structured world 
(Wright, 1992).  
 
The conditioned mind constituted by social or cultural conceptual thoughts becomes a 
lens through which to choose aspects in the stream of human subjectivities, 
experiences and attitudes to construct the real (Streng, 1975). Put differently, the 
conditioned mind can be seen as “a power for assembling aspects of the flux of 
existence into patterns” (Streng, 1975: 431). Through the conditioned mind, human 
beings project socially or culturally patterned conceptual categories upon reality and 
make experience conform to their own conceptual systems (McEvilley, 1982). Based 
on those patterned views, human beings establish certain discourses on reality or on 
the contents of identity of one’s own group and others’ and certain patterns of 
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intergroup dynamics would be also created. In short, getting mind conditioned by 
social or cultural views or conceptual thought is essential for us to make sense of 
reality and acquire ways to think, behave and interact with other people in certain 
manner.   
 
Thus it can be posited that in Western conflict resolution, a main focus of analysis of 
mind has been the conditioned mind that is socially or culturally framed: Western 
understanding of psychological and subjective dynamics in conflict resolution has 
been established upon socially or culturally conditioned mind. In short, Western 
conflict resolution has presupposed conditionedness as mind’s essential nature.  
 
6-2-1-2 How can the conditioned mind become a cause of conflict? 
While appreciating that socially or culturally conditioned mind is essential to 
construct a meaningful life, Buddhist epistemology claims that the same conditioned 
mind can become a critical element that causes or protracts conflict. Therefore, a 
Buddhist epistemology makes a critical analysis of the potential danger of the 
conditioned mind in terms of how or when it can be a cause to arouse or make conflict 
intractable.  
 
From a Buddhist epistemological perspective, the conditioned mind can turn into a 
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cause of conflict when it gets absolutized and clung to as such: a potential danger of 
the socially or culturally conditioned mind can emerge when it gets consciously or 
unconsciously absolutized by extreme attachments. Once we have got minds 
conditioned by certain conceptual thoughts or views, we are inclined to cling to them 
as absolute and that results in fixating the real – objects, persons or groups of people, 
events and so on – with some supposedly unchanging or permanently lasting attributes 
or qualities (Chang, 1971). Due to an absolutization of and strong clinging to socially 
or culturally conditioned mind, sedimented and habitual ways of understanding the 
real are formed and come to limit the objects, people and other phenomena to a static 
essence with a fixed nature (Lipman, 1982).  
 
Buddhist epistemology argues that the absolutization of the conditioned mind and 
strong attachment to it accompanied by fixation of views of the real is connected to a 
human eagerness for the establishment of sense of security and stable sense of self or 
identity. According to Loy (2002: 8), security is “the conditions where we can live 
without care, where our life is not preoccupied with worrying about our life” and that 
entails stabilizing ourselves by controlling and fixating the real including ourselves 
with putatively fixed and unchanging attributes or qualities. Therefore, the fragility or 
instability of constructed identity or sense of self would be seen as a threat to security 
(mainly psychological or subjective sense of security) and consequently, establishing 
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identity by putting supposedly fixed or immutable attributes can come to be felt as 
crucial.  
 
Buddhist epistemology, while recognizing the importance of forming a sense of self or 
identity by getting mind conditioned by social or cultural conceptual thought or views, 
wants to reveal a negative side of that. As sense of self with the belief in fixed and 
unchanging nature or quality becomes strong and extreme, it tends to be imagined to 
be absolute and exclusive of other identities or views of identity (Ramanan, 1978) and 
can drive us to enact extreme behaviours towards others with distinct attributes of 
identity (Der-lan, 2006).  
 
Why can those extreme and exclusive phenomena occur? It can be attributed to a 
pattern of thought caused by an absolutization of and extreme attachment to the 
conditioned mind. An excessive attachment to our conceptual thought or view as 
absolute is inclined to turn into “accepting a dichotomy of either affirmation or 
negation as the standard for its modus operandi” (Nagatomo, 2000: 220). The 
“either-or” thought is a logical attitude that prioritizes one over the other and results in 
one-sidedness of absolutizing our own view and downplaying others (Nagatomo, 
2000). In other words, an extremely egocentric view emerging from an absolutization 
of and excessive attachment to our socially or culturally conditioned mind is prone to 
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make us criticize or attack different views possessed by others and avoid putting a 
critical eye upon or challenging our own view.  
 
What a Buddhist epistemology offers through its critical analysis of socially or 
culturally conditioned mind is not to negate the conditioned mind itself and the 
identity constructed by it. Rather, under a Buddhist epistemological critique, the 
conditioned mind itself can be seen as a cause of trouble if mistreated or misconstrued 
by those who have got their minds conditioned by certain conceptual thoughts or 
views. As examined, the conditioned mind, when absolutized and clung to as such, 
can have a negative impact upon our thoughts and behaviours towards others. 
Therefore, from a Buddhist epistemological critique of socially or culturally 
conditioned mind, it can be posited that when conflict occurs or becomes protracted or 
intractable, it is because that each group’s conditioned mind has got absolutized and 
clung to as such. As a consequence, each group’s view of the other becomes fixed and 
that makes it highly difficult not only to see the other differently, but also to engage in 
critiquing one’s own view. Consequently, that hampers constructive intergroup 
interaction or dialogue to explore the possibility of a peaceful relationship.  
 
As demonstrated in chapters 1, 2, and 3, contemporary conflict resolution established 
on Western epistemologies examines how negative feelings such as hatred, anger, and 
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antagonism and subjective phenomena such as prejudice and discriminatory attitudes 
towards different groups affect intergroup relationships. While it should be 
appreciated that this has made a significant contribution to analyzing psychological 
and subjective dynamics of conflict resolution, the introduction of Buddhist 
epistemology into Western conflict resolution enables us to step further to explore 
how those negative psychological and subjective phenomena can emerge. It is 
ascribed to a conscious or unconscious absolutization of socially/culturally 
conditioned mind. On this view, as a result of absolutization of and extreme 
attachment to socially/culturally built views, we are prone to fall into believing that 
they are objectively right and show negative feelings towards those who have different 
or opposing views as inferior or even threatening.  
 
Therefore, a critical point that Buddhist epistemological critique of the conditioned 
mind is how we can address the force of mind tied down to specific frameworks of 
ideology, cultural value, religious dogma, ethnic or racial values (Ichimura, 1997). A 
key to conflict resolution is a sustained criticism of the essentialist fallacy that makes 
us fixate views on the phenomenal world, which arises from an absolutization of our 
socially/culturally conditioned mind as our ultimate nature. In order to critique and 
challenge our own conditioned mind, Buddhist epistemology suggests that we need to 
explore a mind or mind-state that is not conditioned by social/cultural conceptual 
 338
thoughts or views.  
 
6-2-1-3 Unconditioned mind 
Although engagement in social/cultural conceptual thought is essential in order to 
construct a meaningful reality or make sense of the phenomenal world, the same 
conditioned mind can become a cause of conflict when mistakenly absolutized and 
clung to. As an antidote to address the potential danger of the conditioned mind, 
Buddhist epistemology proposes the idea of unconditioned mind.  
 
The unconditioned mind can be characterized as a mind-state that overcomes an 
absolutization of and extreme attachment to a particular conceptual thought or view by 
gaining an insight into social/cultural conditioning and consequently achieves a 
detached or non-abiding state that can save us from falling into dogmatism. From a 
Buddhist epistemological perspective, a root cause of absolutization of and extreme 
attachment to a particular view can be attributed to a lack of insight into conceptual 
thought. Therefore, by knowing an insight into socially/culturally constructed views in 
terms of how they are built or how they are related to other views including opposing 
ones, we can be given an opportunity to engage in a critical reflection on our 
socially/culturally conditioned mind. The unconditioned mind makes us realize that 
socially/culturally built views or discourses are actually relative to and rely on views 
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or discourses that they want to criticize or oppose as inferior or threatening.  
 
On a Buddhist epistemological view, by knowing the unconditioned nature of mind,  
we can be conscientized that we do not necessarily have to restrict ourselves to a 
particular social/cultural conceptual thought pattern (Murti, 1955). When we realize 
the unconditioned nature of mind, we will be able to avoid getting tied to any extreme 
egocentric or self-centered perspective (Blass, 1996) and be empowered to be open to 
others’ views to explore more inclusive and synthetic views.  
 
There might be various approaches to overcome extreme egocentric or self-centered 
views and promote intergroup communication and accordingly, the concept of 
unconditioned mind proposed here is not the only way. Nevertheless, by providing us 
with an insight into social/cultural conceptual thought in general, the unconditioned 
mind can enable us to engage in critical analysis of our own views from a deeper and 
more fundamental perspective.  
 
6-2-1-4 Analyzing how individuals with conditioned and unconditioned nature of 
mind can engage in conflict resolution 
What Buddhist epistemology claims is that social/cultural conditionedness is not the 
only disposition of individual human mind. While appreciating the conditioned nature 
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of mind, Buddhist epistemology suggests that there is also an unconditioned nature or 
side of individual human mind. What must be emphasized here is that the objective of 
showing different characters of human mind is not to judge which is superior as an 
approach to the phenomenal world. Rather, the main point is that individual human 
mind has both socially/culturally conditioned and unconditioned nature and when both 
are put together and appreciated, the potential of individuals in conflict resolution can 
be expanded.  
 
As critically examined throughout this dissertation, the main character of human mind 
in contemporary conflict resolution based on Western epistemologies is social/cultural 
engagement or conditionedness. In other words, the purview of individual human 
mind has been largely focused on its collective nature and this restriction of individual 
mind to socially/culturally conditioned nature has certain limitations in resolving 
conflict and transforming antagonistic inter-group relationships into peaceful and 
positive ones. 
 
As argued, since an absolutization of socially/culturally constructed views or 
discourses is a root cause of antagonistic and discriminatory intergroup relationships, 
those views prevalent in groups must be critiqued and transformed. However, if the 
nature of individual minds remain socially/culturally-oriented, through which those 
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views or discourses that give rise to negative intergroup relations and make conflict 
protracted or intractable are built, we would find it highly difficult to critique and 
transform them. From a Buddhist epistemological perspective, in order to critique 
socially/culturally constructed beliefs or discourses, we need to step outside them. In 
order to problematize socially/culturally framed views, individuals should be 
empowered with the potential or power to know that there is something wrong with 
dominant views or discourses and to transform them into more peaceful and 
harmonious ones that can be shared with other groups. In short, to critique and 
eventually transform socially/culturally constructed views that have become a cause of 
antagonistic intergroup relationships as a result of getting absolutized, transcendental 
mind or mind-state beyond social/cultural engagement need to be engaged.  
 
The unconditioned mind that Buddhist epistemology proposes is aimed at addressing 
socially/culturally built views, which cause negative feelings, subjectivities and 
antagonistic intergroup relations by knowing an insight into conceptual thoughts. In 
the middle of conflict or violence of any kind, each group believes that its own view is 
absolute and consequently fixed attributes or images are mutually projected and they 
believe that those attributes or natures, though they are essentially projections of their 
own subjectivities, are possessed by those who have got them projected. And these 
subjective phenomena must be exposed to critique and their ultimate unreality must be 
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known by those in conflict. The transcendental mind-state accompanied by an insight 
into conceptual thoughts can enable us to engage in critical analysis and 
transformation of erroneously absolutized views or discourses.  
 
One of the central elements of conflict resolution is transforming intergroup 
relationships: without transforming conflictual and antagonistic relationships into 
harmonious and cooperative ones, we cannot achieve lasting peace. This 
transformation entails changing views of one’s own group as well as of other groups. 
In order to transform antagonistic relations into peaceful ones, currently predominant 
discourses or views that frame ideas of one’s own group as well as of opposing groups 
must be critiqued and transformed by group itself. Transforming negative 
relationships into positive ones requires dialogical relation between/among opposing 
groups to explore views that can be shared across groups. However, what must be 
stressed here is that in order to promote dialogical intergroup relationships, reflective 
self-critique within each group needs to be enhanced.  
 
As Blackburn claims, people tend to shrug off or close their ears to criticism of their 
own views and believe that their values are essentially incommensurable and 
antithetical with those of others (1999). Once a certain discourse or view has been 
created and absolutized, it is prone to become a close circle and those who hold the 
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view can be primed to feel outraged by criticism or the questioning mind that casts a 
doubt upon the view (Blackburn, 1999), as a result which, transformation of one’s 
own view and promotion of constructive dialogical intergroup relationships is 
hampered. However, it is also clear that it is those who have got their minds 
conditioned with discourses or views prevalent in social/cultural groups themselves 
who can problematize and transform them. Therefore, individuals should be 
empowered to put a critical eye on their own groups’ dominant views that tend to be 
extremely self-centered and exclusive and individuals with unconditioned mind-state 
that makes them examine an insight into socially/culturally built views or discourses 
and realize an unreality to absolutize a particular view along with conditioned 
dimension of mind, can engage in a reflective self-awareness and critique of their own 
groups’ predominant views. Reflective self-awareness of our existing views or 
discourses can enable us to step back and to see our perspectives as distorted and 
consequently open the avenue to criticism (Blackburn, 1999), which can promote 
dialogical intergroup relations. 
 
Thus, from the viewpoint of a complementary relationship between Western 
epistemologies and Buddhist epistemology, to resolve conflict and transform negative 
and antagonistic intergroup relationships into positive and harmonious ones, mind or 
mind-state beyond social/cultural frameworks needs to be explored. However, this is 
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not a dismissal of socially/culturally engaged mind: what is proposed is that if 
individuals’ minds remain within the socially/culturally conditioned frameworks, it is 
almost impossible to for them to critique and transform them into more non-violent 
and inclusive ones. What is needed to empower individuals to engage in self-critique 
and open themselves actively to different or formerly opposing groups is the 
achievement of holistic consciousness or mind. Holistic mind consists of 
socially/culturally engaged mind that is necessary to make sense of reality plus 
transcendental mind, represented by the unconditioned mind, that transcends the 
social/cultural framework of mind to critically reflect absolutized socially/culturally 
built views. Holistic mind denotes a realization that everything is related to everything 
else by virtue of inter-relational origination (Matsuo, 1981) and that it is unreal or 
contradictory to absolutize our own view as self-evident or independently right. As a 
consequence of realizing the interdependent nature of conceptual thought and the 
ultimate unreality of absolutizing our view, we can be conscientized with a potential 
of creative and synthetic construction of discourses or views with other groups to 
broaden our views and explore harmonious intergroup relationships. The achievement 
of holistic consciousness or mind that seeks to overcome an extreme egocentric view 
shows that self-transcendence is one of the crucial keys to conflict resolution and 
transformation of negative intergroup relationships. Here, self-transcendence is not 
ontological but epistemological: as conscious or unconscious absolutization of our 
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socially/culturally conditioned mind and subsequent fixation of the phenomenal world 
with certain views or attributes cause antagonistic intergroup relations, expanding our 
view of reality must be explored by revealing the unreality of absolutization and 
fixation of our existing thought or thought mode. When we realize this, we can open 
ourselves to criticism constructively and be creative and inclusive in constructing new 
views or discourses.  
 
As conflict between/among groups is a collective phenomenon, intergroup or 
collective approach to resolution is crucial. However, unless individuals in each group 
are empowered to problematize thoughts or views that are prevalent in the group, 
collective violence cannot be addressed. The empowerment and qualitative 
enrichment of individuals in a group enable them to engage in self-critique and 
transform their thoughts, so that collective madness can be critiqued, sublimated and 
transformed into constructive dialogue.  
 
6-3 Reconfiguring key elements of psychological and subjective dynamics of 
Western conflict resolution 
In the previous section, the potential of individual agency in conflict resolution has 
been explored. By constructing a complementary relationship between Western 
epistemologies and Buddhist epistemology, we can establish a constructive view that 
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individual mind has both a socially/culturally-oriented nature and an unconditioned 
nature beyond social/cultural conditionedness and that they are not antithetical or 
incompatible. Further, individual agency with the unconditioned mind-state can 
engage in reflective self-critique of their own views or discourses on a deeper level 
and be open to more synthetic or inclusive views other groups.  
 
Based on this enhancement of the potential of individual agency, in this section, key 
elements of psychological and subjective dynamics of Western conflict resolution will 
be reconfigured. As discussed in chapter 3, cultural dynamics in the construction of 
human consciousness, social identity dynamics, and a critical approach to 
social/cultural construction of human subjectivity have assumed important roles in 
Western conflict resolution. So, they will be re-examined from an individual deep 
psychological viewpoint.  
 
6-3-1 Reconfiguring cultural analysis  
As generally recognized, culture has been one of the crucial elements in contemporary 
conflict resolution. Culture is a system of shared understandings and symbols of 
reality that connect us mutually and provide us with implicit guidance on the way to 
express ourselves and to make meaning in our lives (LeBaron, 2003). Culture 
constitutes our worldviews that provide foundational ideas of the meanings of life and 
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give us ways to learn as well as reasoning to order what we know (LeBaron, 2005). 
Further, culturally constructed worldviews are deeply embedded in our consciousness 
and frame our meaning-making and identities (LeBaron, 2003): culture plays a vital 
role in constructing our identity as it is forged through cultural groups and according 
to the cultural worldviews and patterns prevailing in those groups (Vayrynen, 2001). 
Thus, culture can be understood as what conditions our minds by forming our norms, 
values, worldviews and truths that are shared collectively, shaping our basic 
thought-mode in understanding reality.  
 
While it is essential to establish a meaningful reality and construct identity, culture can 
also cause conflict or violence. Culture, by providing us with basic components to 
make sense of reality including ourselves, constitutes a core of our social identity. This 
close link between culture and social identity can be interpreted that cultural 
differences between/among groups come to be seen as a threat to each other (Francis, 
2002) and they are prone to engage in conflict. From a cultural perspective, conflict 
can be considered as the struggle to impose one’s culturally established ideas of reality 
upon others, the central point of this struggle being whose culturally founded view of 
reality is taken seriously and appreciated (Vayrynen, 2001). Negative feelings such as 
hostility, anger, hatred or antagonism associated with conflict are awakened and 
exacerbated by cultural differences (Francis, 2002). Cultural difference, rather than 
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being a source or opportunity of enrichment of our own views, is a cause of mutual 
alienation, misunderstanding or misinterpretation, which arouses hostility, affront and 
antagonism (Francis, 2002) and can result in conflict or violence.  
 
From a deep psychological perspective shown in this chapter, cultural difference itself 
does not cause a sense of threat between/among distinct cultural groups. Rather, it can 
be ascribed to a conscious or unconscious absolutization of and extreme attachment to 
culturally conditioned mind. On this view, what should be highlighted in examining 
cultural dynamics in conflict resolution is how culturally conditioned mind itself is 
understood and treated. Since culture frames the way we think and behave, when our 
minds become culturally conditioned, the way we think is prone to be fixated. In 
conflictual situations, culturally conditioned mind is consciously or unconsciously 
absolutized and clung to, in which identifying others having different cultural views 
with negative or antagonistic characters or projecting negative or unacceptable parts 
of ourselves upon them becomes cultural habit (LeBaron, 2005) resulting in 
discriminatory attitudes or violence. Therefore, in order to resolve conflict, individual 
members need to overcome their own deeply habituated practice of seeing other 
cultural groups as inferior to their own (LeBaron, 2005). However, as in Western 
cultural dynamics of conflict resolution, individual minds are confined mainly to 
cultural conditionedness, how they can achieve what LeBaron suggests remains 
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unclear. So, empowerment of individual cultural members with the unconditioned 
state-of-mind allows them to engage in reflective self-awareness of their cultural 
dispositions and step outside their culturally habituated way of thought.   
 
In order to address the projection of negative feelings or perceptions upon other 
groups, it is crucial for those who have different culturally conditioned minds to 
promote mutual understanding and explore values that can be shared across groups. In 
other words, a new understanding or view of reality that can be shared needs to be 
constructed to explore a form of cooperation to transform conflictual relationship into 
harmonious one (Vayrynen, 2001). In order to achieve this mutually cooperative and 
transformative process, it becomes essential to contemplate and accept the idea of 
thinking and doing differently if past cycles of violence and systems of inequality and 
disadvantages that have arisen from a conscious or unconscious abstolutization of 
culturally constructed minds are to be broken (LeBaron, 2005).  
 
On a deep psychological view, individuals can be empowered to be aware that they do 
not have to confine themselves to one particular cultural mode of thought to approach 
the phenomenal world. Individual members with unconditioned mind-state can take a 
detached attitude towards their own existing cultural discourses or views (as they 
know those discourses or views are not absolute) and problematize them to explore 
 350
shared views with other cultural groups. It is through deepening awareness of our own 
cultural starting points and boundaries by critiquing them that we can appreciate and 
absorb richer understandings of other cultures (LeBaron, 2003).  
 
The process of being aware of our own cultural assumptions, understanding other 
culturally conditioned minds and absorbing other cultural views does not mean 
disregarding the culturally constructed self or completely abandoning our own cultural 
perspective (Broome, 1993). Rather, what should be stressed is that in resolving 
culturally caused conflict, it should be presupposed that human understanding is 
provisional, open to present and future change (Broome, 1993) and that one of the key 
factors to bridge cultural differences is creativity (LeBaron, 2003). Put differently, our 
horizons of understanding should not be confined to our own cultural dimensions: 
what should be conscientized in promoting inter-cultural communication to resolve 
conflict is that though it is indispensable, individual mind should not be confined to 
culturally conditioned state. Through the unconditioned side of their own minds, 
members of a cultural group can make a critical reflection on their own cultural views 
from a deeper perspective, which will be the first step towards constructive dialogue 
with other cultural groups.  
 
Further, as LeBaron highlights, in order to address culturally-oriented conflict, cultural 
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members should be aware that culture is “neither a fixed entity nor an insurmountable 
barrier” (2005: 18). Rather, it should be recognized as a process; and this idea of 
culture as a process is crucial to resolve conflict and transform violent relationships 
into peaceful ones. The unconditioned mind can be of help in making us aware of 
culture as a process. The idea of culture as a process can be understood as being that 
our way of thought is in constant change. When cultural members are conscientized of 
an unconditioned side of mind, they come to know that they do not have to cling to a 
particular view as fixed or permanent and obtain a non-abiding state. Consequently, 
they can be empowered to engage in constant critique of existing cultural views or 
values and exploration to create new views or visions of culture since they have come 
to be aware that they do not have to confine themselves to certain cultural view as 
unchanging or permanently true.  
 
It is clear that the culturally conditioned mind and the unconditioned mind are not 
antithetical or incompatible. When we simultaneously know the culturally conditioned 
side and the unconditioned dimensions of our own minds, we can be make a room in 
our minds to problematize and critique existing cultural views framing the way we 
think and behave and to be open to other views to enrich our own culture. In short, 
when we are conscious of the unconditioned nature of mind, we will be able to get our 
minds culturally conditioned in qualitatively richer, more inclusive and synthetic 
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manner than ever before.  
 
6-3-2 Re-examining Social identity  
Social identity is the connection of the individuals’ knowledge of belonging to a 
certain social group and to the emotional and evaluated signification that arises from 
that belonging (Deschamps and Devos, 1998). As Jussim et al argue, social identity 
consists of two elements: “belief that one belongs to a group and the importance of 
that group membership to one’s self” (2001: 6). Identity is the way we demarcate and 
make sense of ourselves, which involves setting a boundary between what we are and 
what we are not, establishing the others and marking out their differences (Crossley, 
2005). In typifying the world in terms of the division of the subject or “us” and others 
or “them”, social identity functions as a means to frame interactions by which 
differences and similarities are constructed and conceived (Jeong and Vayrynen, 1999). 
Thus a core of construction of social identity is a division between “us” and “them”, 
through which to define who we are.  
 
Construction of identity is a subjective phenomenon. Although social identity is an 
existential matter, establishment of it is closely connected to our subjective condition 
or framework: the way we understand reality through certain conceptual thoughts or 
views plays the central role in creating our identity. A combination of myths, 
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memories, values and symbols (Kaufman, 2006a) or sociocultural discourses (Jussim 
et al, 2001) characterizes identity. These symbolic orders are in essence socially or 
culturally constructed, constitute a primary part of the practical consciousness of 
socially or culturally situated individuals (Jabri, 1996) and form our social identity. In 
short, social identity can be understood as the conditioned mind shaped by social or 
cultural conceptual thoughts. By consciously or unconsciously accepting having our 
minds conditioned by socially or culturally constructed norms, values, worldviews and 
truths, our social identity comes to be defined and secured.  
 
One of the most important and generally recognized approaches in examining social 
identity and conflict dynamics is social identity theory that analyzes the psychological 
dynamism between/among different social identity groups. According to the theory, 
human cognition essentially requires us to differentiate our own social identity group 
positively from other groups (Hepburn, 2003). Deschamps and Devos argue that social 
identity theory is established upon two elements: cognition and motivation (1998). It 
is cognitive as the categorization process, in which we differentiate from others, come 
to overestimate intergroup differences and to underestimate ingroup differences and it 
is motivational as what drives differentiation and discrimination is the need for 
self-esteem or self-respect (1998). Accordingly, as Brewer and Gaertner aruge, there 
can be three generally seen features of intergroup schema: “assimilation within 
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category boundaries and contrast between categories such that all members of the 
ingroup are perceived to be more similar to the self than members of the outgroup; 
positive affect selectively generalized to fellow ingroup members but not outgroup 
members (the ingroup favouritism principle); and intergroup social comparison 
associated with perceived negative interdependence between ingroup and outgroup 
(the social competition principle)” (2003: 456). These characteristics demonstrate that 
there is a causal nexus between intergroup discrimination and promotion of 
self-esteem (Brown, 2001). As part of our self-esteem derives from the group to which 
belong, it is believed that making comparisons that favour and prioritize the ingroup 
over the outgroup and discrimination against them will lead to enhancement of our 
own social identity and self-esteem (Stephan and Stephan, 1996).  
 
As perceived differences between the ingroup and the outgroup are exaggerated while 
ingroup differences are minimized, the multiple identities of individuals come to be 
dominated by one certain identity (Jabri, 1996), which results in establishing a firm 
boundary of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. Consequently, difference of social 
identity could be a cause of conflict (Black, 2003) as intergroup prejudice and hostility, 
which have arisen from homogenous view of the ingroup, exaggeration of difference 
of the outgroup and the ingroup favouritism over the outgroup to raise the ingroup’s 
identity, make us more likely to see other groups as threatening and have sense of 
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insecurity (Kaufman, 2001). Under these conditions, distorted views of other groups 
are prone to be maintained and discriminatory and unequal policies can be committed. 
These vicious or spiral cycles of mutual projection of negative feelings and 
discriminatory attitudes and policies make conflict protracted and intractable.  
 
As Jabri argues, the way to resolve conflict that has been caused or made intractable 
by social identity is by achieving multiple identities of individuals (1996). Resolution 
of conflict caused or protracted by a fixation of social identity can be promoted by the 
critical analysis of narrowly defined identity and exploration of alternative 
possibilities which can disturb antagonistic inter-group identity (Jeong and Vayrynen, 
1999). Jeong and Vayrynen claim that possibilities for transformation of identity lie in 
the fact that the boundaries of identity are not fixed and can be open to new meanings 
and perspectives and therefore overcoming the existing dichotomy between 
inclusiveness and exclusiveness defined in antagonistic terms can be within reach 
(1999). From a deep psychological viewpoint, approaching multiplicity of identity and 
constructing more inclusive identities to break through antagonistic discourses on 
identity requires individual members to transcend socially conditioned or restricted 
view of identity of their own and of opposing groups and here, empowerment of 
individual members with unconditioned nature can be of help to make them critically 
challenge their own identities that are essentially intersubjectively constructed. 
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As shown, from a deep psychological perspective, a core of social identity is the 
conditioned mind constituted by social or cultural conceptual thoughts and it can turn 
into a cause of conflict when it gets absolutized and clung to. Therefore, it can be 
argued that in order to critique and transform existing social identity or discourses on 
identity, individual minds tied down to a particular mind-state need to be transcended: 
to be critical and transformative in reconstructing social identity, individual 
mind-states beyond social restriction need to be made more deeply self-aware. 
 
When the unconditioned nature is realized in addition to conditioned nature,  
individuals can attain a detached or non-abiding attitude towards their own existing 
social identities. As a result of knowing unconditioned nature, individuals are 
empowered to realize that existing social identities are not their own ultimate and 
unchanging nature. This detached and non-abiding state of mind can empower 
individual members to be more creative, inclusive and synthetic in thought as they 
have known that they do not have to confine themselves to one specific view or way 
of thought. This nature of unconditioned mind can help us promote multiplicity of 
identity. Since the nature of social identity is subjective, engaging in critical and 
transformative analysis of existing social identity requires us to be self-critical or 
self-reflective in terms of how our fixated view or thought can be broken to know our 
ways of thought are diverse or multiple. Put another way, when individuals are aware 
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that they do not have to be shackled to a particular view that shapes existing social 
identity, they can be empowered to construct diverse social identities as we know that 
their ways of thought are actually multiple. When individuals are aware that their 
unconditioned nature that empowers them to be reflectively self-critical of discourses 
or views of their own existing social identity on a deeper dimension, they can realize 
an unreality to absolutize their current identity and open themselves to exploring 
multiple identities that can be shared with formerly opposing groups.  
 
6-3-3 Complementing critical epistemology  
One of the most intellectually significant points of critical epistemology is its 
understanding of knowledge as a process not as a substance. Critical epistemology 
casts a critical eye on our taken-for-granted views on the real or phenomena including 
ourselves (Burr, 2003) as there is no fixed or unchanging relationship between 
signifiers and signified. Rather, the relationship is a contingent social or cultural 
convention that is in constant change (Baronov, 2004). Put differently, fluidity, 
unstableness or indeterminacy of socially or culturally constructed knowledge are 
emphasized (Gough and McFadden, 2001): construction of knowledge is never 
complete and is inevitably open to revision.  
 
However, there are certain problems in critical epistemology itself in achieving its 
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own aim, that is, engaging in a constant critique of existing knowledge and making 
construction of knowledge an ever-lasting intellectual enterprise. Firstly, the generally 
agreed problem is the death of the subject where individual agency can be 
conceptualized only as the result of discourses in society and social structures, the 
implication of which is that the “individual person, either alone or collectively, has no 
capacity to bring about change” (Burr, 2003: 23). In other words, although critique 
and transformation of socially or culturally constructed knowledge is the core of 
critical epistemology, a qualitative empowerment of individual agency that is 
supposed to challenge and eventually change existing discourses and social structures 
has remained underdeveloped. Second, while it claims that existing discourses that 
have been constructed can be changed, critical epistemology tends to stop at the point 
of fear of reifying alternative constructions and consequently limits its action to 
deconstructing existing discourses without taking proactive efforts to construct new 
discourses or modes of thought (Burr, 1998). So, critical epistemology, while aiming 
at critiquing and transforming existing socially or culturally constructed discourses 
into new ones, has become bogged down into a mere scepticism and is forced to deny 
the possibility of proposing alternative systems of thought (Butler, 2002). In short, 
although some notion of a creative subjectivity should be presupposed to undertake a 
critique and transformation of existing knowledge (Torffing, 1999), as it has barely 
delved into the potential of individual mind, critical epistemology seems to have failed 
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to consummate its intellectual goal.  
 
From an individual deep psychological viewpoint, a fatal problem or limitation of 
critical epistemology is that even if it insists that discourses on phenomena such as 
identities, social or even global structures are socially or culturally constructed, 
contingent and accordingly subject to critique and transformation, an actual critique 
and transformation would be highly difficult as long as individual agency in 
social/cultural group are tied to social/cultural conditionedness.  
 
In order to problematize socially or culturally constructed conceptual thoughts or 
discourses, individuals in social/cultural group need to know that there is something 
wrong with them. However, if their minds remain conditioned in a socially or 
culturally deterministic way, it would be almost impossible to make a critical and 
transformative analysis of existing social or cultural views that condition their minds. 
Put another way, it is crucial for individual agencies to be able to access a 
transcendental mind-state that is beyond socially/culturally determined nature to step 
outside the socially/culturally constructed discourses or views and critique and 
transform them. Individuals with the unconditioned nature of their minds can 
penetrate into an ultimate unreality to absolutize any socially/culturally built views 
including existing one and engage in active deconstruction of socially constructed 
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discourses or views and exploration of alternative ones.  
 
Proposing the unconditioned mind as the means to address potential limitations of 
critical epistemology does not purport to negate the spirit of critical epistemology, that 
is, challenging and transforming discourses or views that produce or constitute 
asymmetric relations in society. Instead, by establishing a complementary relationship 
between critical epistemology and the concept of unconditioned mind to overcome 
potential limitations or contradictions of critical epistemological understandings of 
individual agency, the spirit of critical epistemology becomes better placed to achieve 
its goal.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has been devoted to exploring an expansion of the framework of 
contemporary conflict resolution by constructing a complementary relationship 
between Western epistemologies and Buddhist epistemology. As a result of 
introducing Buddhist epistemology into socially-oriented Western conflict resolution 
and establishing their complementary relationship, our understanding of psychological 
dynamics of conflict and conflict resolution has been deepened and expanded.  
 
Since conflict resolution is a complex and multi-faceted enterprise in line with what it 
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perceives to be the often complex and multi-faceted causes of conflict, it would be 
absurd to claim that an expansion of understanding of human mind made as a result of 
a complementary relationship between Western epistemologies and Buddhist 
epistemology is a panacea for all conflicts. However, it is also true that as long as 
conflict entails human beings, human subjectivity has a huge impact on conflict 
dynamics. Therefore, we need to keep deepening our view of human mind as 
psychological and subjective dynamics in conflict is complex and multi-faceted. This 
dissertation has argued the importance of broadening our view of human mind, which 
will be a steppingstone to the further development or evolution of the conflict 
resolution enterprise.  
 
Research Implications 
Although this chapter has been devoted to deepening and broadening psychological 
and subjective dynamics of conflict resolution through a complementary relationship 
between Western epistemologies and Buddhist epistemology, this research is far from 
comprehensive and has intellectual limitations, from which, though, we can explore 
implications for further research. The main theme of this dissertation has been an 
epistemological analysis of contemporary conflict resolution and exploring how the 
framework of contemporary conflict resolution enterprise can be broadened when 
Western epistemologies and Buddhist epistemology build a complementary 
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relationship. Establishment of a complementary relationship between them has led to 
the expansion of our understanding of human mind and enlarged the potential of 
individuals in resolving conflict and exploring positive and peaceful intergroup 
relations. However, from the perspectives of theory construction and introduction of 
practical methods to engage in actual conflict resolution, this dissertation is far from 
enough. 
 
This chapter has shown a complementary relationship between Western 
epistemologies and Buddhist epistemology in expanding our view of human mind, in 
which the concepts of socially/culturally conditioned mind and the unconditioned 
mind have been proposed; critical analysis of the potential danger of the conditioned 
mind that has assumed the central role in Western conflict resolution has been made; 
and significance of the unconditioned mind has been explored. Further, following the 
proposition that our mind has both social/cultural conditioned nature and 
unconditioned nature beyond a social/cultural framework, key elements of 
psychological and subjective dynamics of contemporary conflict resolution – culture, 
social identity, and critical approach to social/cultural construction of human 
subjectivity – have been re-examined from the viewpoints of conditioned mind and 
unconditioned mind. However, it should be also acknowledged that how what has 
been discussed in this chapter can be applied to actual conflict resolution remains 
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unclear. On an epistemological level, Western conflict resolution and Buddhism can 
have a complementary relationship, which can lead to the expansion of our view of 
human mind and dynamics of conflict resolution, but, on more concrete theoretical 
and praxis levels, more elaboration must be made to give practical expression to what 
has been proposed in this chapter.   
 
As demonstrated in the Chapters one, two and three, Western conflict resolution has 
advanced concrete theories and methods of conflict resolution, which has made an 
invaluable contribution to the development of the conflict resolution enterprise as a 
whole. Contrary to that, this dissertation has not yet done so. Therefore, what should 
be explored following this dissertation is an examination of what has been analyzed in 
this chapter in order to construct more practical theories and methods for conflict 
resolution. For instance, how psychological and subjective dynamics of contemporary 
conflict resolution in the Chapters one, two, and three can be reconfigured from the 
viewpoints of this chapter would be a good research agenda for the future conflict 
resolution endeavour. As shown, contact hypothesis and social identity theory/social 
categorization theory have assumed a central role in approaching intergroup relations. 
These theories can be re-examined by adding the ideas of the conditioned mind and 
the unconditioned mind. We might be able to reconfigure even reconciliation by 
analyzing it from the vista of two dimensions of mind.  
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One of the topics that have been underdeveloped in socially-oriented contemporary 
conflict resolution is how individual agency can engage in a qualitative self-reflexivity 
or critique in resolving conflict. The introduction of (individual) deep psychology 
provides an insight into social/cultural construction of views or discourses in terms of 
how it can be a root cause of conflict and how it can be addressed and empowers 
individual agency to make a reflective self-critique of his/her own views and 
discourses on a deeper and more profound level and achieve self-transformation. This 
does not mean to dismiss or impair social psychological approaches to understanding 
conflict dynamics and resolution. Rather, what must be highlighted here is that, by 
integrating social psychology into a broader and deeper spectrum of human 
psychology, new dimensions can be added to social psychology itself, which would 
enable us to analyze social psychological approaches to conflict resolution represented 
by contact hypothesis and social identity theory/social categorization theory from 
different angles.   
 
There is one more point that should be discussed for the future peace research 
including conflict resolution. This dissertation has demonstrated that a complementary 
or synthetic relationship between different epistemological assumptions can enrich 
and broaden our understanding of conflict resolution, which allows us to add new 
prospects to the conflict resolution enterprise. As critically examined in the third 
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chapter, Western epistemologies, while having developed psychological and 
subjective dynamics, have confined the nature of human mind to social/cultural 
engagement or conditionedness, leaving an analysis of how individuals can critique 
and transform collectively construct views or discourses underdeveloped. Buddhist 
epistemology, on the other hand, critically examines how socially/culturally 
conditioned mind becomes a cause of trouble and how it can be tackled, which 
eventually seeks to achieve mind that transcends social/cultural condition. Further, it 
has been posited that socially/culturally-oriented mind and a transcendental mind are 
not antithetical or incompatible: rather, they are interdependent and when we realize 
both as nature of our mind, the psychological and subjective dynamics of conflict and 
conflict resolution become qualitatively richer and deeper. This is an example of how 
constructing a complementary relationship between different epistemologies can 
complement each other’s limitations or deficiencies they face in approaching the 
phenomenal world alone and this has an interesting implication for the future of peace 
research.  
 
Those who engage in intellectual endeavour take a certain epistemological stance and 
construct a distinct view or discourse on the subject of which they make an analysis. 
Doubtless, this is a natural phenomenon in intellectual or academic enterprises. 
However, the discourse established on a particular epistemological viewpoint tends to 
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be intraparadigmatic and avoids engagement with alternative epistemological and 
theoretical formulations (Jarvis, 2000). This is not a dismissal of taking a certain 
epistemological stance itself. Rather, this dissertation posited that while having a 
particular epistemological perspective is important and advantageous, it can also 
restrict our scope of thought, narrow down our vision and fall into dogmatism. 
Therefore, what is proposed for the future peace research is that the potential merit of 
opening ourselves to appreciating different or opposing epistemologies and exploring 
a complementary or synthetic relationship with them to create new views should be 
actively examined.  
 
As this research has shown, each epistemological assumption has weaknesses or 
limitations as well as strengths and advantages in approaching the phenomenal world. 
We should engage in reflective self-awareness and critique of our own epistemological 
viewpoint with regard to its possible limitations. Once we have established an 
epistemological foundation and concepts and views to examine the phenomenal world, 
we are prone to be unaware of them. They become our habit. However, as Blackburn 
asserts, human beings are “relentlessly capable of reflecting on themselves” (1999: 4). 
Reflective self-awareness and critique of our own normally unnoticed or tacit 
epistemological assumption and theories and practical methods built on it and 
transcending an attachment to a particular epistemological viewpoint as a result of 
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reflective self-critique will allow us to be creative to explore complementary or 
synthetic relationship between different epistemologies and create new views or 
theoretical perspectives. Promotion of proactive inter-epistemological dialogue along 
with reflective self-critique of our epistemological standpoint will have a positive 
impact on conflict resolution in the context of this dissertation but also on peace 
research in general in the long run.  
 
Exploring new epistemological views by constructing a complementary or 
interdependent relationship between different or seemingly opposing epistemological 
assumptions might be seen as a utopian idealism. However, as Thompson asserts, 
“each generation of philosophers has examined established ideas, and by showing 
their limitations, has been able to formulate new ones” (2000: 9), which must be true 
with intellectual or academic endeavour as a whole including peace research. Critical 
self-examinations are an essential part of any disciplinary or intellectual enterprise 
(Jarvis, 2000): by putting a critical eye on existing and prevailing assumptions in 
intellectual or academic enterprise, we should seek to address problems facing us with 
fresh views. No one knows what will happen to the future intellectual enterprise: or, 
rather, we need to construct the direction of it. When we see ourselves through critical 
self-reflection, we can attain control over the direction in which we would wish to 
move to make a better world (Blackburn, 1999). As Jarvis states, intellectual 
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innovations are always controversial and the seeding of new ideas is always derided as 
unrealistic or untimely, but it requires time to germinate and grow and mature (2000). 
As long as a critical attitude towards status quo is the fundamental and foundational 
spirit of peace research, critical and transformative endeavour to create new theories 
and approaches to praxis will never be exhausted 
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